PARTICIPATORY PLANNING IN EAST ASIA

A MAPPING STUDY

AFFILIATED NETWORK FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

ATENEO SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

in partnership with

PRIA GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

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ACT	Area Coordination Team
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIP	Annual Investment Program
ANSA-EAP	Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific
APBD	Annual Plan Budget Document
BAPPEDA	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah
BDC	Barangay Development Council
BDP-PSA	Barangay Development Plan-Participatory Situation Analysis
BSDA	Buddhism and Social Development Association
CAR	Council for Administrative Reforms
CBMS	Community-Based Monitoring System
CBO	community-based organization
CDD	community driven development
CDP	Commune Development Plan (Cambodia)
CDP	Comprehensive Development Plan (Philippines)
CEAC	Community Empowerment and Activity Cycle
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIP	Commune Investment Program
CLUP	Comprehensive Land Use Plan
CMDGs	Cambodian MDGs
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMECON	Organization for International Economic Cooperation
COMELEC	Commission on Elections
COP	Council of Participatory Budgeting
CPP	Cambodia People's Party
CSF	Commune/Sangkat Fund
CSO	civil society organization
DANIDA	Danish Development Assistance
DBM	Department of Budget and Management
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DIW	District Integration Workshop
DKT	focus group discussion (Indonesian term)
DND	Democracy Resource Center for National Development

DoF	Department of Finance (Philippines)
DPPKA	Department of Finance (Indonesia)
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
FCR	Foundation for Contemporary Research
FGD	focus group discussion
FKKB	Forum Kerukunan Keluarga Becak
FKKP	Forum of Coordination of Posyandu Activists
FORMASI	Forum for Indonesian Cooperative Movement
FUNCINPEC	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOLD	Governance and Local Democracy
HUAF	Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry
IDP	Integrated Development Planning
IDPG	Institute for Democratic Participation and Governance
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
ILGR	Initiatives for Local Governance Reform
IMOLA	Integrated Management of Lagoon Activities
IPGI	Indonesian Partnership for Local Governance Initiatives
IRR	implementing rules and regulations
JFPR	Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction
JMC-1 2007	Joint Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2007
KADUAMI	Katinnuloang Dagiti Umili ti Amianan
Kalahi-CIDSS	Kapit-Bisig Laban Sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services
LCE	Local Chief Executive
LDC	Local Development Council
LDIP	Local Development Investment Program
LEA	Legislative-Executive Agenda
LGC	Local Government Code of 1991
LGU	Local Government Unit
LKMD	Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa
LPMK	Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MCUD	Ministry of Construction and Urban Development
MDC	Municipal Development Council
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIAC	Municipal Inter-Agency Committee
MLN	Municipal Learning Network
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MSD	Multi-Stakeholders Dialogue

MTR	Mid-Term Review
NCDD	National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development
NCSC	National Committee for Support to the Communes/Sangkat
NEDA	National Economic Development Authority
NGO	non-government organization
NP-SNDD	National Plan for Sub-National Democratic Development
NSCB	National Statistical Coordination Board
NSDP	National Strategic Development Plan
O&M	operation and maintenance
PACAP	Philippines-Australia Community Assistance Program
PaCoCo	Pagoda Coordination Committee
PATTIRO	Pusat Telaah dan Informasi Regional
PBC	Planning and Budgeting Committee
PEM	Public Expenditure Management
PFM	Public Finance Management
PGP	PRIA Global Partnership
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia
PNPM	Programme Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri
PO	people's organization
PPA	program, project, and activity
PPP	Perencanaan Pembangunan Partisipatif
PRIA	Participatory Research in Asia
PSA	Participatory Situation Analysis
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PTA	Parent-Teacher Association
RAPBD	Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah
RILG	Rural Investment and Local Governance
RKPD	Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah
RPJMD	Rancangan Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah
RPJPD	Rancangan Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah
RPS	Rationalized Planning System
RT	Rukun Tetanga
RW	Rukun Warga
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SK	Sangguniang Kabataan
SKPD	Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah
SLP	Sustainable Livelihood Program
SPG	sub-project group
SRP	Sam Rainsy Party
TGCH	Tam Gian-Cau Hai
TWC	Technical Working Committee
UDRC	Urban Development Resource Center

UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT	Value Added Tax
VND	Vietnam Dong (currency)

INTRODUCTION

ACCOUNTABILITY refers to the obligation of power-holders—those who hold political, financial, and administrative authority—to take responsibility for their actions. In a democracy, people are represented by those they elected. Because they represent the people, those who govern are accountable to the people. Experience, however, shows that elections often fail to serve their "accountability" function.

ANSA-EAP refers to *social accountability* as "organized and capable citizens engaging constructively with government to monitor its decisions and actions toward better delivery of public services, improvement of people's welfare, and protection of people's rights". In demanding accountability from government institutions, social accountability relies on constructive citizen participation and citizen engagement.

For social accountability to happen, it needs an enabling environment—the Four Pillars of Social Accountability.

The Four Pillars of Social Accountability

SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY includes a wide range of actions aimed at ensuring that government fulfills its obligations to its citizens. An enabling environment, however, must be in place for social accountability to happen. "Enabling environment" refers to inter-connected social, economic, and political factors that define the space for constructive engagement and, eventually, good governance. This enabling environment needs four conditions, known as the Four Pillars of Social Accountability: organized and capable citizen groups, responsive government, context and cultural appropriateness, and access to information (ANSA-EAP Strategy Paper, 2009).

