

Social accountability
perspectives and practices
in East Asia and the Pacific

CAMBODIA INDONESIA
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Indonesia

Social
accountability
stocktaking
reports



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PREFACE

In November and December 2010, with the support of The Affiliated Network for Social Accountability-East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP), INSIST Yogyakarta conducted a mapping study on Social Accountability (SAC) in Indonesia. The objectives of the study were to review existing policies, regulations, and guidelines pertaining social accountability and to draw a map of current social accountability practices in Indonesia as well as for use as baseline data on SAC related studies.

It is expected that through this report the reader will gain valuable information about the SAC policy support system including mechanisms and activities and comprehensive map of social accountability thinking, concepts, and practices in Indonesia as well as the challenges to advance the implementation of these policies towards improving the accountability of public agencies and officials in Indonesia. INSIST welcomes feedback and comments to improve the analysis and the knowledge on SAC in Indonesia.

*Indonesian Society for Social Transformation (INSIST)
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ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

ACSI	Active Society Institute
BAPPEDA	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Local (Provincial/ District) Development Planning Agency)
BAPPENAS	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Agency for Development Planning Agency)
BNPB	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National Board for Disaster Management)
CRC	Community Report Card
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Local House of Representatives)
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
FIK ORNOP Sulse	Network of NGOs of South Sulawesi
FITRA	Forum Indonesia untuk Transparansi Anggaran (Indonesia Forum for Budget Transparency)
FPRB	Forum Pengurangan Risiko Bencana (Forum for Disaster Risk Reduction)
IWC	Islamic Women Studies
KOPEL	Komite Pemantau Legislatif (Legislative Watch Committee)
KPI	Komisi Penyiaran Independen (Independent Broadcasting Commission)
KPRM	Komite Perjuangan Rakyat Miskin (Poor People's Struggle Committee)
LBH	Legal Assistance Organization
MBO	Moslem-based organization
Musrenbang	Musyawaharah Perencanaan Pembangunan (Development Planning Consultation Meeting)
PERAM	Posko Pengaduan Rakyat Miskin (Complaint Centers for the Poor)
PFM	Public Financial Management
PME	Perencanaan, Monitoring, dan Evaluasi (Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation)
PNPM	Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National Program for Community Empowerment)
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
SAC	Social Accountability



SKPD	Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah (Local Government Unit)
RPJP	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang (Long-term development planning)
RPJM	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (Mid-term development planning)
TAc	Transparency and Accountability (Transparansi dan Akuntabilitas)
TAF	The Asia Foundation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WALHI	Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (The Indonesian Forum for Environment)
YPSHK	Yayasan Pengembangan Study Hukum & Kebijakan



GLOSSARY OF BAHASA TERMS

Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB)	National Board for Disaster Management
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (BAPPEDA)	Local (Provincial/District) Development Planning Agency
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS)	National Agency for Development Planning Agency
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD)	Local House of Representatives
Forum Indonesia untuk Transparansi Anggaran (FITRA)	Indonesia Forum for Budget Transparency
Forum Pengurangan Risiko Bencana (FPRB)	Forum for Disaster Risk Reduction
Kelurahan	Village
Komisi Penyiaran Independen (KPI)	Independent Broadcasting Commission
Komite Pemantau Legislatif (KOPEL)	Legislative Watch Committee
Komite Perjuangan Rakyat Miskin (KPRM)	Poor People's Struggle Committee
Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (Musrenbang)	Development Planning Consultation Meeting
Perencanaan, Monitoring, dan Evaluasi (PME)	Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation
Posko Pengaduan Rakyat Miskin (PERAM)	Complaint Centers for the Poor
Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM)	National Program for Community Empowerment
Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (RPJM)	Mid-term development planning
Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang (RPJP)	Long-term development planning
Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah (SKPD)	Local Government Unit
Tranparansi dan Akuntabilitas	Transparency and Accountability
Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI)	The Indonesian Forum for Environment

THE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Social accountability has been practiced in Indonesia since decentralization took place soon after the so-called Reformation Era in 1998. At that time, the label had yet to be invented and introduced worldwide.

Initially, Local Government Law No. 22 (Year 1999), Fiscal Relations Law (No. 25, Year 1999), and Clean and Good Governance Practice Law (No. 28, Year 1999) constituted the legal framework and mechanisms for community participation and empowerment in government activities. On the civil society's side, a local network alliance on budget transparency, called Forum Indonesia untuk Transparansi Anggaran (FITRA), was founded to increase people's awareness of their rights regarding budget process and to encourage practices to promote accountability and improve the quality of public services.

Since then, social accountability practices have been expanded and enhanced to include various areas and issues as initiated by, either government, or citizen groups. The donor community has, likewise, played a big role in advancing the agenda of good governance and social accountability in Indonesia. A multi-donor organization for governance reform called Kemitraan or Partnership for Governance Reform was established with managerial support from UNDP Indonesia to link civil society initiatives and the government development planning process.

A few studies on particular social accountability issues or cases had been conducted in the past, though a comprehensive study of the social



accountability situation in Indonesia (that will portray the current situation of social accountability practices including the actors, their initiatives, the gaps between documented policies and practices, and recommendations) has yet to be done. Among these was a study on participatory planning and budgeting in Solo City, where the local government (Mayor and Bappeda), civil society organizations (CSOs), and people worked together to create better conditions for their city. Another study tackled accountability in the education sector of Jembrana, Bali, where the local government capitalized on the efficiency of participatory budget management. This resulted to free education for elementary and high school students of Jembrana. Another study, conducted by Sirker and Cosic (2007), investigated social accountability practices of FITRA in budget analysis and expenditure tracking, and of Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia in participatory gender budget formulation and gender budget analysis. The study covered the scope and development of initiatives, objectives, tools and approaches, partners and stakeholders, resources, constraints and problems, outputs, as well as mechanisms for institutionalization, replication and scaling up of these citizen groups' efforts.

Generally social accountability mechanisms can be applied in four key functions of government: (1) policies and plans, (2) budgets and expenditures, (3) delivery of goods and services, and (4) public oversight. Among these functions, social accountability in Indonesia is most effectively exercised in budgeting and public spending (Malena, 2004). In this function, social accountability is integrated into Public Financial Management (PFM) cycle that covers development planning, budgeting, expenditure tracking, and performance monitoring and evaluation.

This study will focus on social accountability tools for PFM that include participatory planning, participatory budgeting, participatory expenditure tracking, and public monitoring and evaluation on government performance. It will also look into the dynamics between the supply side and demand side of social accountability, given the fact that synergistic action between the two is essential for the enhancement of social accountability practices.

The study will also explore the interface between the citizen groups' knowledge on the policy-making process and knowledge flow in the government's policy-making process.



Indonesia

In the past ten years, Indonesia has seen dramatic reforms in its public policy, covering a diverse range of policy arenas—economic, fiscal management, banking etc. The reforms are complex, interrelated and consequential. However, many policy changes are perceived to have been developed too quickly and with insufficient participation from citizen groups, who were only allowed to participate as a matter of procedure. The more sound reforms have been due, in large part, to inputs from international technical assistance. Social accountability principles require the use of evidence and analysis in order to improve the quality and implementation of policies. To accomplish this, the Indonesian society needs an enhanced capacity to analyze and understand complex problems, the



SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDONESIA: A POLICY REVIEW

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Reform in Indonesia brought two significant changes in governance—democratization and decentralization. Democratization allowed more voice and participation in governance and decision-making through legislations intended to empower civil society. Decentralization brought decision-making on development and finance matters closer to the people. Democratization and decentralization were the precursors of social accountability in Indonesia.

Freedom of Information Law

The New Order Regime under Soeharto nullified the freedom of information and expression stipulated in the 1945 Constitution and in other laws. Information was systematically hidden from the public and any attempt by citizens to disclose it merited sanctions and punishment. Journalists and citizens also could not report the outcome of their journalistic investigations since the government did not think twice about assaulting those who dared to tell the “truth”.

The situation began to change when Soeharto slid down from power and the Reformation Era emerged. As President Habibie and, later, Abdurrahman Wahid led the nation towards democracy, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began to proliferate, lending their voices to the growing clamor for good governance. Good governance, as the NGOs perceived it, required the free flow of information, and there was no legislation guaranteeing freedom of information at that time.

In 2000, the civil society movement pressed for the enactment of a law to establish freedom of information in Indonesia. The Indonesian Center for Environmental Law drafted the Freedom of Information Bill. This move was complemented by the establishment of the Coalition on Freedom of Information, a coalition of 30 NGOs and some individuals who banded



together to support the passage of the bill. The coalition submitted the draft to the Commission 1 of the House of Representatives for review in 2002.

After eight years of drafting and deliberation spanning three administrations, the Indonesian House of Representatives finally passed the Freedom of Information bill, also known as Law No. 14/2008 on Public Freedom of Information in May 2008. It compelled the government to disclose information that affected public interest, including information related to state companies.

The passage of the bill into law has enhanced Indonesia's image as a democratic country. It expresses Indonesia's recognition of Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinion without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." It is also in compliance with Article 28F of the Amended 1945 Constitution, which states: "Everybody has the right to communicate and the right to inform, to develop his or her personal and social environment, and has the right to seek, receive, possess, keep, develop and give the information by any means."

From the perspective of civil society organizations, the law is an assurance of freedom to obtain transparency and accountability from government. The law does not consider civil society as passive actor; instead, it invites civil society to actively engage in governance activities. As stipulated in article 3b and c, the law seeks to "encourage public participation in policy-making and good administration of public institutions". Therefore, civil society organizations can participate in policy-making and public financial management especially in monitoring government spending, public officials' performance, and delivery of goods and services.

From the point of view of journalists, the law means a further guarantee of press freedom in addition to Law No.40/1999 on Freedom of the Press. With its passage, journalists anticipated greater freedom to obtain information from government, which would help them in writing investigative reports on government activities. Article 35 of the Freedom of



Information Law allows journalists to take legal action against officials who refuse to provide the requested information.

The Freedom of Information Law has been regarded, not only by civil society organizations and the press but also by the government, as a deterrent to chronic corruption at all levels of government. It has been a widely recognized fact that corruption happens when people are not privy to information about various aspects of government transactions such as the range of services, terms of payment, proper mechanisms, rights and responsibilities of parties involved, etc. When information is available and accurate, chances for corruption are diminished.

Freedom of the Press

Law No.40/1999 on Freedom of the Press is closely related to the Freedom of Information Law. Before it was enacted, members of the Indonesian press were not free to express their honest opinions, much more to disseminate information related to government issues. Censorship was high and any breach on restrictions imposed on the press led to punishment. During the New Order Era, the government withdrew more than 25 press licenses. One of the most popular incidents was the banning of Tempo Magazine in 1994.

The enactment of the press law transformed the government's way of treating the press. At present, the government's respect for freedom of the press has improved. The assurance given by the law itself provides democratic spaces. One important feature of the law is its protection of the press based on the sovereignty of people, and the principles of democracy, justice, and human rights.

Freedom of the Press also provides for:

- No prior censorship for print and broadcast media – Article 4(2).
- The right to seek, acquire, and disseminate ideas and information – Article 4(3).
- Protection of journalists where they are free to join journalists' associations – Article 7(1).
- The right of citizens to establish a press company or news agency – Article 9(1) and 13.



Decentralization

Among the fundamentals of social accountability in Indonesia are the policies related to decentralization and democratization, since these are correlated to the more direct forms of participation in public financial management (i.e. participatory development planning and budgeting).

One of the policies related to decentralization is Law 22/99 with its superseding revisions of Law 32/2004 on Regional/Local Governance. It grants power and authority to regional/local governments over a number of sectors. It is guided by the principle of public participation in the arrangement, allocation, and utilization of national resources.

In relation to civic engagement, it cites the word “community participation” in local government activities in articles 150, 151, and 199. It stipulates that

...local government, who regulates and administers its own governance according to autonomy and co-administration principles, is aimed to accelerate accomplishment of community welfare through community enhancement, service, empowerment, and participation.

The policy related to local finance is Law No.25/1999, which was replaced by Law No.33/2004 on the Fiscal Balance between National and Regional/Local Government. The law comes as a consequence of task sharing between the national and regional/local governments as stipulated in Law No.32/2004. Essentially, it devolves authority to the regional/local government in terms of financial management, which is comprised of financial authorization, planning, monitoring, allocation, and distribution. The policy on local financial management is strengthened by Law No.17/2003.

Article 150 of Law No.32/2004 mentions that development planning consists of (1) long-term development planning (RPJP), (2) mid-term development planning (RPJM), and (3) local development planning. Likewise, it stipulates that the direction of local finance should be in line with the mid-term development plan. It implies that planning and budgeting are inseparable since a plan always comes with a budget. In the context of



national and local government, Figure 1 describes the relationship between development planning and budgeting.

Figure 1. Relationship between development planning and budgeting.



Participatory Planning and Budgeting

Law No.32/2004 mentions citizen participation in development planning and budgeting but it does not describe the terms of participation in detail. A more direct and detailed description on participatory development planning and budgeting, especially at the regional/local level is contained in Law No.25/2004. This law created and established mechanisms for the institutionalization of the Musyarawah Perencanaan Pembangunan (*musrenbang*), a multi-stakeholder consultation forum, at all levels of government over long-term (RPJP), mid-term (RPJM), and annual (Rencana Tahunan) timeframes. It also emphasized the need to synchronize all approaches—political, democratic, participatory, bureaucratic, technical, bottom-top, and top-bottom—into regional planning.

The State Minister for National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) and Home Ministry issued Joint Ministerial Decree No.1354/M.PPN/03/2004



and 050/744/SJ on the Guidelines for the Implementation of Musrenbang and Local Participatory Planning. The guidelines established spaces for public participation in planning and budgeting and regulated entry points into these processes. These decrees also provided guiding principles on how *musrenbang* forums should be convened at different levels. In 2007, the government issued the Joint Ministerial Decree No.0008/M.PPN/01/2007 and 050/264A/SJ on the Technical Directives for the Convening of Musrenbang, which set new procedures, processes, and mechanisms. These, likewise, incorporated more principles and requirements such as flexibility, inclusivity, gender responsiveness, the need for organizations to possess competency in participation skills, organization of working groups, and framework for discussion.