Organized and capable citizen groups

The level of organization and capacity of citizen groups, civil society organizations, communities and other development stakeholders—the breadth and scope of their membership, their technical and advocacy skills, their capacity to mobilize resources, effectively use media, and strengthen their legitimacy and quality of their conduct and actions including their internal accountability practices—are all central to the success of social accountability action. This capacity has technical and substantive as well as procedural requirements so that the efficient and effective initiatives in the form of agenda, platforms, projects and programs bring forth the desired outcomes and changes.

Responsive government

The responsiveness of government to citizens' participation is embodied in the laws, rules, practices and cultural mores that circumscribe the actual space for citizens to hold government officials accountable. Since space for citizen participation is opened up by reform champions within government, finding and nurturing these reform champions from the ranks of bureaucrats, government officials, and public servants is an important part of social accountability action.

Context and cultural appropriateness

To succeed, social accountability action must respond effectively to the economic, political and cultural context of a sector, nation, or region. To ignore context and culture is to risk alienating local stakeholders. When context and culture are deemed inhospitable to social accountability action, social accountability must be pursued strategically, with foreknowledge of the environment, the barriers, and the risks.

Access to information

Essential to social accountability practice is the availability of reliable public data and its correct analysis and interpretation by competent citizen groups. Access to information includes both physical access to source documents and their availability in a format understandable to users. It also requires access to those who either have the information or know where the information is lodged. All these underscore the need for an unambiguous law guaranteeing freedom of information.

With these enabling conditions in place, social accountability has a greater chance for governance and development outcomes to be realized.

Social Accountability and the Public Finance Management Cycle

PUBLIC FINANCE Management (PFM) is at the core of good governance (Maggi & Hegarty, 2008). With the growing demand for accountability and transparency from government, understanding the PFM process facilitates more effective responses and strategies for addressing these concerns (Ramkumar, 2008).

Figure 1. The Public Finance Management cycle.



Source: ANSA-EAP, 2009.

PFM is about collecting resources in a sufficient and appropriate manner, and allocating and using these resources responsively, efficiently, and effectively. It focuses on the system of aggregate control, prioritization, accountability and efficiency in the management of public resources and delivery of services. Some PFM activities include resource mobilization, prioritization of programs, budgeting, management of resources and exercising controls (Schiavo-Campo & Tommasi, 1999).

PFM has three objectives. The first is efficient allocation of resources, that is, the use of limited resources such that it maximizes goods and services. Second is distribution of income, in which government expenditures result in transferring income from one sector to another, for example the purchase of medicine transfers wealth to those who will use the medicine. Distribution of income should be treated in such a way as to promote equity among different income levels and sectors. Third is macroeconomic stabilization, that is, the absence of excessive fluctuations in the overall economy. This means sustained growth and the ability to recover when faced with financial and economic crisis. (ANSA-EAP & Deles, 2010)

There are four stages in the PFM cycle (Figure 1). In the first stage planning, needs, priorities, programs, and strategies are identified. Budgeting comes next, in which available resources are identified and allocated according to the priorities listed in the first stage. The third is expenditure management, which is the utilization of resources. Procurement is part of this process. Finally, performance is evaluated, in which government performance is reviewed in relation to set goals and priorities in the planning phase.

Involving citizen groups and civil society in PFM promotes transparency, better tracking and execution, and overall responsiveness of the process. Examples of citizen involvement in the PFM include support in the function of oversight government activities, influencing allocation of public funds and budget to reflect public priorities, and monitoring of government performance to increase accountability and continuously improve delivery of results (ANSA-EAP & Deles, 2010).

Planning, which is the first step in the cycle, has a critical role in identifying and prioritizing development needs. Decision-making on the allocation and use of scarce public resources depend on planning. But how do we ensure that citizen participation is mainstreamed in the PFM, starting with planning?

This paper explores the understanding and practice of citizen participation in development planning in a number of countries in East Asia. Specifically, the study wants to:

- Develop a reasonably comprehensive mapping of participatory planning experiences in Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam and Thailand;
- Identify stakeholders and their roles in participatory planning processes in particular and in social accountability in general; and
- Analyze gaps and challenges in relation to policy environment, institutional capacity, and actual practice.

The study interviewed experts on participatory planning, local leaders, and other community stakeholders in Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In addition, it also reviewed secondary literature from the four countries, including Mongolia, Vietnam, and Thailand. The study presents four detailed cases from Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines. The study focused on local cases on participatory planning practices in Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines.

ANSA-EAP, in coordination with PRIA, held a one-day validation workshop in Phnom Penh in Cambodia on July 9, 2010. Participants included participatory planning experts, actors in the documented case studies, practitioners from civil society organizations, and donor agencies in the region. The workshop outputs were integrated into the final report.

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING — AN OVERVIEW

THE FOLLOWING section presents an overview of participatory planning in East Asia. It reviews of the role of citizen participation in the democratic governance cycle and presents some characteristics of participatory planning. Based on the case studies presented, it summarizes the current situation of participatory planning in the region: the interplay of policies, institutions, and programs within the context of decentralization; the initiators and stakeholders; the tools and techniques applied; and the steps and processes used. It places participatory planning in the context of social accountability and the challenges it faces given the context and culture of the region. Finally, this section provides some directions for the future of participatory planning in East Asia. The section ends with a summary of the participatory planning situation in the four countries based on the cases presented.

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING IN EAST ASIA: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE

IN THE late 1970s and early 1980s, the discourse on "participation" revolved around such terms as "participatory development", "popular movement", "people's participation", and so on. These terms were adopted from Paulo Freire's (1921-1997) concept of "conscientization of the oppressed", found in his seminal work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Freire, 2007). Social activists—who found Freire's ideas refreshing—started organizing and "conscientizing" communities to fight oppression. In many cases, the issues revolved around access and control over natural resources such as land, water, and forests. Many of today's environmental movements where people's participation is a feature owe their existence to these movements.