In addition, there are laws, regulations, and guidelines related—directly or indirectly—to participatory development planning and budgeting. Among these are:

- Participatory planning:
 - ◆ Government Regulation No.20/2004 on Government Work Plan
 - ◆ Government Regulation No.21/2004 on Ministerial Work Plan and Budget
 - ◆ Government Regulation No.39/2006 on Monitoring and Evaluation Procedure for the Implementation of the Development Plan
 - ◆ Government Regulation No.40/2006 on the Procedures for Formulating the National Development Plan
 - ◆ Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.050/2020/SJ on the Directives for the Formulation of Local Long-term and Mid-term Development Plans
 - ◆ Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.050/987/SJ on Guidelines for Convening of Participatory Development Coordination Forums
- Participatory budgeting:
 - ◆ Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.29/2002 on the Guidelines for Local Financial Administration, Responsibilities, and Monitoring
 - ◆ Law No.1/2004 on State Treasury
 - ◆ Law No.15/2004 on the Inspection of Administration and Responsibilities of State Finance
 - ◆ Government Regulation No.58/2005 on Local Financial Management
 - ◆ Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.59/2007 on the Guidelines for Local Financial Administration



- ◆ Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.30/2007 on the Guidelines for Formulation of Local Budget for the 2008 Fiscal Year

The abovementioned laws, regulations, and guidelines provide direction and description about participatory planning and budgeting at the national level. For their part local governments have issued counterpart regulations and resolutions to guarantee citizen participation. Table 1 shows some regions that have such issuances.

Table 1. Local regulations on citizen participation.

REGION	REGULATION
Kabupaten Bone	Local Regulation No. 8/2008 on Musrenbang
Kabupaten Garut	Local Regulation No. 17/2008 on Transparency and Participation
Kota Bandar Lampung	Local Regulation No. 13/2002 on Community Participation in the Formulation of Local Revenue and Expenditure Budget
Kota Gorontalo	Local Regulation No. 2/2002 on Community-Based Development Planning Local Regulation No. 3/2002 on Transparency Local Regulation No.4/2002 on Monitoring of Government Administration
Kota Palu	Local Regulation No. 5/2006 on Transparent and Participatory Local Government Administration
Kota Pontianak	Local Regulation No. 2/2009 on Public Information Transparency, in article 1 verse 20
Kota Semarang	Local Regulation No. 9/1007 on Procedure of Local Development Planning Formulation
Kota Pare-Pare	Local Regulation No. 17/2004 on Community-Based Development Administration
Kabupaten Wajo	Local Regulation No.11/2004 on Participatory Development in Kabupaten Wajo
Kabupaten Kendal	Local Regulation No. 6/2006 on Procedure for the Formulation of Local Development Planning and Implementation of Musrenbang Kabupaten Kendal
Kota Blitar	Mayor's Decree No. 67/2004 on Participatory Development Management System
Kabupaten Sumedang	Local Regulation No. 1/2007 on Procedure for Local Planning and Budgeting in Kabupaten Sumedang
Kota Surakarta	Mayor's Decree No. 17/2008 on Preparation for Musrenbang Implementation
Kabupaten Padang Panjang	Mayor's Decree No. 31/2003 on Procedure for Participatory Planning in Kota Padang Panjang



As mentioned above, the main mechanism for citizen participation in development planning and budgeting is the *musrenbang* or Multi-Stakeholder Consultation Forum. There are eight stages in *musrenbang* and each stage has stakeholders. Table 2 summarizes the stages and their corresponding stakeholders.

Table 2. *Musrenbang stages and the stakeholders for each stage.*

SCHEDULE	STAGE	STAKEHOLDER
January	Musrenbang Desa (Village Musrenbang)	Village head, hamlet head, neighborhood chairperson, tradition elder, representatives of women group, youth group, community organization, etc.
February	Musrenbang Kecamatan (Sub-district Musrenbang)	Head of sub-district, village delegations, representatives of community organizations at sub-district scale
March	Forum SKPD Kabupaten/ Kota (Forum of Local Development Working Unit at district/ municipality level)	District bureaucrats, sub-district delegations, representatives of community organizations at district/municipality
March	Musrenbang Kabupaten/ Kota (District Musrenbang)	Delegations of sub-district Musrenbang and Forum of Local Development Working Unit
March	Forum SKPD Propinsi (Forum of Local Development Working Unit at provincial level)	Community organizations at the provincial level that are directly related to the function of Local Development Working Unit and delegation of local government at district level including Bappeda or Local Development Planning Agency
April	Musrenbang Propinsi (Provincial Musrenbang)	Delegations of Forum of Local Development Working Unit and District Government, all regents/ mayors, Local Development Planning Agency, representatives of State Ministry for Development Planning, representatives of Home Ministry
March	Musrenbang Pusat (Central Musrenbang)	All ministry/Non-department Government Agencies, Governors as observers
April	Musrenbang Nasional (National Musrenbang)	All ministries, governors, and head of Local Development Planning Agency at provincial level

Table 2 indicates that citizens at the grassroots level participate in village *musrenbang* only. In the next stages up to the district *musrenbang*, participation involves the delegation system. It means that only a few



citizens are involved in sub-district *musrenbang* and forum of Local Development Working Unit at district *musrenbang*. Citizens do not participate in the higher forums anymore since the participants of these forums are usually public officials.

The period for *musrenbang* forums that allow citizen participation is relatively short. *Musrenbang* at village, sub-district, and district levels are implemented for a period of three months only, usually from January to March. To ensure accountability, citizens should monitor the implementation of the higher level *musrenbang* and the implementation and reporting of development programs agreed in lower level *musrenbang*. In this sense, the Public Freedom of Information Law plays an important role in facilitating the monitoring of development activities and budgeting of expenditures especially outside *musrenbang* forums. The law provides that all public documents, including government work plans (central, provincial, and district/municipality) and budget documents, should be made accessible to citizens.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Political, socio-cultural, and economic factors appear to have greatly influenced the policy environment of social accountability in Indonesia.

Political Factors

Before the Reformation Era, Indonesia lived under a collusive democracy and centralized government. For 32 years under the Soeharto regime (1966-1998), the political system in Indonesia only accommodated three political parties that competed in the elections for House of Representatives at the national and local levels. The president was elected by the People's Consultative Assembly, whose members were a combination of the House members plus Regional Delegation. The ruling government with Golongan Karya as its political vehicle always had absolute control over the House and Assembly members through the mobilization of public officials and military to force people to elect Golongan Karya. To maintain its control over the state, the Soeharto administration implemented a centralized type of



governance where decision-making on all state affairs was controlled by the national government.

When Soeharto's administration ended, Indonesia had three multi-party elections conducted in a relatively peaceful and orderly manner. In the last two elections, people elected the president directly. The elected president's party did not obtain a majority vote in the House elections. To secure support from majority of the House, the president's party coalesced with other political parties. Unfortunately, the driving forces for the coalition did not include unity of ideology or political platform. Instead, the coalition was based on vested and short-sighted interests, (i.e. securing the required quota in government seat). As a result, government power has rested greatly on the House and the political parties in the House themselves cannot claim to be truly representative of their constituents.

The coalition in the parliament under the current presidency is the best example of a coalition that does not represent public interest. To secure Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's government, Partai Demokrat—the president's party—coalesced with a few parties and one of them was Partai Golkar. These are the parties with the biggest number of seats in the parliament. Unfortunately, this coalition has weakened government's efforts to settle a corporate-made disaster in East Java—namely the Lapindo mudslide—which has become a major cause of concern for citizens, given the fact that the owner of the corporation is the chairperson of Partai Golkar.

The Reformation Era also brought in a decentralized government. The beginning of decentralization has been marked by the rise of 'little kingdoms' in local governments across the country. Local governments are currently imbued with so much authority to plan and design their own budget, which they take as an opportunity to manage the budget for their own gains. Since mechanisms for checking have not been properly installed, the local government does not disclose/provide related documents to the public. This has rendered the local governments' resources vulnerable to misuse and abuse in a variety of ways such as bloated budget, false procurement, and pre-arranged tender. This has given rise to "decentralized corruption", which replaced the "centralized corruption" of the New Order regime.



In fact, people have become aware of the rampant and chronic corruption, which has become a part of Indonesia's political landscape. The International Transparency Corruption Perception Index has demonstrated this clearly. From 1999 to 2003, Indonesia's index was between 1.7 and 1.9. In comparison, the 1998 index was 2.0. Interestingly, the 2010 index was 2.2., which showed an insignificant change from the previous years' rating. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index affirmed this result as they gave the score of 0.44 in the aspect of Absence of Corruption to Indonesia, which ranked 7th in the list of 7 Asia Pacific countries in 2010. This implies that corruption has not eased up despite the fact that mechanisms to combat it have been put in place during the decentralization era.

The small gains in the fight against corruption cannot be ignored, however. The central government considers corruption as a special crime that needs to be managed in a special manner. As a result, it formed the Corruption Eradication Commission in 2003. The formation of the commission was also a response to the inability of the regular institutions—namely the police and the judiciary—to combat corruption due to systematic corruption within these institutions. The integrity of the commission was gravely challenged when a police institution charged two of the commission's senior members of accepting bribery in a corruption case that they were handling. In this unlikely battle, public support for the commission—not the least from more than one million citizens who started a “lizard vs. crocodile movement” via Facebook—has gained sympathy for the embattled commission officials and shaped an opinion that the charges were a form of manipulation by the police institution to weaken the commission.

Civil society has, likewise, taken up the cudgels in the fight against corruption. Indonesian Corruption Watch has been playing the role of a ‘watch dog’ monitoring public officials’ conduct. The organization actively publishes its researches and reports to inform people about public officials’ acts of corruption. Lately, its determination was rewarded with the selection of Bambang Widjojanto, one of its senior members, as candidate for Chairperson of the Corruption Eradication Commission. Another civil society organization fighting corruption is FITRA. The organization is an alliance of academicians, NGO activists, development practitioners, journalists, and



government officials. It scrutinizes budget formulation and expenditure both at national and local government levels.

Socio-Cultural Factors

Freedom of expression in Indonesia has dramatically improved over the years. The euphoria over the newly established democratic spaces and the issuance of Press Law No.40/1999 opened communication channels between the citizens and the government. Journalists have been able to express their opinions and thoughts freely. Publishers have been allowed to publish or re-publish books that were formerly prohibited or banned by the government such as Pramodya Ananta Toer's books.¹ Citizens have also been able to voice out their concerns through mass media. Kompas Daily, one of the players in the print media, regularly runs public polls to get the citizens' views and opinions on government performance.

A few challenges have been noted in exercising the freedom of expression in Indonesia. First, some mass media entities hold a political agenda, being owned by people engaged in politics. In this case, mass media is used as a means to promote the political agenda of the moneyed and those in power. As a result, objectivity is greatly diminished. Second, some civil society groups have the tendency to express their opinions in a less savory and, at times, violent manner, which intimidates the media. Third, the government still actively exercises censorship and prohibits the publication of documents perceived to be detrimental to its stability. A recent example is the banning of Pretext for Mass Murder (Alasan untuk Pembantaian) by the Justice and Human Rights Ministry and the Attorney General's Office,² which featured the September 30 Movement and Soeharto's coup d' etat in Indonesia (Gerakan 30 September dan Coup d' Etat Soeharto di Indonesia).

Faith-based organizations also hold a pivotal role in civic engagement. Historically, Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama—the biggest Moslem-based organizations—have been the traditional forces for citizens to engage with government. In the beginning of the Reformation Era, Muhammadiyah endorsed the foundation of a political party, named Partai Amanat Nasional, while Nahdatul Ulama was the supporter of another party named Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. The leading figures of these organizations, then, became the first national leaders elected through a widely-accepted democratic



election. Abdurrahman Wahid of Nahdatul Ulama became the president while Amien Rais of Muhammadiyah became Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly.

Economic Factors

The Harvard University JFK School of Government's recent study on Indonesia's economy and institutional transformation asserts that the current Indonesian economy has inherited the legacy of economic oligarchy.³ Along with collusive democracy, it creates barriers that prevent new players from entering into a wide range of industries. Among the Indonesian economy's handicaps are the following: a dysfunctional legal system, a paternalistic political system, and disempowered citizens. The legacy is said to have left Indonesia ill-equipped to face the challenges of the current global financial crisis.

In relation to government accountability the legacy, as described by the study, has formed government-businesspeople patronage where the players protect each other's interests. This trims down the government's ability to exercise the rule of law. It is especially evident when people look at the political map and see that political parties are dominated by moneymakers; or when they are confronted by the fact that presidential candidates are usually backed by businesspeople. In consequence, the government eventually cannot take strong, decisive action against improper business conducts. In this case, it also opens itself up to the danger of entering into fraudulent, often abusive transactions favorable to the businesspeople that put the officials in power.

An example is the case of rapid deforestation in Kalimantan. Curran et al (2004) reported that forest depletion in the protected areas was not due to smallholder agriculture, as often claimed by the timber industry. Rather, it is due to logging activities by the industry giants. The timber concessions, granted in 1960-1970s, had been exhausted by the 1970s-1980s. Soon enough, the loggers began entering the protected areas. Decentralization has accelerated the depletion because local governments can issue small logging leases since control from the central government is weak. As a result, uncontrolled logging in the remaining areas occurs without any significant opposition and action from the government.



Further, the Saich et al. (2010) states that there are some constraints on Indonesia's economic progress, including:

- Over-reliance on natural resource exploitation especially mining and forest,
- Underinvestment in people especially on education and preventive health,
- Overvalued exchange rate,
- Exhaustive business licensing both financially and psychologically, and
- Inefficient state-owned enterprises

CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY-RELATED POLICIES

As a mechanism for participatory development planning and budgeting, the accomplishments of *musrenbang* may be viewed in many ways. *Musrenbang* in Sumedang, for example, is considered as a model since the degree of participation is high and the local government is responsive to the people's aspirations. *Musrenbang* in Surakarta is also considered a success story due to the collaborative engagement between a citizen group (Indonesian Partnership for Local Government Initiative) and the government. In Malang, however, people at the grassroots level have a negative regard for the *musrenbang* since all the development programs that they proposed in the past were rejected. *Musrenbang* is also seen as a formality only – a part of the procedure that should be implemented annually as provided for by law.

Among several key issues in the implementation of *musrenbang* include (1) the uneven commitment from the regional leadership; (2) limited legislative oversight of budget preparation and disbursement; (3) minimal influence of *musrenbang* process in resource allocation; (4) limited capacity of CSOs to understand the planning process; (5) limited capacity of citizen groups to dialogue and negotiate with the government.

Uneven Commitment from Regional Leadership



The degree of commitment from local leaders to implement a participatory approach varies across regional administrations. Corruption and influence of political parties are also major concerns. For example, political parties often direct development programs along their agenda and claim credit for these programs.

Limited Legislative Oversight of Budget Preparation and Disbursement

Local House of Representatives (DPRD) often do not consult their constituents to identify community needs or to prepare information and analyses for public debate. Elected members of the House are said to interact with constituents only before election time. After that, they forget the people who voted for them. This attitude is driven by the structure of political power in Indonesia where party loyalty prevails over and above loyalty to the constituents.

Minimal Influence of *Musrenbang* Process in Resource Allocation

Budget preparation and implementation are dominated by political parties, with little involvement of the community. *Musrenbang* seems to be a forum where citizens are allowed to list the development programs needed by their community, but the resource allocations are determined by government officials who are driven by political party priorities. The list of programs prepared by the community, thus, remains as a wish list. As one of the key informants stated, “This may result to the community’s apathy and indifference to efforts enhancing social accountability, initiated either by the government or civil society organizations. Community participation in the *musrenbang* is only considered as an effort to fulfil procedural requirements rather than an effort to truly provide a space for genuine participation.”

Limited Capacity of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on Technical Matters

Civil society organizations that participate in the *musrenbang* do not have sufficient knowledge (e.g. about complex budgetary preparation process and about communities’ economic rights) to assert their perspectives on



development outcomes. In addition, there is a perception that the *musrenbang* process does not satisfy communities' needs and is only a form of window-dressing by regional elites to push for and legitimize their agendas. This lack of confidence leads to a weakening of efforts to advocate for the communities' needs.

Limited Capacity of Citizen Groups to Engage Government Constructively

To enter into a dialogue and negotiation with the government, citizen groups do not only need political room (such as *musrenbang*) but, more importantly, information about government policy and budget (specifically for the evidence-based policy dialogue/negotiation type). Enhancing the capacities of citizen groups to conduct simple research is a critical path towards the development of negotiation as a tool for engaging government. World Bank PEACH study and The Asia Foundation Local Budget Study⁴ are examples of promoting evidence-based local budget dialogue through enhanced capacity of citizen groups in data collection and analysis.

The Asia Foundation Local Budget Index in May 2011, which covered 43 districts, shows that there is no correlation between the practice of *musrenbang* in districts and the quality of budget (in terms of transparency, accountability, *musrenbang* and gender equality).

PROMOTING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH THE KNOWLEDGE SECTOR

Knowledge organizations (think-tanks or university-based research organizations) can contribute to a stronger civic engagement by influencing public policy-making with their research products (knowledge). A mechanism for civic engagement and participation in public policy-making has been established; however, some specific forms of participation (technical participation) are limited—i.e. supplying knowledge (research data) for public policy making. The capacity among (non-government) knowledge sector organizations in conducting policy researches is limited to a few organizations in Java (for example SMERU for poverty issue and CSIS for public policy). This situation is best exemplified in how the government



EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING

In the past five years, Indonesia has seen a dramatic reform of its laws and public policy in disaster-related issues. However, many policy changes are being made hastily, in part to respond to the never ending disaster and rapid social change that is driving a high level of demand for reform. Both national and local legislations on DRR have been developed too quickly and with insufficient information to determine the nature and dimensions of the problems at hand.

The government authorities mandated for disaster management have been making policies largely independent of other stakeholders and there is yet a mature enough public space for discourse. There is the risk of policies being of low quality, less relevant, and incoherent. It is, therefore, critical that evidence basis is presented to the public sphere to improve the quality of policy making.

of Indonesia developed its policy on disaster risk reduction as described in the “Evidence-based policy making”, below.

The challenge is, as Mr. Kristanto Sinandang observed,⁵ for strong research/knowledge organizations in Indonesia (in disaster the risk reduction sector) to provide sound policy recommendations and be able to convince policy makers to use their products. On the other hand, policy makers also need support in developing their skills to formulate effective and practical solutions, and to build consensus in support of the proposed solutions.

Another challenge is the need to clarify the technical aspect of citizen participation in public policy making, rather than dwell on the political aspect (e.g. regulation, mechanism, etc.) alone. These technical elements are part of the research-policy interface, starting from agenda creation to advocacy work. Most research agenda developed by non-government think-tanks is donor driven—the problem of “being”. Some of these think-tanks are also struggling to conduct good quality research and how to develop policy recommendations (problems of doing), while others struggle with their skills in effective networking and coalition-building (problems of relating).

AusAID defines the knowledge sector as the overall institutional landscape of government, private sector, and civil society organizations that support the development of public policy. It includes think-tanks, educational institutions, specialized agencies, certain types of private sector contractors, and a wide range of non-governmental organizations. A strong




and powerful knowledge sector will strengthen social accountability through ensuring that public policy is culturally appropriate and developed based on high quality and valid evidence that had passed the public’s quality assurance system.

ODI’s “Bridging Research and Policy” project defined research as a systematic effort to increase the stock of knowledge through “critical evaluation, theory building, data collection, analysis and codification related to development policy and practice”. In contrast, policy includes both “declarations and plans” as well as “courses of action” carried out on the ground (Crewe and Young, 2002). In simple terms, research for policy is about understanding the whys and wherefores of public concerns (e.g. What is the problem? How to address it?) In contrast, public policy is concerned with the intent to do something in practice to address a problem. This means that public policy, inevitably, involves normative questions such as “What should we do to address public problems?” Advocacy, on the other hand, is distinctly concerned with taking action to change a policy. This means that research, advocacy and policy-making are distinct practices that face distinctly different challenges; but each process could bring the government and non-government actors closer.

Each aspect in the chain of activities set out in Figure 2 raises its own set of challenges in enhancing partnership between government and citizen groups.

The crucial step to ensure social accountability practice in a research-policy interface is to define both policy and research questions that represent the public’s concerns. Good research agenda can use a strong empirical knowledge base. However, the empirical knowledge base needs to

Figure 2. The chain representing the interface in research, policy and advocacy.





be generated through credible research practices, known to and tested by the public, or at least by the research community.

It is often assumed that policy works according to what is often called the “rational model”. In this view, policy-makers assess and compare policy choices and weigh social, economic and political costs and benefits before coming to a rational decision (McCarthy & Ibrahim, 2010). However, public policy is a political decision with economic-political considerations. McCarthy and Ibrahim advise that although research can aim to inform policy questions, it is difficult to expect that research will directly lead to policy formulation. The kind of research that is concerned with generating knowledge relevant to policy will tend to have a more significant impact if it builds on the dynamics of influence between researchers and policy makers.

Considering the above situation, applying social accountability principles will require researchers to acquire skills as “policy entrepreneurs”. This role can also be played by intermediaries within policy networks. In addition, researchers may target public agenda to affect public opinion and increase receptivity to their ideas. To aid in advocacy, they can coordinate with civil society coalitions and other interests groups involved in policy formulation. In addition to building networks with policy makers and other civil society groups in building their influence, research organizations can be plugged into knowledge hubs, and use mass media and advocacy groups to disseminate their findings.

REVIVING INDONESIA'S KNOWLEDGE SECTOR

Policy-relevant research can promote efficiency directly by expanding the stock of knowledge; however, public policy is a political product. Policymaking does not take place in a vacuum, but in the political context where policymakers rule. That is why, public policy does not always use evidence generated through research; instead, it reflects the interests and demands of the politicians, albeit in varying degrees (Park, 1998). Politicians are not always accountable to their constituents.

A key criterion of accountability is the efficiency of resource allocation within the public sector. Indonesia has been shifting its accountability focus from the efficient use of public resources to effective public revenue (tax)



collection. For instance, as an impact of intensive mass media coverage on the “Gayus-gate”,⁶ the public now cares not only about how public funds are used, but also on the efficiency of public revenue collection. Public opinion (pressure) is proven as an effective way of promoting the effective management of public resources. The Gayus case involved politicians from a ruling party as well as high ranking law officers. This exhibited the responsiveness of the government to the demands of the people, especially if aided by media coverage. The former Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani, was forced to resign due to her strong opposition to interference from politicians in public financial policy making. She has moved to the World Bank in Washington DC as a managing director. In this kind of situation, collaboration between the media and policy-oriented social science research centers gains significance. Park (1998) said, “The better informed the general public is about the misallocation of public funds, the more likely they are to seek recourse to remedies that cut short the lives of policies responsible for the misallocation. Knowledge is power, and social science research empowers the citizenry.” In terms of how it manages public resources, the government of Indonesia is likely to be more reliant on public opinion (e.g. through surveys) rather than on the regulations or evidences provided by think tanks or citizen groups. The government applies an “evidence-based policy making”. In truth, however, it is really about popularity over substance and soundness of the policy.

The challenge, therefore, lies in supporting collaboration between media and citizen groups (knowledge sector organizations, in this case) to promote research-based evidence as alternative to the “evidence” preferred by the government in its policy-making process.



UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDONESIA

The emergence of social accountability in Indonesia started during the period of *reformasi* (Reform) in 1998. Since the *reformasi*, the Indonesian government has been caught in a careful political balancing act between long established socio-political norms and several emerging forces in Indonesian society. The process of *reformasi* in Indonesia has been marked by better exercise of the freedom of speech in contrast to the censorship of the New Order era. This has led to more open political debate in media, as well as the development of various cultural expressions. A general election in June 1999 produced the first freely elected national, provincial, and regional parliaments in over forty years. Since then, regions have been given more autonomy to manage some responsibilities and powers. At the same time, citizen participation in government has been encouraged and outlined in several laws and regulations. The process of *reformasi* has increased the level of citizens' participation in policy formulation, planning, budgeting as well as in the monitoring of public service delivery. Since then, citizen groups, the media, as well as government officials have become aware of the existence of cultural forces demanding openness and clean government, or what has come to be known as "Social Accountability".

In Indonesia, social accountability is perceived to be related to public accountability, good governance, and other academic terms related to government accountability. People, generally, do not make a distinction

SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: MEDIA COVERAGE?

For the Kendari City Government, social accountability is similar to good governance. The concept of social accountability, which was introduced by the ANSA-EAP's Southeast Sulawesi network, is neither something new nor different from the concept of openness. Specifically, one form by which social accountability is applied is when government programs are covered by the media.



between “horizontal” and “vertical” mechanisms nor between the “supply” side and the “demand” side of governance.

Social accountability is, likewise, perceived to be related to the ideas of freedom of speech, transparent governance, and people’s participation in policy-making as well as in financial planning and implementation. To some, social accountability means “engagement of citizens in demanding accountability from the government through various direct or indirect political communication channels. These channels and mechanisms may be initiated by the state or by the citizens, but in most cases the initiatives come from the latter”. This hews closely to Malena et al.’s definition.⁷

Table 3. Varying perceptions of the social accountability conceptual framework.⁸

ACTORS	SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY CONCEPT	
	<i>Understanding of Social Accountability</i>	<i>Who are Responsible</i>
National civil organizations	Social accountability is about the respect of civil/human rights by the authorities, about democratic elections, people’s right to gain access to public information, government transparency, and citizen’s participation in government policy-making and financial planning and implementation; freedom of speech.	Government agencies (executive), people’s representatives (DPR), legal apparatus, and political parties.
Local citizen groups or civil organizations (including network members of ANSA-EAP)	Social accountability is about people’s right of access to public information; government transparency and citizens’ participation in policy-making and financial planning and implementation; clean government (i.e. elimination of corruption of any form).	Government agencies (executive), people’s representatives (DPR), legal apparatus, and political parties.
Media	Social accountability is freedom of speech, freedom of the press, democratic elections, people’s right of access to public information, government transparency, and citizens’ participation in government policy-making and financial planning and implementation.	Government agencies (executive), people’s representatives (DPR), legal apparatus, and political parties.



THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDONESIA

The following section presents the findings of the social accountability mapping in Indonesia, based on actual experiences in the regions of Java (West Indonesia) and Sulawesi (East Indonesia). For purposes of organization, these findings have been clustered around the Four Pillars of Social Accountability Framework developed by ANSA-EAP.

Strengthening Government Openness in Social Accountability

Indonesia has the necessary laws, regulations, and guidelines to encourage social accountability. In terms of citizens' participation in policy-making, financial planning and implementation, there have been a number of initiatives of which the degree of success has yet to be determined.

Act #25 of 2004 concerning National Development Planning System states, in Article 1, Paragraph 1 that, "Planning is a process for determining appropriate future action, through a sequence of choices, taking into account available resources." Article 21 states that "the Council of Development Planning (*Musrenbang*) is a forum for interaction in the framework of national development plans and regional development plans." Article 27, Paragraph 2 clarifies that, "Further provisions concerning the procedures for preparing the Local RPJP (Long Term Development Plan), Local RPJM (Middle Term Development Plan), Strategic Plan of SKPD, RKP, Renja (work plan) of SKPD and implementation of the Regional *Musrenbang* are governed by Local Regulation."

Referring to Government Regulation No. 40/2006 on Procedures for Formulation of the National Development Plan in the context of preparing the annual Government Work Plan (RKP), a preparatory agenda is to be formulated at the national and local levels through the implementation of *musrenbang* at each level of government, from village, sub-district, district/city, provincial to central level. To operationalize the Act and the PP (Government Regulation), a SEB (Joint Letter) was issued by the Minister of State for Planning/Head of Bappenas and the Ministry of Home Affairs on Technical Guidelines for Implementation of the Annual *Musrenbang* No.



008/M/PPN/01/2007 and No. 050/264.A/SJ of 2007 on the Technical Directions of Musrenbang Implementation. However, since 2008, the central government has stopped issuing new SEBs. As basis for organizing *musrenbang* from 2008 to 2010, the local government referred to SEB No. 008/M/PPN/01/2007 and No. 050/264.A/SJ of 2007.

Table 4 (next page) presents a summary of the laws supporting social accountability practice in Indonesia. Analysis of the laws (in terms of legality) was done based on the legislation effectiveness measure proposed by Malaluan (ANSA-EAP). In terms of practicality, the bases for evaluation were reports from www.kebebasaninformasi.com, a review of the law by Jakarta Post and Tempo Magazine, and comments from prominent politicians such as Bagir Manan.

Social accountability experience in western Indonesia (Java)

In Java, the government is perceived to be the only actor obliged to be accountable. Among the key government agencies in Java are Bappeda (Regional Planning Agency), SKPD (Regional Working Unit Agency), BPS (Central Statistics Bureau), and the Agency of Public Relations.