Figure 2. The context of participation in the project cycle framework.



In the 1990s, international donor agencies, such as the World Bank, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), expanded the concept of "participation" especially in large-scale government projects in developing countries.[1] These agencies saw that project costs could be lowered through beneficiary participation. Grassroots participation was promoted, for

[1] The World Bank, which had already been incorporating local participatory structures and Participatory Rural Appraisal in many of its projects, formally adopted the Participation Policy in 1994.

example, on afforestation or wasteland development, provision of drinking water, and promotion of preventive health care (Tandon, 2007). Local innovations and people's inputs showed better results in the utilization of resources. More importantly, there was a sense of ownership in the projects.

The project cycle was used as a framework to "manage" participation (Figure 2). Most of the participatory practices and methodologies evolved from the developing countries.

The practice of "participation" during these years led to a deeper discourse on "democracy building", "good governance", and the concept of "citizenship". One line of thought said that citizenship is conferred by the State; thus citizens have "rights" to claim from the State, while the State has the "obligation" to fulfill those claims. Another line of thinking stressed that citizenship should be "active" and "responsible", emphasizing the duty of citizens as contributors in building society.

The concept of participation was also attached to "good governance". Up until then, governance was thought of as technocratic and administrative. It was thought that decentralization, which a number of developing countries adopted, would bring about wider participation and, thus, enhance development effectiveness, inclusiveness, and equity.[2]

Participation in the Democratic Governance Cycle

PARTICIPATION IS assumed to be inherent in the democratic governance cycle (Figure 3). The cycle starts with the *electoral process***.** Citizens vote for individuals and parties based on the latter's development platforms. Those elected into office *develop and formulate policies* that are supposedly aligned with their campaign promises. Development needs are identified and prioritized through *planning and resource allocation* (or *budgeting*). Using expenditure management principles, the government *utilizes the allocated resources***.** The effective use of resources should bring in the desired *performance results*. Based on government's performance, citizens decide whether or not to re-elect their government leaders in the next elections.

2 While there are overlaps, distinctions should be made among the terms decentralization, deconcentration, and devolution. Decentralization refers to a transfer of responsibility from central to local agents of authority. Deconcentration refers to the transfer of administrative responsibilities from central bureaus of agencies to a subordinate field office. Devolution refers to shifting decision-making powers from central to the local level of government (Schiavo-Campo, Sundram, &Vista-Baylon, 2001).

Figure 3. Participation in the democratic governance framework.

In practice, the cycle of democratic governance is not always smooth and rational. Electoral promises are often forgotten; gaps and misalignment exist between policy direction and resource allocation; resources are diverted for political purposes; and leakages and corruption impede government spending. Development outcomes are thus not achieved as expected. When this happens, there is a crisis in governance.

Cornwall and Coelho (2007) identified three views that have emerged in response to this crisis in governance. These are:

- The *neo-liberal market* approach argues for decentralization and an emphasis on privatization. The market takes the lead, and citizens become consumers.
- The *liberal representative model* focuses on correcting democratic institutions and emphasizes a multi-party electoral process. Citizens are regarded as passive actors.
- The *"deepening democracy" approach* borrows heavily from the participatory democracy tradition. Democracy moves beyond institutions to the community. Citizens become part of decision-making through a regular and continuous effort.

Characteristics of Participatory Planning

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING has a number of characteristics.

- *Use of local knowledge*. Participatory planning taps into the knowledge and experience of local communities. Information and technical processes are provided by experts and other sources (e.g., census, economy surveys, etc.).

- *Direct citizen involvement at various stages.* Citizens are not regarded as mere data sources. They are actively involved in decision-making, implementation, monitoring, and maintaining services and installations.
- *Development of individual views through social interaction.* While conventional planning emphasizes individual interests and opinions (which are often static), participatory planning puts importance on mutual learning. People share ideas, experiences, expertise, and interests. Further, it recognizes that interests can change over time.
- *Diversity of interests is valued.* People have diverse interests and expectations, rooted in social constructs such as family structures and gender roles. The participatory planning process allows this diversity to be articulated and shared.

Table 1 shows the distinctions between conventional planning and participatory planning.

Table 1. Differences between conventional planning and participatory planning.

Characteristics	*From "project" approach…*	*To "process" approach…*
Focus	Things	People
Planning	Top-down	Participatory
Change	Linear, controlled	Iterative, uncontrolled
People	"Beneficiary"	"Citizen"
Behavior	Dominating	Empowering
Typical procedures	Logical framework	Negotiated principles and processes
Accountability	Upwards	Downwards and 360 degrees
Spread	Replicated	Catalyzed
Outcomes	Infrastructure, standardized	Relationships, diverse

Source: LogoLink, 2002

Participatory Planning Initiatives in East Asia

MANY PEOPLE think local development planning is for experts and specialists. But the move toward decentralization in East Asia in recent years has prodded local government institutions to plan, implement, and deliver services to citizens. Starting in the early 1990s, many East Asian countries underwent a shift in the way they do governance. From being highly centralized, these countries are placing an important role on sub-national and local governments as vehicles for development.[3]

It must be noted, however, that the move toward decentralization in East Asia has been uneven. China, for example, is a non-starter, while Vietnam is lagging behind. Efforts in the Philippines and Indonesia are moving ahead; Cambodia, Mongolia, and Thailand have moved more cautiously (White & Smoke, 2005).