Although a variety of laws and legislations are available and implemented (in compliance with the prescribed procedure), *effectiveness* remains to be the main concern of citizens. *Musrenbang* is one of the institutionalized mechanisms regulated by law, but its effectiveness has long been a cause for concern. Despite its aim to provide spaces for citizens to participate in development planning, *musrenbang* is actually conducted for the sake of complying with the prescribed procedure only. The process of deliberation does not really happen as development planning is dictated by the government. Citizens' suggestions on priorities for planning are rarely taken into account as the government sometimes has its own priorities. This is also, partly, due to the lack of information and understanding on the government's development agenda and the lack of ability of government officials to simplify their presentation using uncomplicated terms.

The government's commitment to obey the rules that it issues is also questionable. According to a key informant, not all prescribed steps of the *musrenbang* are followed. The pre-*musrenbang* is often omitted. The window for citizens' participation in the *musrenbang* activity is small and

Indonesia



Table 4. Laws supporting social accountability action in Indonesia.

REGULATIONS	REVIEW
Law No.14/2008 on Public Freedom of Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The bill was drafted in 1999 by the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law and submitted to the House of Representative in 2000 by the Coalition of Freedom of Information. The draft was reviewed starting 2002. After a prolonged period of debates and discussions, the House passed the bill into Law. Based on the evaluation, the law is seen to provide the necessary foundation for the promotion of accountability and transparency in government. The scope of information contained therein covers the procedure for information request and release, protection for the citizen requesting for information, safeguards against violations, and dispute- resolution mechanisms that encourage the vertical accountability practice. However, the law also contains provisions that allow the government to withhold information on sensitive matters.
Law No.40/1999 on Press Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The law has been accepted as a pivotal point in transforming the practice of freedom of expression. As opposed to many restrictions and sanctions during the New Order Era, the present environment enables mass media, journalists, and individual citizens to express thoughts and ideas freely. Some implications of the law include: no prior censorship for print and broadcast media, right to seek, acquire, and disseminate ideas and information, protection of journalists where they are free to join journalists' association, and right of citizens to establish a press company or news agency. Despite those encouraging points, some challenges that hinder social accountability practice remain. For instance, some sectarian groups resort to coercing mass media agencies and practitioners when they have dissenting opinions on certain issues. In effect, citizens are not free to express their honest opinions and thoughts. Another challenge is the political agenda of some mass media agencies and practitioners, which prevents them from being objective and hinders the practice of internal accountability.
Law No.32/2004 on Administrative Decentralization and Law No. 32/200 on Fiscal Decentralization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both laws bring the decision-making process of development planning and budgeting closer to citizens, as well as create a sense of ownership among local government leaders and stakeholders. These also provide a foundation for initiatives in participatory planning and budgeting. Despite their much-vaunted accomplishment as one of the biggest decentralization moves in the world, their implementation triggered the formation of 'little kingdoms' across the country. This was brought about by lack of transparency since budget-related information was not disclosed to the public. The law gave regional/local government authority over the preparation and allocation of their respective budgets. This situation encouraged the civil society to draft the Freedom of Information bill.

Indonesia



Table 4. (Continued)

REGULATIONS	REVIEW
<p>Law No.17/2003 on State Finance, Law No.58/2005 on Regional Government Financial Planning, and Home Ministry Regulation No.13/2006 on Local Government Financial Management</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These policies institutionalized accountability, transparency, efficiency, and effective public resource allocations.
<p>Law No 25/2004. General Regulation on Musrenbang (Participatory Planning and Budgeting)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The law institutionalized the creation of Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (Musrenbang), a multi-stakeholder consultation forum at all levels of government over long-term (RPJP), middle-term (RPJM), and annual (Rencana Tahunan) timeframes. It also emphasized the need to synchronize all approaches – political, democratic, participatory, bureaucratic, technical, bottom-top, and top-bottom – into regional planning. • It also contained operational guidelines of the musrenbang: • Joint Ministerial Decree No.1354/M.PPN/03/2004 and 050/744/SJ on Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of Musrenbang and Local Participatory Planning. These establish spaces for public participation in planning and budgeting and provide entry points into this process. These also provide guiding principles on how Musrenbang forums should be convened at different levels • Joint Ministerial Decree No.0008/M.PPN/01/2007 and 050/264A/SJ. These contain sets of procedures, processes, and mechanisms in conducting Musrenbang. These also incorporate more principles such as inclusiveness, gender responsiveness, the need for organization teams to enhance competency in participation skills, organization of working groups, framework for discussion and flexibility.
<p>List of related regulations on the participatory planning and budgeting</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government Regulation No.20/2004 on Government Work Plan • Government Regulation No.21/2004 on Ministerial Work Plan and Budget • Government Regulation No.39/2006 on Monitoring and Evaluation Procedure for the Implementation of the Development Plan • Government Regulation No.40/2006 on the Procedures for Formulating the National Development Plan • Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.050/2020/SJ on the Directives for the Formulation of Local Long-term and Mid-term Development Plan

Indonesia



Table 4. (Continued)

REGULATIONS	REVIEW
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.050/987/SJ on Guidelines for Convening of Participatory Development Coordination Forums • Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.29/2002 on the Guidelines for Local Financial Administration, Responsibilities, and Monitoring • Law No.1/2004 on State Treasury • Law No.15/2004 on the Inspection of Administration and Responsibilities of State Finance • Government Regulation No.58/2005 on Local Financial Management • Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.59/2007 on the Guidelines for Local Financial Administration • Ministerial Decree of Home Ministry No.30/2007 on the Guidelines for Formulation of Local Budget for the 2008 Fiscal Year



narrow since the participation is by invitation, which implies government's power to choose the representatives. Despite seemingly accommodating laws on public participation, there is an observable dissonance between what is being prescribed and what is being practiced.

Selection of participants is not as inclusive as the law prescribes. *Musrenbang* participants are often the community elites (village heads and personalities at the village-level *musrenbang*, for example) or citizens who, basically, have less knowledge on development planning and prioritization. In some regions, such as Pekalongan District, the ones invited are those who have bargaining power (e.g. large number of inter-sector members).

Public hearing is another mechanism which lacks clarity in its definition. What is meant by "public hearing" is face-to-face interaction with government officials and DPRD members. Though there is a legal basis for the conduct of public hearings, there are no guidelines in carrying these out.

Appealing for public hearing, exerting pressure by giving statements and publishing position papers in media, as well as lobbying with government officials are strategies that have been commonly employed by citizen groups. These, however, have certain requirements such as the availability of contacts in government agencies and local parliament, and the ability of groups to compel public officials to pay attention to them. This is to say that only citizen groups with certain bargaining power (e.g. with large membership and inter-sector connections) can possibly participate while others who are not well organized, and who turn out to be the most vulnerable, can never have the chance to participate.

In Java, it appears that accountability is only for certain people under certain conditions. There seems to be little interest in formal ways of government-citizen engagement. Some organizations believe that *musrenbang* has insignificant influence over the planning and budgeting process, so much so that citizen groups resort to other informal means such as by appealing for public hearings or face-to-face interactions with public officials. *Musrenbang* is deemed insufficient in efforts to enhance public participation. Participation means providing all citizens, whether individuals or groups, an opportunity to hold the government accountable for its policies, activities, and programs, ensuring that the government responds to



the peoples' needs, delivers quality services efficiently and uses funds judiciously.

This study found that most citizen groups in Java lack interest in monitoring the planning and budgeting process. The results of *musrenbang* at the lower levels of governance are often nullified by the *musrenbang* conducted in the higher levels of governance. Development plans proposed by citizens in the village level are often nullified during *musrenbang* in sub-district level. The government asserts that the citizens' plan must be synchronized with the government's plan. It is, therefore, necessary for citizens to be watchful of every stage of the budgeting process to make sure that the citizens' agenda is taken into consideration.

Social accountability experience in South and Southeast Sulawesi

The main government agencies responsible for exercising social accountability include all the local government units. All SKPDs (Local Government Unit) are formally mandated to carry out social accountability activities although, in reality, the processes of budget planning, spending, and performance tracking lack transparency.

Social accountability awareness of government officials involved in policy making and in public financial management is relatively high, considering the existence of rules in both national and local levels. There appears to be a gap, though, between awareness and action. NGOs and staff of government offices claim that although there is involvement of citizens at the *kelurahan* level in the process of development planning meetings, participation is limited (quantitatively, with only about 20-30 participants). Furthermore, only the

ON AWARENESS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Trikora, the Head of Public Relations of the Kendari city government, says that the Act on Disclosure of Information and Public Service is not a foreign concept among municipalities. He asserts that long before the national act was stipulated, they had already issued a local regulation related to this, namely Perda No. 15 of 2005 on public participation in local policy formulation. In preparing the budget, the government involves several NGOs and other stakeholders through open discussion and public consultation. He adds that local government policies are also always open to scrutiny.



local elite are invited and the marginalized sectors (women, workers, senior citizens, children, and the poor in general) are ignored.

Interestingly, in 2005, the Bappeda (Planning Body) of Kendari city implemented a policy to conduct pre-*musrenbang* for the village-level development planning after a technical training on PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) in several villages, in cooperation with Yayasan Pengembangan Study Hukum & Kebijakan (YPSHK).⁹ The purpose of this pre-*musrenbang* was to allow the residents of each village to learn about the components to be discussed in the meetings and to be able to differentiate between their wants and their actual needs. The city government provided a budget of Rp250.000 per *kelurahan* to carry out pre-*musrenbang* in 64 villages.

Musrenbang and women's participation¹⁰

Increasing the awareness and understanding of the community on social accountability is not sufficient to foster effective engagement of women and the poor in local development processes. Mechanisms that promote their active participation must also be strengthened and sustained. To facilitate the engagement of women in the *musrenbang* process as well as to strengthen the *musrenbang* process, The Asia Foundation (TAF) and its partners have implemented the following activities:

- **Public decision-making fora.** Reducing cultural, social, and structural barriers is essential to ensure women's participation and inclusion of their priorities in local development planning and budget processes. Effective and gender sensitive facilitators can play crucial roles in ensuring that local development planning meetings are inclusive and responsive to the needs of women and the poor.
- **Village forums for women.** The program involves organizing village-level forums targeted to increase the participation of women in development issues at the grassroots level. These regular quarterly meetings seek to provide a venue for women to voice out their concerns, develop their skills and confidence in public speaking, and to provide a supportive environment for them to engage in developing solutions to shared problems in their community. Issues raised during these meetings are documented and brought up during the village *musrenbang*.



- **Citizen Report Cards.** Citizen Report Cards (CRC) are a simple but powerful tool to provide public agencies with systematic feedback from users of public services. CRCs are used to collect feedback on the quality and adequacy of public services from actual users; these provide a proactive agenda for communities, civil society organizations and local governments to engage in dialogue with service providers to improve the delivery of public services. TAF has introduced the use of CRCs as a way of engaging the community in the budget execution stage. The CRCs have been used to systematically record information and present the results to the respective government officials responsible for the selected services. The use of CRCs seeks to empower women and the community to track and monitor budget expenditures throughout program implementation and to facilitate open and productive discussion on local government performance.

The engagement of women in local public policy deliberation and implementation in Sulawesi remains to be poor. According to the Asia Foundation (2008), less than 7.3% of public officials are women, which implies their low level of participation in social accountability processes such as budgetary and policy-making.

Table 5 is a summary of the issues and opportunities of the *musrenbang* experiences.

RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: INDONESIA'S VIBRANT CIVIL SOCIETY

The government (at all levels) and civil society organizations have been the main actors on the development of social accountability thinking and practice in Indonesia. Civil society, in this case, refers to the arena outside family, the state, and the private (market), organized to pursue public interest in demanding government accountability.¹¹ Civil society organizations include media, non-government organizations, religious, and cultural organizations. Political parties and military-based organizations are not included.



Table 5. Summary of issues and opportunities in the musrenbang process.

ISSUES	OPPORTUNITIES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insignificant influence of <i>musrenbang</i> in development planning. • Development plans proposed by citizens are rarely accepted due to variations from the government’s priorities • <i>Musrenbang</i> is often conducted in a formal way, using formal language, which is sometimes difficult for ordinary citizens to understand. • Resource allocations are actually determined by the government and political parties. • Participation in <i>musrenbang</i> is by invitation, which implies that not all citizens can participate in <i>musrenbang</i>. This explains why <i>musrenbang</i>’s participants are local elites (village heads and prominent figures in village level <i>musrenbang</i>, for example) or citizens have basically less knowledge on development planning and priority needs of the poor. • <i>Musrenbang</i> often omits the participation of marginalized sectors such as women, the poor, etc. • The number of participants is limited to around 20-40 people and often dominated by government officials. • In order to participate in <i>musrenbang</i>, citizen organizations must prove themselves to possess bargaining power (such as large membership, having contacts in government or parliament’s inner circle, etc.). • Citizen groups lack knowledge and capability to fully understand the budgeting process. • Citizen groups also lack the interest in monitoring <i>musrenbang</i> from village to district level to ensure that the development plan firmed up at the lowest level of <i>musrenbang</i> is not nullified by <i>musrenbang</i> in the higher level of government. • Citizen organizations need to improve their capacities on budgeting and planning to ensure better participation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Musrenbang</i> remains as the only formal way of citizen participation that reaches the lowest level of government, i.e. village level. • In order to maximize it, the government should improve and find innovative ways of reaching out to the citizens to know their aspirations (e.g. by disseminating information on the government’s development planning, conducting forums for citizen organizations before holding <i>musrenbang</i>, presenting the development plan in simple language, etc. • To ensure fulfilment of its function to facilitate citizen’s participation, the government is required to involve more members from marginalized groups such as women and the poor.



Citizen Groups in western Indonesia (Java)

There are various civil society organizations pushing for social accountability in Java. Most are NGOs and peoples' organizations concerned with social accountability-related issues (e.g. participatory planning and budget formulation, budget analysis, and government performance monitoring).

Strategies and tools are diverse and dependent on the nature of citizen groups applying them. NGOs usually start with community organizing, encouraging the establishment of community-based organizations (CBOs), then increasing their capacity and awareness on participation and budget transparency as well as budget reading and analysis. This type of group is considered to have better access to information and knowledge sources. They also consider themselves "intermediary organizations", whose function is to facilitate the participation and connection between the government and citizens. Among this type of organizations are Pattiro, FITRA, Lakpesdam NU, IDEA Yogyakarta.

Pattiro, a national NGO, has worked in 20 regions in partnership with local citizen organizations. They have helped organize the local organizations, train the members and promote their participation in *musrenbang*, as well as encourage women participation in *musrenbang*. In addition, Pattiro also gives consultancies to SKPDs, supplementing ideas on development priorities that are contextual to the regions in question.

Forum Warga Jepara, a Jepara based inter-sector citizen group, was consolidated with the assistance of Lakpesdam NU, a national NGO. It has identified its needs and formulated its demands for a bigger budget allocation for small-scale enterprise, education and agriculture sectors. It has held hearings with the Mayor, SKPD, Bappeda and parliament members to push for their demands.

Jaringan Masyarakat Bantul (Bantul Society Network) has taken an attempt to improve the educational system in its area. Engagement began with identifying problems, the amount of budget allocated for the sector, and government policies regarding the sector before filing a demand for hearing with the government. It has been collaborating with media to disseminate its



concerns. It has also been lobbying with parliament members and government officials to get them to respond to its demands for hearing.

FITRA, for its part, releases an annual report on government budget usage at the end of the fiscal year. It analyzes then criticizes certain budget allocations that do not have anything to do with welfare improvement for the poor. Its reflections on the 2010 fiscal year budget, for instance, highlighted an increase in allocation for welfare that, in reality, did not have significant impact for poverty reduction. It also noted the inefficiency in budget allocations for government and parliament members' travel.

Citizen Groups in the South and Southeast Sulawesi Region

Sulawesi has also displayed a great potential for social accountability in terms of civil society initiative. As in other parts of Indonesia, women face significant challenges in increasing their participation in local public policy deliberations and implementation. Women make up less than 7.3% of officials of decision-making rank in local governments. Thus, women officials are seldom involved in planning or drafting budgets for their own offices or for the sectors they work with. All the provinces of Sulawesi, except for North Sulawesi and West Sulawesi, are at the bottom 10 in Indonesia's Gender Development Index, with Gorontalo province ranking last. The average percentage of women members in district/city legislatures in Sulawesi is 6 %, which is unacceptably low in comparison to the national average of 7-8%.

Some of the civil society organizations operating in the South and Southeast Sulawesi region are:

- Inninawa: working on literacy campaign and social movements to build critical mass
- Active Society Institute (ACSI): organizing street vendors and traders from traditional markets.
- Islamic Women Studies (IWC): engaged in the education of children from poor families in Lette village, Mariso Sub-district;
- KOPEL (Komite Pemantau Legislatif/Legislative Watch Committee)
- KPRM (Komite Perjuangan Rakyat Miskin/Poor People's Struggle Committee) Makassar: Facilitates and articulates the interests of the poor people. Since 2003, the cadres of KPRM have been advocating for



the economic, and socio- cultural rights of the poor, and have been directly dealing with the bureaucratic public services apparatus at the village up to city level. KPRM members have been working for the fulfillment of the basic rights and needs of the citizens, especially the poor (e.g. food, water, etc.).

- FIK ORNOP Sulsel (Network of NGOs of South Sulawesi)
- LBH (Legal Assistance Organization) Makassar,
- KPI (Komisi Penyiaran Independen/Independent Broadcasting Commission) South Sulawesi,
- Student Executive Board (Social Political Faculty of Hasanuddin University)
- Media (Tribun Timur Daily and its media networks and the Fajar Daily and its media networks) The Research and Development agency of Fajar has been involved in assessing the performance of local government units and in encouraging the government to improve the quality of services by granting awards as incentives.
- Yascita (Kendari City and neighboring districts)
- KPI Sultra (Kendari City and Konawe, Kolaka and South Konawe districts)
- YPSHK (Kendari City, 15 villages in Konawe District)

ORGANIZED SMALL RETAILERS IN MAKASSAR

Besides the issue of public information disclosure, another aspect of public service that has been a problem in Makassar is waste management. Pasar Terong, one of the largest “traditional” markets in Makassar, generates huge amounts of trash daily. The city government has failed to perform its role, despite the fact that the merchants have been paying garbage levy on a regular basis. The oft-repeated question is, “Where has the 'garbage money' gone? Has it really been used to handle the waste problem, or has it been diverted to other unlawful expenses?” This question needs an immediate response, given the fact that the management of traditional markets is handled by the local government-owned company belonging to the city of Makassar, which is managed by a team dominated by politicians rather than professionals.

Fortunately, in Pasar Terong, through SADAR (Persaudaraan Pedagang Pasar Terong or Brotherhood of Terong Market Traders) and supported by an NGO called Active Society Institute (ACSI), the demand for the market managers to work professionally has been widely expressed. This is not the situation, though, in the other markets in Makassar (16 large markets and 30 small markets) where the traders are relatively poorly organized. *(From a focus group discussion with NGOs, South Sulawesi)*



- Komnasdesa Sultra (Wawonii Island, Konawe District) and some other networks such as Walhi, Medikra, Jauh Sultra, Telapak, and Indonesia Journalist Alliance

So far, in South Sulawesi, fighting corruption has been the main motivation for creating networks and initiating actions among CSOs and NGOs. ANSA-EAP partners in Southeast Sulawesi have been working on various social accountability-related issues including participation in policy formulation and financial planning and implementation

Similar to what their Java counterparts have been experiencing, CSOs in Sulawesi have also been confronted with the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of implementation of social accountability-related legislations at various levels of governance. A list at the end of this writeup provides an inventory of citizen groups involved in social accountability work in Indonesia in Java and Sulawesi.

THE CHALLENGE OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN INDONESIA

Law No.14/2008 on Public Access to Information has become the legal basis for the public to obtain information from the government. The law mentions what kind of information can be accessed by the public and what are the rights and duties of the public and state institutions in relation to accessing information. The Indonesian Republic Government's Regulation No. 61 of 2010 on the "Implementation of Law No. 14 Year 2008 on public information disclosure" was issued later to guide and regulate implementation of the law. According to this law, all government units are mandated to provide information that is demanded by the public. Yet, in most cases, citizens are invariably referred to Bappeda, SKPD, Office of Public Relation and BPS (Statistical Bureau) on matters concerning budget and development.

Access to Information in Western Indonesia (Java)

Websites are among the tools of the government in disseminating information to the public. Almost all local governments in Java, and probably in all of Indonesia, have their own official websites. Regional BPS offices have



their own websites as well. The government websites commonly provide information on regional demographics, economic and cultural profiles as well as the potentials of the region in question. Yet, with regard to social accountability practice, only a few of them provide information on the government's development plan and budget. The Kebumen District in Central Java is one of the few that comply with this social accountability requirement.

The information on development and budget usually takes on the form of numbers and allocations that barely make sense to common people. In addition, basic information that would enable citizens to participate in planning and budgeting is generally unavailable. The way information is prepared and packaged makes for a limited audience.

Those who have better access to government documents are likely to be the ones who have "connections" with government officials or DPRD members. FITRA and Pattirol, for example, mentioned that their regional chapters had no difficulty accessing government documents.

According to FITRA, this easy access is due to their organization's reputation as playing an active role in the budgeting process. The government, according to FITRA, seems to trust the organization because the latter has been providing consultancy services and assistance to the government regarding the budgeting process. This appears to be the case because there were instances when FITRA sent its requests through mail under a different, unfamiliar name and it did not receive any response from the government agencies involved.¹²

The reluctance to give information to the public may have been due to the fear that the documents would be misused by people who have no legitimate purpose for acquiring it. Another reason may be the poor archiving system of government agencies, leading to claims that some documents are "not in their office", as reported by Kompas, on FITRA and its partners' request for public documents from some national level government institutions (Kompas, 2 December 2010, p.19).



Access to Information in Eastern Indonesia (Southeast Sulawesi)

The City of Kendari has adopted the Law No.14/2008 on Public Access to Information by issuing City Regulation No. 15 of 2003 on public participation in policy formulation and City Regulation No. 14 of 2003 on freedom of information.

Despite the issuance of the two city regulations, there are no technical guidelines on their implementation. There is no government agency in the local area that is mandated to carry out the task of information disclosure. The effectiveness of the two adopted regulations, therefore, remains vague and doubtful.

Like the other regions in Indonesia, the government of Kendari City maintains a website that provides data ranging from local regulations to several reports on the performance of city government. Unfortunately, some information is lacking and even outdated. The most recent data posted on the site date back to 2005 and 2006.

Another way of obtaining information from government agencies, such as the Office of Public Relations, BPS and Bappeda, is through formal request (e.g. official communication sent via postal mail). The process can be very bureaucratic and complicated at times. The BPS is less demanding as it does not require data about the person/institution requesting for information.

Media networks, such as the print media, play an important role in the dissemination of public information, but there are times when the information conveyed by the media leans favorably towards the government side. There are media entities, though, who take the risk in disseminating information favorable to and grounded on people's interests such as Radio Suara Alam and Kendari TV.

As in the case of Java, the information provided by the government related to budget is in the form of numbers and may appear to be too technical to laypeople who might find it difficult to appreciate and understand such technicalities.

The challenge in the arena of access to information is the lack of willingness of local governments to provide information to citizens. The other side of the equation is the weak demand from citizens for the government to disclose information.



CULTURE AND CONTEXT IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES

Some existing cultural beliefs and values in Indonesian society affect the way citizen participation is conducted. To some extent, it also affects the interpretation and understanding of social accountability itself. The issues being highlighted here are the inclusion (or non-inclusion) of women and other marginalized groups in social accountability practice, as well as the power relations between the government and the citizens. The following experiences illustrate the interplay of cultural values and belief with the practice of social accountability.

Listening to the Voices of Moslem Mass-Based Organizations

The influence of Moslem mass-based organizations (MBOs) in creating public demand for reform in some districts in Indonesia cannot be underestimated. The two largest MBOs, i.e. Muhhamadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) have had experiences in monitoring poverty, using tools such as the following:

- **Citizen Report Card (CRC).** Used to monitor citizens' perception of health service delivery, particularly their perception of those services provided at community health centers (*puskesmas*).
- **User-Based Survey.** Used to monitor programs on road infrastructure.
- **Government Programme's Monitoring Team.** A participatory scheme to monitor and evaluate free health and education programs.
- **Simple Community Monitoring.** Mobilizing various stakeholders including teachers, students, parents and health practitioners to observe the free health and education program schemes implemented by their respective local governments
- **Complaints Handling.** The establishment of "Complaint Centers for the Poor" (Posko Pengaduan Rakyat Miskin or PERAM). The members of the centers, particularly those from the MBOs, help the community by providing them information and assistance in filing complaints, mostly related to health and education services, with respective LG offices.

Partnership with Moslem MBOs reflects the cultural appropriateness in increasing citizen's participation in poverty reduction programs. It is built on



existing networks of Indonesian mass-based Muslim organizations and, therefore, brings the influence and credibility of Islamic organizations together, which is then enhanced by the technical advocacy experience of economic reform groups.¹³ Mobilizing large numbers of poor citizens (as a Muslim organization's constituent), especially in rural areas, and bringing their seldom-heard voices to bear down on the political process is the central work of this initiative.

Culture and Context in the Java Experience

The traditional view of women as being good only for domestic tasks prevails largely in Java, despite a rigorous campaign on women inclusion in engaging government. Women commonly consider engagement activities (even in its simplest forms such as village or neighborhood "RT/RW" meetings) as men's business.

Yet, despite this cultural norm, a number of women organizations have emerged in recent years. In Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta, there is an organization of women that attempts to participate in budgeting, namely Jaringan Kelompok Perempuan Gunung Kidul (Gunung Kidul Women Network). FITRA also mentioned that among the members of their local partner organizations are women who have been actively participating in the organizations' activities. They are few in number though.

The political culture of government is characterized by lack of openness to all public elements, which explains the reliance of citizen groups on traditional forms of engagement such as lobbying and informal, often personal ways of negotiating with the government.

One way of describing the government bureaucracy is "procedure-oriented". While it is true that administration means following procedures, too much adherence to procedure can render the government non-flexible and rigid, which leaves little room for innovations. A manifestation of this is the inability of government officials to explain development planning in plain language that can be easily understood by the majority.

Culture and Context in the Southeast Sulawesi Experience

Government officials and citizen groups in Kendari City have become aware of the significance of social accountability practices (engagement of



citizens in governance and transparency) in the development of the city and the society.

Unfortunately, due to the prevailing politics of ethnicity and kinship that emanated from the era of New Order, the belief and awareness has yet to be translated to actual practice. Politics in Kendari City shows symptoms similar to that of other Indonesian regions. In Kendari, kinship-based politics, which relies on blood ties or personal affinity among political actors (e.g. governors, chairman of the parliament, the mayor and local officials) is a major concern.

The distribution of power is uneven and generally based on “family ties”, which means that those holding official positions of authority belong to the same ethnic group as the highest figures of authority (e.g. mayor). Even when dealing with private parties for infrastructure construction, transparency in the selection process is practically non-existent because of kinship-based politics. This has a divisive effect on the citizens and causes resentment among various ethnic groups.

While the engagement of citizen organizations in the development process has been deemed as a requirement for social accountability, tension continues to exist between the government and local NGOs. Engagement tends to be “critical” rather than constructive in nature. Several other NGOs (such as WALHI¹⁴) continue to adopt an adversarial stance in relating to government due to lack of mutual trust and respect for each other’s nature and activities.

CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDONESIA

Following a presentation on learning from actual social accountability implementation in the regions of Java and Sulawesi, the succeeding section lists down the gaps and challenges to social accountability practice in Indonesia: difficulty in measuring the impact of civic participation, emphasis on compliance to process rather than real participation, dilemma between project-based participation versus the regular development process, and the accountability of citizen groups.



Difficulty in Measuring Developmental Impact

The idea that inspired a number of policies on citizen engagement and participation is that citizen engagement and participation can contribute to improve governance and deliver pro-poor development outcomes. However, the impact of civic participation on measurable democratic and developmental outcomes has proven to be difficult to assess. Some “best practices” are limited to single interventions, and almost of them are strongly associated with personalities with strong leadership, a factor that is not easy to create or replicate in other set-ups.

Procedure Versus Participation

In a country like Indonesia where premium is placed on procedures and the cartel of politicians is at the top, one can expect citizens to interact with the state through formal governance spaces (including through parliament). In reality, though, associations and social movements from the ground are as important inspirations and means for change.