Decentralized governance is often thought of as providing an enabling environment where policies, programs, and institutions emphasize local participatory planning. The move toward decentralization is probably beneficial: local institutions are better equipped in finding

[3] Important factors that drive decentralization in these East Asian countries are economic growth, urbanization, and a second wave of democratization.

ways to enlist citizens to participate in public decision-making processes (Wong & Guggenheim, 2005). While participatory planning has been adopted by a number of local governments, the challenge is to institutionalize the practice.

Reviewed here are cases of participatory planning from Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines. With the cases as platforms, this paper takes a deeper look at the policies, institutions, and programs; the initiators and stakeholders; the tools used and the techniques applied; and the steps and processes in participatory planning.

The interplay of policies, institutions, and programs

To understand decentralization, it is important to examine the crucial components of policies, institutions, and programs.

Policies

Most East Asian countries already have the legal and policy framework for participatory planning in place. But the design and enabling conditions of these frameworks, however, vary from country to country. According to Logolink (2002),

> Legal frameworks were important but not sufficient… More than the presence of legal frameworks, enabling conditions at the local level make participatory planning happen… The variance in how these frameworks are actually experienced depends on a number of factors like the levels of organization of civil society and the presence of champions with sufficient political will to make the intention of these frameworks real. (p. 35)

Enabling conditions include the "degree of which CSOs [civil society organizations] and communities are prepared to take on the challenge of participatory approaches" (Logolink 2002, p. 32).

While Indonesia's legal and policy framework is not as evolved as the Philippines', it has provided the enabling conditions for citizen participation, thus allowing local level innovation. The Philippines' legal and policy frameworks support community participation in local planning, and a number of good practices have been identified. Vietnam and Cambodia, on the other hand, seem unable to provide the conditions required for implementing their legal and policy frameworks for citizen participation.

Cambodia. Cambodia is relatively new to decentralization. It was only in 2001 that the Law on the Election of Commune Councils and the Law on the Administration and Management of Communes (or *sangkats*) were enacted. These laws initiated the move toward decentralization. After the first commune council elections in 2002, the Cambodian government established a number of regulatory structures and mechanisms in support of decentralization

The Commune Law and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) mandate all communes to develop and implement a five-year Commune Development Plan (CDP). The CDP adopts a bottom-up participatory planning process designed to address the needs and aspirations of the people. The CDP provides the framework for a multi-year Commune Investment Program (CIP) and for the preparation of the commune annual budget.

Being new in decentralization reform, many local institutions are not prepared and majority of citizens are unaware of their right to participate.

Indonesia. The end of the Suharto regime in 1998 signaled the start of decentralization in Indonesia. Law No. 22/1999 decentralized authority to the district and municipal levels. Law No. 25/1999 provides 25 percent of the national budget to local governments in the form of the General Allocation Fund. Act No. 25/2004 encourages citizen participation in development planning. Government Regulation No. 8/2008 puts into detail the content and process of planning. It took nearly a decade for Indonesia to enact the IRRs for the decentralization reform process.

Three documents result from the bottom-up planning process: a 20-year long-term plan document, a 5-year mid-term plan document, and an annual plan document.

Mongolia. Mongolia underwent rapid transition from a centralized democracy to an open market economy in the early 1990s. The 1992 Constitution recognizes administrative units as self-governing. Governors represent sub-national level governments. Assemblies at the lower level elect representatives to the higher-level Assembly. The constitution provides for mechanisms where people can participate in decision-making at all levels of government. However, the legal framework for the IRRs is still not in place.

The Philippines. The 1987 Constitution was ratified a year after the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos, who had ruled as a dictator for over a decade. In 1991, the Local Government Code (LGC), which emphasized citizen participation, was enacted. The LGC institutionalized citizen participation through Local Development Councils (LDCs) at various levels: *barangay* (village), municipality, city, and province. The LDCs are responsible for crafting a comprehensive and multi-sector 5-year development plan to be approved by the *sanggunian* (local legislative body); formulating public investment programs; and coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating the implementation of development programs and projects. The LDCs are supposed to mobilize citizen participation in these processes.

In summary, Indonesia and the Philippines have a more developed legal framework for participatory planning compared with that of Cambodia and Mongolia.

Institutions

Local institutions that facilitate participatory planning appear to be more advanced in the Philippines and Indonesia. Those in Cambodia, Mongolia, and Vietnam are still evolving.

Cambodia. The commune council initiates local planning. Depending on the size of the population it represents, a commune council's membership may range between five and 11. The commune chief presides over the council and appoints members to the advisory committees. The advisory committees include the Planning and Budgeting Committee (PBC) and the Procurement Committee. Each village is represented in the PBC. The PBC prepares the Commune Investment Plans and drafts the budget for the Commune/*Sangkat* Fund, which in turn is submitted to the commune council for approval and adoption.

At present, participatory processes face two major constraints. First, commune councilors, who are directly elected by the people, do not find participation by the people important. Second, majority of the people are not aware of their right to participate nor do they know about the functions of the commune council.

Indonesia. The Regional Planning Agency *(*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah or BAPPEDA) of Indonesia plays a crucial role in the local planning and budgeting process. The

BAPPEDA, which is composed of administrative officials, prepares the planning documents and organizes the *musrenbang* (short for Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan)[4]. The BAPPEDA draft plan is the basis for the musrenbang deliberations. Based on the musrenbang output, the BAPPEDA chairman prepares the various planning documents.[5] The Dnas Pendapatan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Asset (or Department of Finance) prepares the budget. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (or district legislative council) provides policy support for the annual plan budget.

The Philippines*.* The Local Government Code gives an important role to the local development councils in local planning. The LDC is headed by the local chief executive: the provincial governor at the provincial level, the mayor at the city or municipal level, and the barangay captain at the village level. Other members include representatives of accredited sector organizations, non-government organizations, civil society organizations, community-based organizations, and the local congressman.

The LDCs are mandated to mobilize citizen participation in local planning. The LDCs are supposed to meet at least twice a year or as often as necessary.

Programs

Many programs that use the participatory planning approach in East Asian countries focus on poverty alleviation. Multilateral funding agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) supported these initiatives. The preference was for a community-driven development approach intended to strengthen local institutions.

Cambodia. UNDP funded the S*eila* (literally in Khmer: "foundation stone") in 1996. Aimed at poverty reduction in the rural areas, *seila* was designed and implemented to strengthen decentralization for local planning, financing and implementation at the provincial and commune levels. The *sangkat*, which is recognized as the smallest unit of governance, played an important role in implementing the S*iela*.

Indonesia. Indonesia's major poverty reduction program, called Programme Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri (PNPM), uses the participatory approach. The program is designed to create employment, stimulate the local economy, and build community participation.

Mongolia. The Sustainable Livelihood Program (SLP) of Mongolia is aimed at poverty reduction using the participatory approach. The program's objectives include increasing the quantity and quality of cattle through proper management, increasing rural community access to funding opportunities, and building the capacity of the community to ensure quality program

[4] *Musrenbang*, or Multi-Stakeholder Consultation Forum for Development Planning, is a deliberative multi-stakeholder forum that identifies and prioritizes community development policies. It aims to be a process for negotiating, reconciling and harmonizing differences between government and nongovernmental stakeholders and reaching collective consensus on development priorities and budgets. There is a hierarchy of these forums for synchronizing between 'bottom up' and 'top down' planning. (Local Governance Support Group-USAID, [n.d.])

[5] Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah (RKPD) refers to the workplan. Rancangan Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah (RPJMD) refers to the medium-term development plan. Rancangan Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah (RPJPD) refers to the long-term development plan.

implementation. While the policy supporting participatory processes are in place, the IRRs still need to be clearly spelled out.

The Philippines. The Kalahi-CIDSS[6] is the Philippine government's flagship poverty alleviation program. It is a community-driven development (CDD) initiative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) that aims to reduce poverty and vulnerabilities to poverty by addressing negative conditions relating to lack of capacity and resources at the local level and limited responsiveness of local governance to development community priorities. The six-year project, which started in 2003, covers 25 percent of the poorest municipalities in the poorest 42 (out of 79) provinces of the Philippines, equivalent to more than 4,000 villages in 182 municipalities.

Supported by the World Bank and implemented at the *barangay* level, Kalahi-CIDDS adopts a participatory approach in the conduct of situation analysis, development planning and resource allocation, organizational development and local structure enhancement, community mobilization and volunteer development, and community-based monitoring and evaluation. It has a built-in grievance redress mechanism. In addition, the Community-Based Monitoring System (CBMS) provides information for planning and monitoring.

These poverty reduction programs have components that encourage community participation at various stages of program or project implementation. The cases illustrate the extent to which these programs have created a favorable environment for the institutionalization of participatory planning and social accountability.

Initiators and stakeholders

Participatory processes are more likely to be sustained if these are adopted at the local level (such as in the Municipality of Pinabacdao in the Philippines and Solo City in Indonesia). However, if the process is top-down or initiated by an external agency (such as Mongolia's SLP), sustainability becomes an issue.

The major actors in participatory planning, as found in the cases, are the national government; the local government units; community members represented by community-based organizations (CBOs) and citizens' associations; civil society organizations, NGOs, media, and the academe; and donor agencies.

Each actor has a distinct set of roles and functions, but there are overlaps. The national government provides resources and creates an enabling policy environment. Local governments implement the policies, provide specific guidelines, and consolidate community needs. Community representatives articulate the community's aspirations, needs, and priorities; facilitate whatever local counterpart is available (usually in the form of labor); and monitor the implementation of activities. Civil society organizations lobby for an enabling policy environment, monitor the implementation of policies, and facilitate the participation of community members. Finally, donor organizations, together with other actors, provide resources and technical assistance.

Cambodia. The village chief convenes the *sangkat* members to participate in the planning activity. The results of the planning activity are consolidated by the village councilors and give

[6] *Kapit-Bisig Laban Sa Kahirapan*-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services.

shape to the Commune Development Plan. In terms of resource sharing, the community contributes about 10 percent, in addition to labor. NGOs participate by providing additional funding support.

Indonesia. Solo City initiated the *musrenbang* process with the support of the Indonesian Partnership on Local Governance Initiatives (IPGI). The participants included government administrative officials, civil society members, and academicians. This group lobbied the city government to try out participatory planning and participatory budgeting. In 2005, the city mayor, who was perceived to be a reformist, adopted the *musrenbang* process.

Mongolia. The experience of Mongolia in initiating a participatory approach was a top-down process. The national government, supported by ADB, implemented a community-driven development project in the *ger* communities in urban areas. Headed by the Ministry of Construction and Urban Development (MCUD), the project was designed to allow citizen participation in project planning, implementation, maintenance, and monitoring. An inter-agency steering committee composed of the MCUD, Ministry of Finance, local governments, public urban service organizations, and NGOs provided policy and technical support. The ADB involved local NGOs and experts in mobilizing and training local officials and community leaders.