Aside from formal mechanisms of participation, one must give value to community initiatives (such as community organizing from below and mobilizations by citizen organizations) in creating real change in public policy. When international aid mechanisms in Indonesia are working through government structure, government is in charge of the task of citizen engagement. The assumption is that development interventions must support state institutions first, and then the government will foster civic engagement. In fact, it has been recognized that the government adheres more on procedure rather than on the quality of civic engagement outcomes. Procedure becomes a ritual without value. Accountability is, thus, reduced to a set of procedures that need to be complied with rather than a matter of influencing public policy, for instance. In a way, the procedural concern does open channels of participation. But it allows only bits and pieces of citizen participation in planning and budgeting activities, and leaves the more essential parts of decision-making to the government.

Constructive citizenship, improving practices of participation, strengthening accountability, and contributing to social cohesion are, therefore, still domains of citizen groups. While the government has



provided mechanisms and opened ample space for participation, such as the *musrenbang* and public hearing mechanisms, their effectiveness and impact remains to be seen. The Court of Justice, however, has played a significant role in handling corruption cases that have become a central issue in Indonesia. Yet, as some corruption cases become more political than legal, the significant role of courts of justice in ensuring accountability is critical. In addition, the government has actually established the Office of the Ombudsman where the public can address its complaints on public services. Yet, considering the fact that it is mainly national- and provincial-based, the Ombudsman has not yet succeeded in reaching citizens at the lowest level of governance.¹⁵

Project-Based Participation Versus the Regular Development Process

The Government of Indonesia has been implementing a bottom-to-top, multi-level civic engagement and participation in the development planning process called “*musrenbang*” at various levels of government. Due to its complexity in representation issues and significant lag time between planning and implementation, *musrenbang* is losing its credibility among the development actors and is considered only as a formality or part of a procedure. On the other hand, a large government poverty reduction program called Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM)¹⁶ also applies a participatory planning process, which is attended by the same development actors in the *musrenbang* process. While the development planning process in PNPM is facilitated by professional (meaning private, well-paid) facilitators, the facilitators of *musrenbang* are ordinary civil servants from a government agency who are less motivated, compared to the PNPM’s facilitators. The result is such that the regular *musrenbang* now gets less attention from development actors and has become a planning ritual with low quality output.

Government can both be a major competitor or a potential donor in the eyes of national NGOs. This is in recognition of the fact that the local state—with its administrative repartitions—represents the primary and most important agency for sustainable development processes in developing



countries. Hence the typical areas of development cooperation, such as health, education, safety, social welfare, human rights, etc. constitute the core responsibilities of the state. Therefore, with the exception of very small initiatives, development programs and projects can reach long-term sustainability only if they are embedded in, or, at the minimum, in line, with the respective programs and/or initiatives of the local government. But the question is, which government? The government is not homogenous. It consists of various interests which may be contradictory to the development agenda of citizen groups. Some local governments operate like private sectors when the governor/head of district is also a businessman/woman, or is dictated by the private sector. At present, it is sometimes challenging for the local CSOs to establish meaningful cooperation with the government. Also, the participation of civil society in local development dialogues is often quite difficult although improvements have been noted from time to time.

Accountability and Governance of Citizen Groups

Media accounts have alleged that with the proliferation of NGOs in 1998, funding has been misused, with some NGOs organized mainly for the money. NGOs have also been accused of lacking transparency towards the Indonesian people, and of deliberately keeping their ideological commitment hidden to get more funds. Many other NGOs feel uncomfortable about the situation. Money matters have cast a cloud of doubt on NGOs and damaged the reputation of the NGO movement.

Although many of the Java-based NGOs have branches in provincial centers, these are typically dependent on the head office and lack financial or programmatic autonomy from the Java office. The overall lack of non-Java-based organizations results in an under-representation of non-Java citizens.

Although a full discussion of CSO accountability issue is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that the perception of CSO accountability is critical to their capacity to promote social accountability. Public officials are unlikely to respond to an organization that is not representative of a constituency, or one that is not accountable to the beneficiaries of its services. (Beck, Mendel, and Thindwa, 2007)

A study was conducted by FITRA and TAF towards the end of 2010. Titled *Kajian Pengelolaan Anggaran Daerah* (Study on Local Budgeting), it aimed to



EVIDENCE-BASED ADVOCACY ON LOCAL BUDGET

Using research-based advocacy is effective in maximizing the policy advocacy strategies, but partner capacity to conduct budget analysis should be strengthened. Presenting their local budget study (which consists of comprehensive analysis on budgeting processes) and budget analysis help [The Asia] Foundation's partners to dialogue with the senior government officers. Some local governments have responded positively to our partners' recommendations such as in Palangkaraya, East Lombok, Cilacap. As a result, some local regulation was adopted through the use of Local Budget Study's data. However, the partners should improve their capacity for budget analysis to be at par with that of the government. For instance, in Bojonegoro, the Bupati has an expertise in budget analysis. When the PWA presented their findings and recommendations, the Bupati showed another set of data to disprove our partner's data.

The national law No. 14/2008 on freedom of public information pressures the local government to promote the transparent policy. Even though decentralization opens the opportunity for the public to access the policy and information, there are still difficulties in getting information from the government especially when it comes to budget concerns. However, when this law was implemented, many local governments responded rapidly by establishing the information committee. The committee is a room for CSO activist to monitor and get involved in these processes.

*Civil Society Initiatives Against Poverty Project
Lessons Learned documented by The Asia
Foundation (Jakarta)*

assess the performance of 42 city/district governments in five provinces in Indonesia on the budgeting and planning process based on the principles of good governance (namely transparency, participation, accountability and equality). The study highlighted several issues such as the lack of commitment in gender issue mainstreaming, limited spaces for participation in *musrenbang* and the lack of budget commitment following public participation in *musrenbang*. The study, nevertheless, noted some progress in transparency as indicated by the availability of documents on budgeting, better access to the documents, and publication of the documents on the websites.



IS SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY THE ANSWER TO INDONESIA'S WOES?

Transparency and accountability have emerged over the past decade as key ways to address both developmental failures and democratic deficits. Corruption has been suggested as a major contributor to the low growth rates of many developing countries (Mauro, 1995). Therefore, corruption and inefficiency are two target areas for social accountability. In the development context, the argument is that through greater accountability, the “leaky pipes” due to corruption and inefficiency will be repaired, aid will be channelled more effectively, and in turn, development initiatives will produce greater and more visible results. (McGee & Gaventa, 2010).

An alternative approach to reducing corruption, which has gained prominence in recent years, is to increase participation by community members in local-level monitoring. Citizen group participation is now regarded in much of the development community as the key, not only to reduced corruption, but to improved public service delivery. Shanta Devarajan, the World Bank Chief Economist for Africa, believes that social accountability is the answer to these developmental failures:

There is increasingly good evidence that transparency and accountability make a significant difference, that are, in some cases, surprisingly transformational. There is an increasingly impressive collection of individual case studies, rigorously evaluated, which demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach. For example, Jacob Svensson and Martina Björkman conducted a randomized field experiment in Uganda to test the effect of increasing community-based monitoring. They found that when communities more extensively monitored providers, both the quality and quantity of health services improved, including reducing infant mortality by a third. (Devarajan, 2010).

However, Olken’s study (2007) on over 600 road projects in Indonesia found that participation is not always used for purely benevolent purposes and does not always generate positive results. In his study, increasing grassroots participation in monitoring had little average impact, reducing missing expenditures only in situations with limited free-rider problems and



limited elite capture. Overall, he suggested that traditional top-bottom monitoring can play an important role in reducing corruption, even in a highly corrupt environment.

Cases in Uganda and Indonesia have given two different impacts of community participation. Does it mean that transparency and accountability are really having significant influence? What factors affect these? McGee and Gaventa (2010) suggest that it is very difficult to come up with definitive, evidence-based generalizations and that any conclusions on the impact of transparency and accountability must also be located within a broader discussion of the contexts in which these occur.

The following sections will discuss the contexts and development trends in Indonesia that are considered important in assessing the impact of social accountability. This will look at trends on development aid in Indonesia, widening the citizens' sphere of influence, stripping social accountability of its technical nature, and a social accountability roadmap for the country.

Trends on Development Aid Delivery in Indonesia

One of the important factors in assessing the impact of social accountability in Indonesia is the trend of development aid delivery after the donors signed The Jakarta Commitment—a commitment to channel aid through government structure, as an implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. For instance, AusAID's approach to supporting education improvements in Indonesia has evolved in recent years—from contract-managed activities parallel to the Government, to greater alignment with and use of Indonesian systems. The latter will continue to evolve, and Australia's support will be increasingly delivered through country (government) systems. Presently 60% of Australia's education assistance is delivered through Indonesian Government systems. However, it is envisaged that closer to 95% of funding will pass through country systems by 2015. (Nugroho, 2009)

There is a growing tendency for institutional donors' spending mechanism to be channelled through international development companies and multi-donor trust fund (including the United Nations), thereby excluding citizen groups from access and participation and in shaping the policy. In the



Indonesian context, the tendency is towards a growth in the portion of aid to government (and marginalization of CSOs in terms of funding). Within this mechanism, citizen group participation is assumed as the responsibility of the government. The government will manage it through its regular participation mechanisms—described in the preceding chapters as procedural and often resulting to low quality participation.

The Other Costs of Social Accountability

The many benefits of social accountability had been previously documented¹⁷, but studies on the other costs of social accountability have yet to be conducted. If social accountability is considered as a development mechanism and if improving everyone's access to information will strengthen accountability frameworks, consequently, social accountability initiatives will require additional work (which translates to additional cost). While evidence on the benefits of social accountability had been documented, our understanding on the cost of social accountability initiatives is limited.

There are two types of costs of social accountability. The first is cost related to knowledge management, information dissemination, and data analysis—i.e. the operational costs. The second is cost of transparency (political cost). A comparison between the planning process in the PNPM—a multi-donor poverty reduction program—and the planning process in the regular development programs in Indonesia provides a good example of these two types of costs. Planning, monitoring and evaluation processes in PNPM are considered more effective and efficient because it invested a bigger proportion for data management than the regular development program of the government of Indonesia. The PME process in regular development program is considered weaker not only because of less investment for data management, but also because of the reluctance of government staff to take on additional tasks as a consequence of transparency. For example, due to broader participation in a *musrenbang* process in a district in South East Sulawesi, the government was required to conduct other consultation meetings with other citizen groups and it was pressured to revise the planning documents. This caused a bad impact on the “image and popularity” of the Mayor as this plan revealed his hidden agenda



in favor of a crony. The Mayor, then, considered *musrenbang* as a risky development procedure. He later opted to publish the city's plan on local newspapers and called it "transparency".

In addition to the above, possible costs and risks to the government in allowing more spaces for social accountability include:

- Reputational risks arising from the public's access to information about projects which are controversial or which may turn out to be unsuccessful;
- Accountability costs which may increase, if greater transparency leads to closer examination of development programs, resulting in more requests for information and questions about the details of the projects; and
- Data-cleaning costs—some government agencies will want to re-examine information that was collected and recorded for internal use before it is released to the public. (Barder, 2009)

Widening the Citizens' Sphere of Influence

While transparency and accountability aim to inform development policies, one cannot expect these to lead directly to policy formulation on development. There is no direct link between transparency and accountability and development-related policies. This means that, while transparency and accountability actors/facilitators need to justify the social value of their work among the donors and the communities they serve, it is not easy to measure the direct impact of transparency and accountability on their development policies.

Transparency and accountability work can have a significant impact on development policies if it will also work on building the capacity of actors to influence policy makers. Formulation of development policies is a political decision. Hence, it is but fitting to explore ways of bringing political forces (i.e. policymakers and government officials) within the citizens' sphere of influence by enhancing the latter's capacities and improving their credibility and reliability in engaging the former. A case in point is the experience of Forum Pengurangan Resiko Bencana or FPRB (Disaster Risk Reduction Forum) in Yogyakarta, which was able to influence government policies on



disaster risk reduction after it was able to access the right information, process and package it, and present it to the government.

The Merapi case is a fine example of how enhanced capacities of citizens can influence and persuade government officials to honor provisions in national laws warranting civil society participation in crucial processes related to development. It also shows that when policies and decisions are subjected to public inquiry and scrutiny (where citizens are armed with reliable information and documentation), government officials and lawmakers become more open and careful in making decisions.

Stripping Social Accountability of Its Technical Nature

Among various government and non-government organizations in Indonesia, understanding and appreciation of transparency is limited to the

MERAPI ERUPTION: ACCESS TO DATA CHANGED POLICY

From 26th October to 5 November 2010, Yogyakarta province and parts of Central Java province were hit by disaster. Mount Merapi had erupted, causing the death of 300 individuals and damage to infrastructure and agriculture amounting to approximately US\$ 555,000,000. The eruption affected 53,000 households and displaced thousands of families. As part of its response to this disaster, FPRB decided to participate in designing the policies on rehabilitation programs and management, as mandated in the Disaster Management Law.

FPRB assisted the district and province levels in the planning process by supplying data on the damage and recovery needs. To facilitate the proper and effective implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction programs, FPRB emphasized the importance of involving the civil society in the monitoring and evaluation activities.

On January 5, 2011, BNPB (National Body for Disaster Management) facilitated a meeting to design the Action Plan, with national and local government agencies and FPRB representatives as participants. A debate ensued over the “Decision on the Disaster Status” and the involvement of civil society in the monitoring and evaluation process. BNPB was initially reluctant to involve civil society organizations, but after FPRB invoked the provision in the Disaster Management Bill warranting civil society involvement in planning, monitoring, and evaluation of disaster risk reduction-related (DRR) activities and programs, it was allowed full participation in DRR-related activities. FPRB’s capacity to gather and process data for monitoring and evaluation contributed to this gain.

Saleh Abdullah, Member of FPRB Yogyakarta



presentation of figures and statistics in annual reports usually distributed among a limited audience (e.g. partner institutions, donors, etc.) at the end of each fiscal or calendar year. It would help for these entities to sit down, discuss and arrive at a consensus on what data to publish, how to process and package the information, and what format to use for easier access. This will make information-sharing and benchmarking less-complicated.