The Philippines. While the Philippines' Kalahi-CIDSS framework is crafted at the national level, the success of its implementation depends largely on participation at the local level. This is shown in the Municipality of Pinabacdao whose mayor made true his promise to involve his constituents in the development process. The Kalahi-CIDSS was a perfect match to support his vision.

Using the community-driven development approach, the project was implemented with the support of the DSWD, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Institute for Democratic Participation and Governance (IDPG, a local NGO), and the Philippine-Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP). The DSWD provided the overall project framework as well as technical inputs. The DILG guided the municipality in formulating its development plan using the Rationalized Planning System (RPS). PACAP's support was in the form of a grant fund, while IDPG carried out secretariat and community organizing work.

In all these cases, a number of tools and techniques were employed for participatory planning.

Tools and techniques

The participatory approach uses four kinds of tools. These are needs assessment tools, mobilization tools, negotiation tools, and monitoring tools.

Needs assessment tools are applied in various forms in the countries studied. The Philippines' Kalahi-CIDDS utilizes the participatory situation analysis, while Cambodia conducts a needs assessment survey. Both are used to deepen the community's understanding of their own situation as well as to generate ideas on how to address their needs. *Mobilization tools* are used in Indonesia to organize sectoral groups, and in Mongolia, to form network savings groups. These tools are intended to enhance participation in the planning process.

Tools for dialogue and negotiations are also utilized. Cambodia has its District Integration Workshops, the Philippines its Municipal Learning Network, and Indonesia its *musrenbang*.

These are the platforms where dialogue and negotiation take place as participants identify and prioritize their needs. *Monitoring tools* such as the Philippines' Kalahi-CIDSS CBMS helps assess to what extent has the projects achieved their objectives.

A number of accountability tools and techniques are unique to each country. In Cambodia, some of the participatory tools and techniques to promote downward accountability include the disclosure of the commune council's minutes of meetings during village meetings, the village notice board, and the use of "accountability boxes". The accountability boxes in particular are used as a feedback mechanism where villagers anonymously deposit complaints about alleged misuse of commune funds or the poor quality of projects and service delivery. The boxes are opened once a month by provincial authorities.

Indonesia practices proactive disclosure of budget information. Posters bearing the local budget are displayed in strategic areas. Local governments adopted this method from the NGOs.

Similar public disclosure initiatives are also practiced in the *gers* of Mongolia. Project budgets are always available for inspection by community members. Various participatory techniques are used, such as transect maps, Venn diagrams, and flowcharts. Information boards announce community activities and projects during the monthly "Sports Day" in the *bag* communities, thus facilitating cross-community learning.

These tools and techniques are seen to promote social accountability, specifically participation in development planning.

Steps and processes

Unlike in Cambodia, Mongolia, and Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia have IRRs that detail the steps and processes of local participatory planning.

Cambodia. The five-year Commune Development Plan is prepared and approved by the commune councils during their first year in office. The CDP provides the framework for the multi-year Commune Investment Programme and for the preparation of the national budget. It is reviewed and updated yearly.

The planning process begins at the commune level. The village chief, who is nominated by the commune council in each village, convenes the meeting in July. The villagers are invited to the activity. The attendance of commune council members and other local officials are encouraged, but not mandatory. Participants in the commune-level meetings identify the needs of their community, and then prioritize them. The document is submitted to the commune council, which deliberates on the communes' recommendations and prioritizes programs and projects. The output is the CDP, which is submitted to the District Integration Workshop.

The commune Planning and Budgeting Committee prepares Commune Investment Programmes for the appropriate allocation of resources for the projects. The PBC also prepares the draft budget for the Commune/*Sangkat* Fund (CSF), which is submitted to the commune council for adoption.

The District Integration Workshop (DIW) serves two purposes: as the venue where commune councilors present their CDPs and negotiate with representatives of government agencies, and as an assessment of the previous year's projects. The output is the final and consolidated version of the CDPs. Projects not approved at this level may still be implemented, but funds will come from the CSF.

Indonesia. The BAPPEDA in Indonesia consolidates and synchronizes five kinds of plan documents: a) government priorities at the provincial and national level; b) the vision and mission for development as articulated by the local mayor; c) an evaluation of the previous year's annual development plan, d) the people's aspirations (*musrenbang*), and e) the legislative agenda.

Using the mayor's vision and mission for development, long-term (20-year) and a mid-term (five-year) strategic plans are prepared. Each government agency develops its strategic plan. The mid-term plan is then translated into action plans, which in turn become the basis for the BAPPEDA to commence the annual planning and budgeting process.

Participation in the planning process has two tracks: sector-based and geographic. The sector-based track starts with discussions participated by groups as diverse as artisans and educators. The discussions are then brought to the city level, where inputs from the sectors are consolidated. The geographic track starts with the households (*rukun tetangga)* and neighborhood groups (*rukun warga*). Representatives of these *rukuns* participate at the *kelurahan* discussions. Their proposals are consolidated and discussed in the *musrenbang* at the *kecamatan*[7] level, where representatives of the *kelurahan* also participate. Any citizen can participate in the deliberations although he/she does not have the right to vote.

The series of local discussions results in a documentation of issues and recommendations. The documents are sent to the concerned government agencies. A forum called Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah (SKPD) in each agency department synchronizes the proposals with the department's activities, and then prepares a plan and a corresponding budget. The department-level draft plans are consolidated in preparing for the draft city plan or the Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah (RKPD). The RKPD is presented and discussed at the city-level *musrenbang*.

It is in the city-level *musrenbang* where decisions are made about funding distribution between the city government and the provincial government. The city-level budget is funded by the local government, while the other proposals are by other stakeholders (community, NGOs, private sector).