Transparency has been generally regarded as a technical term and a jargon among CSOs that has yet to be internalized and substantiated because of lack of understanding and capacity to give flesh to it. Documenting social accountability practices—e.g. gains, benefits, as well as challenges at hand—and cascading these down to the local level can help arouse interest in transparency. The Yogyakarta-based Institute for Research and Empowerment, for instance, has been actively empowering communities and local institutions to engage in social accountability work. Through its endeavors, it has shown that bringing the government closer to the people can be beneficial to society, especially the poor in rural Yogyakarta.

WANTED: A ROADMAP FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDONESIA

As its economic and political situation improves and stabilizes, Indonesia is getting more opportunities to explore new approaches to development work and to consolidate the gains made on social accountability implementation. Based on the results of this study, among the basic challenges confronting social accountability implementation in Indonesia are¹⁸:

- A lack of consensus and clarity in the understanding of the term “Social Accountability”, “Transparency”, and “Accountability”, which is an epistemological problem. Among various sectors in Indonesia, social accountability is interpreted as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR);
- The complexity arising from the multiplicity of key players in social accountability work. Each has his/her own outlook, interests, values, mandates, and agenda that greatly shape the outcomes. In addition, decentralization in Indonesia has led to a multi-level structure and has multiplied the layers and number of players in social accountability work;



- Gaps and lack of standards (e.g. methods and tools) for assessing and analyzing the impact (e.g. cost and benefit) of social accountability; and
- Documenting/maintaining data relevant to the development of social accountability over the years to aid the evaluation of social accountability practices.

As earlier mentioned, the enabling conditions for social accountability practice are present in Indonesia, and that a variety of tools and approaches are being utilized by citizen groups. It has been noted, though, that some initiatives are donor-driven and are dictated by the priorities and agenda of funding agencies. For instance, DRR, which is very relevant to Indonesia as a “supermarket of disaster”, has been left out in the development agenda. It might help to incorporate DRR with development programs since it is highly relevant to Indonesia where the majority of the population lives in disaster-prone areas.

Development programs, which are generally developed using a logical framework, are generally concerned with fostering change. It might help to supplement this framework with the social framework which focuses on the human actors within the social change process. Many of the development programs in Indonesia (including social accountability-related initiatives for good governance, anti-corruption, etc.) are not clear on the kinds of change that these intend to achieve, in what way the desired change may be attained, and the assumptions or bases for the actions and interventions. This situation has led to some difficulties in identifying what impact to measure, how to measure it, and what factors influenced it.

There is a large number of social accountability initiatives implemented by the government (through legislations), the citizen groups (through programs funded by donors or through internal resources), and the private sector (through abidance with good governance principles). Outcomes of these, however, are measured in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of implementation rather than in terms of relevance to developmental and democratic empowerment. A social accountability roadmap will help consolidate these initiatives and identify a common direction for social accountability practice in Indonesia.



LIST OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACTORS IN INDONESIA

No.	Partner Name	Scope of Work and Contact Information	Focus of Work
1	Bandung Institute of Government Studies (BIGS)	Jl. Kidang Pananjung No.5C, Bandung 40135 E-mail: bigs@bdg.centrin.co.id Website: www.bigs.co.id	Budget transparency, Public service accountability, Legal reform to promote public participation in budgeting planning.
2	Civic Education and Budget Transparency (CIBA)	e-mail: ciba_yti@yahoo.com Jl. Kebagusan Dalam I no.56 Pasar Minggu	Budgetary advocacy.
3	Forum Warga Kota Jakarta (FAKTA)	Jalan Pancawarga IV No 44 RT 003/07 Cipinang Muara (Belakang Gudang Seng - Kalimalang) Kode Pos : 13420 Telepon : +62-21-856-9008 Fax : +62-21-856-9008 e-mail: faktajakarta@yahoo.com	Advocacy for participative public policy, urban-poor community organizing for participation in budgeting, planning and evaluation of policy implementation.
5	Seknas FITRA	Jl. Kalibata Utara II No.34 RT. 011 RW. 002 Kel. Kalibata, Kec. Pancoran Jakarta Selatan 12670, Po Box 7244 Phone: 6221-7947608 Fax: 6221-7947608 e-mail: seknas_fitra@yahoo.com website: www.seknasfitra.org	Budget study and analysis, budgetary advocacy, provision of training for grass roots communities in budget analysis.
6	FITRA North Sulawesi	Jl. Arief Rahman Hakim, Gg.Sukmawati No.1A Medan 20217 Phone/Fax: 061-7340303 e-mail: fitra_su@inde.net.id	Budgetary analysis, pro-poor advocacy budget, transparency and accountability.
7	Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW)	Jl. Kalibata Timur IV/D No. 6 Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia Phone : +62 - 21 - 7901 885, 7994 015 Fax : +62 - 21 - 7994 005 e-mail: icwmail@indosat.net.id website: www.antikorupsi.org	Anti-corruption campaign and advocacy.
8	Lakpesdam NU	Jl H. Ramli No. 20A Menteng Dalam, Tebet, Jakarta Selatan, 12870, Telp: 021-8298855 Faks: 021 8354925 e-mail: lakpesdam@cbn.net.id website: www.lakpesdam.or.id	An umbrella organization of 17 provincial chapters and 75 regional chapters. The chapters are involved in participatory planning, government monitoring through deliberation.



List of Social Accountability... (cont'd.)

No.	Partner Name	Scope of Work and Contact Information	Focus of Work
9	Smeru	Jl. Cikini Raya No. 10A Jakarta 10330 Indonesia Ph: (62-21) 3193 6336 Fax: (62-21) 3193 0850 e-mail: smeru@smeru.co.id website: www.smeru.or.id	Research on governance, poverty, gender, government policy implementation.
10	Pattiro	Jl. Tebet Timur Dalam VIII No.39. Tebet. Jakarta Selatan 12820 Telp: (021) 8379 0541, 7098 6724 Fax: (021) 829 4691 e-mail: pattiro@yahoo.com, pattiro@cbn.net.id website: www.pattiro.org	Gender budgeting, participatory budgeting.
11	Women Research Institute (WRI)	Jl.Kalibata Utara II No.25A RT. 016 RW.02 Jakarta Selatan 12740 DKI Jakarta Ph: 021 - 799.5670; 798.7345 Fax: 021 - 7987345 e-mail: womenresearch@cbn.net.id	Research on gender budget implementation, advocacy on gender budget.
12	Kopel (Komite Pemantau Legislatif)	Address: Jl. Batua Raya 9 No.3 Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan Email: kopelmakassar@yahoo.com Website: www.kopel_online.com	Government and parliamentary monitoring, political education for communities,
13	KPPA (Komunitas Peduli Perempuan dan Anak) Sulawesi Tengah	Jl. Cemara VI. No.6 Kelurahan Donggala Kodi Kecamatan Palu Barat, Palu Sulawesi Tengah. Telephone/ Fax: (0451) 461088 Email: kppasulteng@gmail.com	Advocacy for victims of violence, women, and children; monitoring and advocacy of women and children responsive policy and budget.
14	LP2G (Lembaga Pengkajian Pembangunan Gorontalo)	Kompleks Perum PLN Kelurahan Dulalowo Kec. Kota Tengah Location: Jl. Makassar NO. 24, Gorontalo, Indonesia Email: lp2g_gorontalo@ymail.co.id	Good governance, water and coral management, children protection.
15	Lembaga Pemberdayaan Perempuan (LPP) Bone	BTN Soddangnge Jln. Andi Malla No.4 Kel. Biru Kec. Tanete Riattang Kabupaten Bone Sulawesi Selatan e-mail: asia_bone@yahoo.com	Advocacy on women, children, marginalized group related policy; capacity building for marginalized groups.
16	Pilar Nusantara (Pinus) Sulawesi Selatan	Jl. Hestaning Raya No. 38 Makassar Sulawesi Selatan e-mail: pinus.sulsel@gmail.com	Advocacy of public policies
17	Institute for Community Justice, Makassar	Jl. Topaz Raya Ruko Zamrud Blok G/12 Makassar e-mail: icj_mksr@yahoo.co.id	Legal reform towards gender, local community responsive regulations



List of Social Accountability... (cont'd.)

No.	Partner Name	Scope of Work and Contact Information	Focus of Work
18	Swadaya Mitra Bangsa (YASMIB)	Jl. Tamalate IV No. 9 Makassar 90222 – Sulawesi Selatan Telp. (0411) 883 427 Fax . (0411) 883 427 Jl. Andi Latanratu No. 175 Takatidung 91313 – Polman, Sulawesi Barat Telp. (0428) 22546 Fax. (0428) 22546	Budget analysis and advocacy
19	Women Institute Research and Empowerment of Gorontalo (WIRE-G)	Jl. Rajawali No.77 Kota Timur Kota Gorontalo Email:wire.gto@gmail.com	Research on women, women’s education and advocacy



LIST OF LOCAL-LEVEL PARTNERS

No.	Partner Name	Partner's Base	Sites Supported
1	Center for Socio-Cultural and Economic Studies (PKSBE)	Padang - West Sumatera	Kota Padang, Kota Padang Panjang
2	The Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity (Maarif Institute)	Jakarta Jl. Tebet Barat Dalam II No.06 Tebet, Jakarta Selatan 12810 Phone : +62-21-83794554 Facsimile : +62-21-83795758 email : maarif@maarifinstitute.org Alamat e-mail ini dilindungi dari spambot, anda harus memampukan JavaScript untuk melihatnya web : www.maarifinstitute.org	Kota Bandar Lampung, Sleman
3	Nahdlatul Ulama's Institute for Human Resource Studies and Development (PP Lakpesdam NU)	Jakarta Jl H. Ramli No. 20A Menteng Dalam, Tebet, Jakarta Selatan, 12870, Telp: 021-8298855 Faks: 021 8354925 e-mail: lakpesdam@cbn.net.id website: www.lakpesdam.or.id	Cilacap, Kota Surabaya, East Java Province
4	Pilar Nusantara (PINUS)	Bandung - West Java	Garut, South Sumatera Province
5	Sanggar Bandung	Bandung - West Java	Sumedang
5	Labda Yogyakarta	Yogyakarta	Kota Palangka Raya
6	Center for Regional Study and Analysis (PATTIRO), Semarang	Semarang - Central Java Jl. Wonodri Joho II no.986G Kelurahan Wonodri Semarang 50242 Jawa Tengah Ph: 024-8441357 Fax: 024-8441357 E-mail: pattiro_semarang@yahoo.group	Kota Semarang, Kota Blitar, West Java Province
7	Center for Regional Study and Analysis (PATTIRO), Pekalongan	Pekalongan - Central Java Jl. Parang Garuda III No 1 Perum Medono Indah Pekalongan, Jateng Telp.: (0285) 4415868, 7910277 E- mail: pattiro_pkl@yahoo.com	Kota Pekalongan, Kota Surakarta, Central Java Province
8	Bina Swagiri Foundation (Fitra Jatim)	Tuban - East Java	Serdang Bedagai, Situbondo
9	Aisyiyah, East Java Chapter (PW Aisyiyah Jawa Timur)	Surabaya - East Java	Bojonegoro



THE ASIA FOUNDATION'S PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS ON CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES AGAINST POVERTY PROGRAM

NATIONAL-LEVEL PARTNERS

No.	Partner Name	Partner's Base	Scope of Work
1	Center for the Study of Islam and Society, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (PPIM UIN)	Jakarta Jl. Kertamukti No. 5 Pisangan Barat, Ciputat 15419, Jakarta Indonesia Telp. +62 21 742 3543, 749 9272 Faks. +62 21 740 8633 Email. admin@ppim.or.id Web: www.ppim.or.id	Provide a national survey on Mass Based Organizations (MBOs)
2	Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (YAPPIKA)	Jakarta Jl. Pedati Raya 20 RT007/RW09 Jakarta 13350 DKI Jakarta Ph: 021-8191623 Fax: 021-8900670;85905262 E-mail: yappika@indosat.net.id Web: www.yappika.or.id	Organizational capacity assessment of the civil society partners implementing pro-budget advocacy.
3	Institute for Innovation and Participatory Development (INISIATIF)	Bandung - West Java Jl.Guntur Sari IV no.16 Bandung 40264 Jawa Barat Ph: 022-7309987 Fax: 022-7309987 E-mail: inisiatif@bdg.centrin.net.id Web: www.inisiatifbandung.org	Provide technical assistance and trainings to improve the capacity of budget advocacy organizations. Develop modules on health financing at the local level.
4	National Secretariat of Indonesia Forum for Budget Transparency (Seknas FITRA)	Jakarta Jl. Kalibata Utara II NO. 34 RT. 011 RW. 002 Kelurahan Kalibata, Pancoran Jakarta Selatan DKI Jakarta Ph: 021-797608; 08159590511 Fax: 021-797608 E-mail: sekretariat@seknasfitra.org Web: www.seknasfitra.org	Conduct a Local Budget Study to analyze local government allocations from a pro-poor perspective in 42 districts.



Local-Level Partners... (cont'd.)

No.	Partner Name	Partner's Base	Sites Supported
10	Gorontalo Development Analysis Institute (LP2G)	Gorontalo	Kota Gorontalo, North Gorontalo
11	Community and Economic Development Study Foundation (YLP2EM)	Parepare - South Sulawesi	Sidrap, Wajo
12	Humanity Study Institute (LenSA)	Mataram - West Nusa Tenggara	West Lombok, East Lombok, West Sumbawa, Dompu, West Nusa Tenggara Province



LIST OF LOCAL BUDGET ADVOCACY CENTERS

No.	Name of Budget Centers	Members	Site
1	Salam Center	NU, Muhammadiyah, BITRA and other NGOs	Serdang Bedagai
2	Community for West Sumatra Development (Masyarakat Peduli Pembangunan Sumatra Barat – MaPP)	Muhammadiyah, NU, MUI Indonesia Churches Association (PGI), IMM, HMI, GMNI	West Sumatra Province
3	Forum Bahtera Serambi (FORBAS)	Muhammadiyah, Aisyiah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, Naswiatul Aisyiah dan Tarbiyah	Kota Padang Panjang
4	MITRA Center	Muhammadiyah dan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Perwati, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Komhamda, Muslimat NU, KPI Sumbar	Kota Padang
5	Community Discussion Forum (Forum Rembug Warga)	Muhammadiyah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, NA, IRM, IPM, PPKL, Jaringan Perempuan Pesisir (JPRP)	Kota Bandar Lampung
6	Forum for Poverty Eradication (Forum Musyawarah untuk Pengentasan Kemiskinan – Forum MUSTAKIM)	NU, Muhammadiyah, Pilar Nusantara Palembang	South Sumatra Province
7	Forum Dumai Madani	NU and Muhammadiyah network, academics from Universitas Riau	Kota Dumai
8	Majelis Masyarakat Madani Ogan Ilir	NU and Muhammadiyah networks, Pesantrens	Ogan Ilir
9	Budget Advocacy Working Group (Pokja Advokasi Anggaran)	PUI, Matlaul Anwar, NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, NU	West Java Province
10	Garut Community for Local Budget (Masyarakat Peduli Anggaran Garut – MAPAG)	MUI, NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, BKSWI, Futuwah, Shafat, Hamida, Sarekat Islam, SII, Riyadul Alfiyah, Garut Governance Watch, Pilar Nusantara Garut, LSG	Garut
11	Health-Care Forum (Forum Peduli Kesehatan – FPK)	Lakpesdam, IPNU, IPPNU, Marif, Aisyiyah, ANSOR, LSM Sumedang Sehat Sejahtera, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, Sali-mah, P3ML, BKSG, BKSPPI	Sumedang
12	Committee for the City’s Budget (Komite Masyarakat Peduli Anggaran Kota-KOMPAK)	PC NU, PC Lakpesdam, IPNU, Muslimat	Kota Banjar
13	Presidium Anggaran	MUI, PD, Muhammadiyah, PC NU	Cilacap
14	Community Forum for Pekalongan (Forum Masyarakat Peduli Pekalongan - FORMAP)	NU, Muhammadiyah, other Muslim MBOs, CSOs, press, individual	Kota Pekalongan



List of Local-Level Budget Advocacy Centers (continued)

No.	Name of Budget Centers	Members	Site
15	Moslem Forum for Budget-Care (Forum Umat Islam Peduli Anggaran - FORMIPA)	Coalition of various MBOs	Kota Semarang
16	Tim 9	Nahdlatul Ulama City of Semarang Branch	Kota Semarang
17	SALIMAH Center	Woman wing of Welfare Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)	Kota Semarang
18	Nahdlatul Ulama Surakarta Study and Network Forum (Forum Studi dan Silaturahmi NU Surakarta - FOSMINSIA)	Muslimat, Fatayat, Anshor, IPPNU, IPNU, PMII, NU Sub district chapters	Kota Surakarta
19	NU Working Group on Public Policy Transparency (Pokja Pemberdayaan Umat untuk Transparansi Kebijakan – Pokja PUTK PWNU)	Lakpesdam, Fatayat, Muslimat, IPPNU, Lembaga Bahtsul Masail, Lembaga Pertanian, Lembaga Kesehatan, PC NU	Province of Central Java
20	Coalition for People-based Budget Advocacy	Pattiro, NU	Province of Central Java
21	Forum Ki Semar	Muhammadiyah, NA, Aisyiah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, IRM	Sleman
22	Sleman Youth Association (Himpunan Pemuda Sleman – HIMDA)	Pemuda Ansor, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, KNPI, Karang Taruna	Sleman
23	Kaum Jagad Bersinar	Coalition between NU and Muhammadiyah	Kota Blitar
24	Forum M-PATI	PD Muhammadiyah, NA, Aisyiah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah	Bojonegoro
25	Nahdliyin Society Center	PC NU, Anshor, Fatayat, Muslimat, PMII, IPPNU, Partai Demokrat	Kota Surabaya
26	Citizen Forum – (Forum Warga)	Muslimat, Fatayat, Aisyiah, IPPNU, IPNU, LP2KP, LPSM	Bondowoso
27	Forum for Budget Transparency (Forum Situbondo untuk Transparansi Anggaran – FOSTRA)	PC NU, Muslimat NU, Fatayat NU, Muhammadiyah, Aisyiah, Fitra Jatim, CENTRIS	Situbondo
28	Nahdliyin Forum for Budget Care (Forum Nahdliyin Peduli Anggaran – FNPA)	Lakpesdam, Fatayat, IPNU, IPPNU	Province of East Java
29	People Aspiration Forum (Forum Aspirasi Umat-FAU)	MUI, NU, Fatayat NU, Muslimat NU, Pemuda Ansor, Muhammadiyah, Aisyiah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, HMI, PMII	Kota Pontianak
30	Budget-Care Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Peduli Anggaran – FKPA)	PC NU, PWNU, IPPNU, Fatayat NU, Ibtihadul Mubalighin, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, Mosque Council, Nasyiatul Asyiah, Hidayatullah, HMI, PMII, An Nur Foundation, Darul Amin	Kota Palangka Raya



List of Local-Level Budget Advocacy Centers (continued)

No.	Name of Budget Centers	Members	Site
31	Babussalam Center	NU, Muhammadiyah, Syarikat Islam, Pemuda Ansyor, NA, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, Musloimat NU, Al Khairat, Forum Komunikasi Dakwah Remaja, IRM, IPPNU, Idealis	North Gorontalo
32	SYALOM Center	Pantekosta Churches, Protestan Churches, Catholic Churches, Advent Churches	North Gorontalo
33	PERSIS Center	Persatuan Islam	Kota Gorontalo
34	Forum for the Poor (Forum Peduli Mustada'fin)	Dewan Dakwah Islam, PCNU, Fatayat, Remaja Masjid (BKPRMI), KAHMI, PD Muhammadiyah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, Nasyatul Aisiyah, Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah, KNPI, Gerakan Sidrap Membangun (GSM)	Sidrap
35	Forum AlMaun	PD Muhammadiyah, Aisiyah, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah, As'adiyah	Wajo
36	Budget Care Council (Dewan Peduli Anggaran-DPA)	NU, Muhammadiyah, MUI, Pesantren Salman Pemuda Ansor, IRM, women activist, Lensa, informal leaders,	Kota Dompu
37	Budget Care Forum (Majelis Peduli Anggaran)	NU, NW, Muhammadiyah, Muslimat NU, Muslimat NW, Aisiyah, Pesantrens Association for Anti Corruption (APPGAK), Pesantrens Forum (FKSPP)	West Lombok
38	Budget-Care Council (Dewan Peduli Anggaran – DPA)	NU, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Waton	Central Lombok
39	Budget Care MBO Forum (Forum Ormas Peduli Anggaran-FORPA)	Muhammadiyah, NU, Muhajirin, Quwwatussidiqin, NW, Maraqitta'limat, Hidayatullah, Al Ma'arif Pesantren	East Lombok
40	Muhammadiyah Center	PDM, Youth and womens' wings of Muhammadiyah	West Sumbawa
41	Nahdliyin Committee on Budget Care (Komunitas Nahdliyin Peduli Anggaran – KNPA)	PP Lakpesdam, Fatayat, PMII, IPNU, IPPNU	National Level



LOCAL BUDGET STUDY

In 2010, FITRA, supported by The Asia Foundation, conducted a study that aimed to observe the performance of local government in budgeting based on the principles of good governance, i.e. transparency, accountability, participation and gender responsiveness. In doing so, the study assessed four stages in budgeting cycle, namely: budget planning, discussion, implementation as well as accountability.

The study was conducted in 42 districts and cities in 5 provinces in Indonesia from September 2010 to January 2011. The evaluation of local government's performance in budgeting was conducted by assigning index measurement, which ranged from 1 to 100. With the help of the index value, the study categorized the performance into very good, good, average and less than average. The index value was determined by studying 21 compulsory documents made in planning and budgeting. Interviews and FGDs were also conducted to verify the judgment.

To assess the performance of local government in promoting and applying transparency principles, the study investigated three main issues: 1) the availability of planning and budgeting documents, 2) the institutionalization of information provision by the government, and 3) the degree of government's openness in managing the budget. The study found that most of the regions that were assessed were transparent enough that they provided planning and budgeting documents requested by community members, both through formal and informal means (e.g. websites). From the 885 documents requested during the research period, 65% were available, while around 35% were withheld by the government. Documents were normally given in less than 17 days after the request. This study referred to the provisions of Law No. 14/2008 on Information Disclosure, which compelled government institutions to provide documents requested by the public in 17 working days at the most; it was found out that the government was faithful to this provision. Documents on budget planning were mostly available and open to the public, while those on implementation, deliberation and accountability were difficult to access. Furthermore, most



local governments have yet to establish special units to handle information dissemination to the public and formulate operational procedures on information dissemination. Interestingly, the study also noted that regions outside Java gave freer access to information than their Java counterparts, providing documents that were usually withheld by the Java-based offices.

Despite the issuance of laws on public participation in budgeting and planning process, the rate of participation in the studied regions remains to be poor. Most regions were not innovative enough in creating alternatives more suited to local contexts (other than the existing Musrenbang). Musrenbang itself had a limited number of participants, whose ideas were, oftentimes, ignored. The degree of participation in the budget planning stage was generally better than in stages of the budget cycle. Women and other marginalized sectors were given minimal opportunity for participation in the planning.

In some regions, the government had established special units to receive complaints from the citizens and set up a complaints database system to speed up response to concerns. Some mechanisms, though, have yet to be out in place. Another good practice that was observed was to timely submission of budget documents to the parliament for as aids for the discussion. This enhances participation in the succeeding stages of the budget cycle (e.g. budget implementation). Although some local governments had no integrated system for procurement, most had instituted a procurement scheme before holding public biddings (commonly conducted in public). Some of the local governments had set up an online bidding system, which may be considered as a step towards the prevention of corruption. Unfortunately, most of the local governments had yet to publish the list of blacklisted companies with poor track record in procurement, as mandated by Presidential Regulation No. 54/2010.

The study, likewise, suggests that planning and budgeting in most regions in Indonesia are not yet gender responsive despite the existence of a law related to it. Spaces provided for women participation is limited to members of women's organizations, women activists, and women from the academe. In addition, only 60% of the sample local government units had established special units for gender mainstreaming. Among these, only five had formed gender-responsive budgeting units that have not been functioning effectively



since gender-based analysis was not considered in the problem analysis. In addition, the number of women holding top official positions in most of the regions was less than 20% of the total (number of officials in the regions).

The study concluded that most regions in Indonesia had not implemented the principles of good governance fully. Their performances were categorized as 'average' according to the index value set up for this study. In addition, there was no significant difference in the performance between cities and districts as well as between Java and non-Java regions. Considering its results, the study posted several recommendations for the national and local governments and for citizen groups to consider. These include: a) building the capacity of district/city government in actualizing good governance principles by encouraging inter-district/city learning; b) establishing units to evaluate the efficiency of the district/city governments in providing information; c) providing more spaces for public participation; d) establishing local accountability agencies to ensure government accountability; and e) paying close attention to every budgeting cycle and providing easy-to-understand and easy-to-access information to the public related to the budget cycle.



ENDNOTES

¹ A prominent writer, candidate for Nobel Prize in Literature whose writings represent the socialist perspective. In the beginning of the New Order Era, Pramodya Ananta Toer was exiled to Buru Island due to his association with Indonesian Communist Party.

² Saich, Dapice, Masoud, Perkins, Pincus, Rosengard, Valley, Wilkinson, and Williams, (2010).

³ Ibid.

⁴ The study was coordinated by Seknas-FITRA and implemented by 28 local CSOs in 42 districts/municipalities and five provinces in Indonesia in 2010-2011.

⁵ Personal communication with Kristanto Sinandang, Head of Crisis Prevention Unit, UNDP Indonesia on 29 November 2010.

⁶ The so-called “Gayus-gate” dominated the headlines of the Indonesian mass media in 2010. As a low level tax officer with a monthly salary of US\$1,200, Gayus had US\$11 million in his bank account. In the court he admitted that he received the money from some companies as compensation for his “kindness” in helping them reduce their tax. This case has opened eyes of the public to the fact that the revenue side needs also “accountability”. In the past, focus was more on the use of public funds.

⁷ Compare with Malena, Forster, and Singh (2004): “Social Accountability can be defined as an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e. in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. Mechanisms of social accountability can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens or both, but very often they are demand-driven and operate from the bottom-up. Social accountability mechanisms are sometimes referred to as “external” or “vertical” mechanisms of accountability.” (p. 3)

⁸ The data in this table is not intended to represent the general perception of government and non-government agencies’ understanding of social accountability. The data in this table contains findings from a series of semi-structured interviews with a number of government officials and NGO leaders conducted for this study.

⁹ YPSHK or Foundation of Development Study for Law and Policies was founded on July 21, 2001 and incorporated on October 18, 2002. The organization cooperates with CSOs toward community development, with emphasis on respect for human rights, law and pluralism. Retrieved from <http://www.ansa-eap.net/networking/geographic-focus/east-indonesia-conveners-group-indonesia/country-partners/yayasan-pengembangan-study-hukum-kebijakan-yphsk/>

¹⁰ Information from this section was collected from The Asia Foundation project “Building Better Budgets for Gender Responsive Governance” in 2009.



¹¹ Compare with the conceptual framework of civil society by Heinrich (2005) and Chandoke (2005).

¹² Interview with FITRA staff, 22 December 2010. Pattiro staff, in a separate interview, also related a similar experience.

¹³ Activities with Moslem MBOS expand the Muslim leaders' understanding of the budgetary processes (budget literacy training), thereby providing opportunities for pro-poor policy advocacy. The second module, PP Lakpesdam NU guided the Moslem leaders on how to conduct *bathsul masail*, a forum of Islamic leaders (*kyai*) that discusses social problems from an Islamic perspective. .

¹⁴ WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, or The Indonesian Forum for Environment) is an Indonesian environmental non-governmental organization, which is part of the Friends of the Earth network. It describes itself as "Indonesia's largest environmental NGO," and its scope is broader than just environmental concerns: "It stands for social transformation, people's sovereignty, and sustainability of life and livelihoods." Retrieved from <http://www.eng.walhi.or.id/ttgkami/>

¹⁵ The Indonesian Ombudsman recorded that in 2010, they received 5942 complaints. The figure is low when measured against the Indonesian population of 237.6 million (www.ombudsman.go.id).

¹⁶ National Program for Community Empowerment.

¹⁷ McGee and Gaventia (2010) listed the benefits as follows: (1) increased state or institutional responsiveness; (2) lowering of corruption; (3) building new democratic spaces for citizen engagement; (4) empowering local voices; and (5) better budget utilization and better delivery of services.

¹⁸ This categorization was adopted from Talisayon's "Monitoring and Evaluation in Knowledge Management for Development" (2009).

¹⁹ An example of a PNPM program that works in more than 15,000 villages of more than 450 districts.



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