Budgeting is a technical process. The consolidated draft plan or RKPD is matched with two policy documents, the general policy on budget and the projected budget[8] prepared by the BAPPEDA and the Department of Finance. The final draft of the city budget, or Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah (RAPBD), in which specific budgets are allocated for each line department, undergoes a public hearing. The document is then submitted to the legislative council or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) for review and approval. The final document is called the Annual Plan Budget Document (APBD).

Mongolia. Development planning in Mongolia is based on two types of plans: the land use plan and the urban plan. Ideally, the urban plan is based on the land use plan. But being new to the market economy, Mongolia is experiencing difficulties in coordinating the two plans. (Prior to the 1990s, land use planning was mainly directed at rural areas.) There are many cases where urban plans do not follow the land use plan.

[7] A subdistrict (*kecamatan*) is a subdivision of a regency or district (*kabupaten*) or city (*kota*) in Indonesia. A subdistrict is divided into administrative villages (*kelurahan*).

[8] The projected budget is based on a projection of local revenues vis-à-vis the strategic plan. The Department of Finance (DPPKA) prepares the projected budget for ten sectors every year. The budgets are forwarded to the line departments.

The Urban Development Resource Center (UDRC) facilitates development planning in the *ger* areas. It manages workshops with volunteer community groups (such as savings groups) to identify and prioritize community needs. A sub-project committee is assisted by the UDRC in developing a proposal and drafting a budget for the priority sub-project. The proposal includes an operational and maintenance plan as well as a monitoring and evaluation plan. Once evaluated and approved, the projects are implemented under the management of the community group. This includes fund management, procurement of materials and transportation, and the hiring of contractors and laborers.

The Philippines. Local development planning in the Philippines is based on two planning documents, the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) and the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP). Both documents are prescribed in the RPS of the Department of the Interior and Local Governments (DILG).

The CLUP refers to a document embodying specific proposals for guiding and regulating growth and development of a city or municipality. It is comprehensive because it considers all sectors significant in the development process, i.e., demography, socio-economic, infrastructure and utilities, land use and local administration, within the territorial jurisdiction. It lays down the strategies on how to maximize the use of the spatial aspects of a municipality.

The CDP, on the other hand, is intended to promote the general welfare of the local inhabitants as a corporate body. It is a comprehensive multi-sectoral development plan. To this end, the Local Development Councils are mandated to formulate long-term, medium-term, and annual socio-economic development plans and policies. The CDP is considered as an action plan to implement the CLUP.

Guided by these two documents and with inputs from the Legislative-Executive Agenda (LEA) and *barangay*-level development plans, the LDCs identify strategic programs, projects, and activities (PPAs). These are matched and prioritized with available financing resources. The resulting document is the six-year Local Development Investment Program (LDIP). The Annual Investment Program (AIP) is the current year's slice of the LDIP. The AIP serves as the basis for preparing the annual executive budget once approved by the *sanggunian*.

Following the Kalahi-CIDSS framework, the Municipality of Pinabacdao emphasized participatory situation analysis. Village-level representatives come together to analyze and to assess the local situation and the development of various sectors. The analysis leads to a visioning exercise where participants articulate the future ideal state of the village. Based on the situation analysis and the vision, the representatives develop their strategies and activities.

While all country cases adopt some form of people participation in the identification of needs and priorities, there are features unique to some. For example, the participatory approach in Indonesia and the Philippines is used not only for crafting the local development plan and its corresponding budget, but also to validate the results through local assemblies. This step is not found in Cambodia and Mongolia.

What seems to emerge from these steps and processes are the following lessons:

- Stakeholders own the process if a combination of bottom-up and top-down processes are utilized;
- Integration of village- or commune-level plans with district-level plans have a higher chance of accessing support from government agencies at higher levels;

- The use of "activity mapping"[9] across governance levels is key to effective participatory planning (e.g., commune council, district council, provincial council in Cambodia);
- The process is inclusive and acceptable if people are consulted (e.g., neighborhood-based discussions and sector- or interest-based discussions in Indonesia);
- Alignment of strategic plans and mid-term plans with annual plans ensures sustainability of processes and policies;
- Sustained participation in the processes of planning, implementation, monitoring, assessment and evaluation strengthens social accountability and produces better development outcomes.

Given these lessons and insights, what is the impact of participatory planning in social accountability?

Participatory Planning in Social Accountability

THE PRACTICE of participatory planning in East Asian countries has had a positive impact on strengthening and institutionalizing social accountability, at least at the local level.

It has opened the flow of information between and among stakeholders, specifically information on the planning process, budget allocations, and performance of government. The installation of feedback mechanisms has strengthened the grievance redress system, thus opening the space for government officials to be more responsive to their constituents.

Stakeholders require access to relevant and useful information in order for participatory planning to succeed. Information such as availability of resources, evaluation of previous plans, the quality of socio-economic data, and many more, are crucial in public decision-making.

Wong and Guggenheim (2005) observe that in the process of crafting "Indonesia's *Kecamatan* Development Plan, village committees must report back to the general village assembly at least twice during sub-project implementation to discuss progress and financial status" (p. 253). While similar mechanisms cannot be found at the city level, the local chief executive submits a quarterly report to the legislative body whose members are elected by the people.

The Commune Administration Law in Cambodia says that village chiefs should disseminate the minutes of commune meetings to the people. It seems, however, that the policy is not being implemented. People in the villages say they are not aware of minutes of commune meetings.

The sense of ownership of community activities appears to have been enhanced in Solo City, Pinabacdao, and in Erdenet City. This is shown in the increase of monitoring activities of government programs and projects. In Solo City, for example, women's groups actively monitor the annual budget implementation at the *kecamatan* and neighborhood levels. In Pinabacdao, organized elderly citizens monitor the actual implementation of projects. As Wong and Guggenheim (2005) note:

[9] "Activity mapping" is an exhaustive list of activities that organizations undertake, with each activity allocated to a specific tier of the organization.

> Each village forms an independent committee responsible for overseeing contracts, procurement, finances and implementation of development projects. These committees must report on financial status and physical progress at various stages. Provincial journalists and NGOs are also invited to act as watchdog over the proper use of public development funds. Together these mechanisms provide a system of checks and balances to help keep local governments accountable. (p. 253)

The participatory planning process has likewise strengthened feedback and grievance mechanisms. Prior to the *musrenbang* process, people in Solo City, Indonesia, as in Pinabacdao in the Philippines, lacked confidence in dealing with their respective local governments. But this has changed: people are now more confident in asking for information and bringing their complaints to the government. Those who were interviewed said people now have the courage to approach government officials and air their complaints.

While the signs are encouraging, the practice of participatory planning remains confronted with issues and challenges.

Participatory Planning in East Asia: Challenges to Social Accountability

Capacity gaps

THE CASES show that local governments and citizen groups—key actors in social accountability—need to build and enhance their capacities and competencies for constructive engagement. Both actors have gaps in understanding the principles and rationale behind citizen participation. Knowledge and skills in participatory processes and the use of participatory tools and techniques remain gray areas that need to be addressed. Citizen groups are unfamiliar with how the government bureaucracy works and often lack the technical capacity required in planning.

Low participation

Although decentralization in many East Asian countries has made inroads in leveling the governance playing field, citizen participation is still low when it comes to public decision-making. Some of the challenges include issues in government's administrative capacity and commitment to facilitate participation, not to mention the lack of community awareness toward mobilization. The demands of marginalized sectors such as women, the youth, the elderly, indigenous groups, and the like are under-articulated. Specific and detailed implementing rules and regulations, where these exist, are not implemented in an effective way.

Low participation is often a result of a lack of appreciation and understanding of the community situation and context. An example is Cambodia, where commune-level planning activities are held in July. This period is right in the middle of the rainy season when majority of the villagers are working in the fields. Because many villagers are not literate and do not realize the importance of the planning process, it is not uncommon for the village chief to just simply fill up the planning documents himself. But in communities where NGOs and traditional groups

(such as faith-based organizations) are active, participation by community members appear to be higher.

In Indonesia, where the *musrenbang* guidelines are quite detailed, the quality of citizen participation still leaves much to be desired. Marginalized groups in particular hardly take part in the *musrenbang*. In addition, those in government agencies tasked to prepare the plan and budget documents do not have a role to play in the *musrenbang* at the *kecamatan* level, with the effect that most of them are out of touch with the needs and concerns of the community.

In the Philippines, the process of participation largely ends with the identification of programs, projects and activities to address community concerns. Citizen participation is still wanting in the areas of budget formulation, expenditure tracking, procurement monitoring, and performance assessment.

Wish listing

Common among East Asian countries is the gap between the realization of people's aspirations and the resources available to governments. Because people are not fully aware of resource limitations and because plans are not based on real needs, the tendency is to create a long and unrealistic wish-list. Local governments and citizens are unable to achieve their objectives and they end up disappointed with participatory processes.

Figure 4. Unfulfilled expectations in participatory planning: a vicious cycle.

In Cambodia, as elsewhere in the region, not all people's demands—as articulated in their plans—are met. While they realize that resources are limited, people express disappointment when their long list of proposals to improve service delivery are not included in the final plan document. This experience discourages them from participating in the next round of planning activities. Even land expropriation is affected; people refuse to give up their lands for the construction of roads and irrigation canals. This vicious cycle is illustrated in Figure 4.

Weak downward accountability

Despite efforts to enforce downward accountability—referring to an agency's responsibility to answer for its actions to beneficiaries—many East Asian countries continue to be hobbled with issues of corruption, patron-client relationships, and bureaucratic capture.

While policies and mechanisms for accountability are in place, citizens are not able to maximize their use. Lack of awareness, inability to access to information, constraints in the socio-cultural environment, and geographic limitations are often identified as hindering factors. Edgardo and Hellman (2005) comment that

> Countervailing powers representing a broader range of public interests, such as the media and NGOs, are generally less developed in local jurisdictions… With limited resources, low capacity, weak links to national networks, and significant government interference in their activities, local NGOs still tend to play a restricted role in holding local governments accountable. (p. 240)

In Cambodia, a commune committee carries out monitoring and evaluation of projects. Accountability boxes are also used to gather feedback from the villagers. However, accountability boxes are often not effective because people simply do not know about these or, if they know, do not find these relevant. Accountability boxes are sometimes placed far from their homes. Thus, even with these mechanisms in place, citizens continue to complain about the poor quality of services.

Indonesia also has accountability mechanisms in place, but these are only useful in areas where citizens are organized and mobilized.

Access to information is likewise a major factor that affects downward accountability. While the Freedom of Information Act has been enacted in Indonesia, only a limited number of NGOs and activists have the capacity to make full use of the law. In the Philippines, the Freedom of Information law has yet to be passed.

The gaps and challenges highlighted here are only several of the many issues confronting citizen participation in East Asian countries. Focused interventions to resolve these issues may lead to a more effective participatory process especially at the local level.

THE FOLLOWING pages present an analytical matrix of participatory planning in East Asia. The analysis is based on the four case studies from Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines.

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING SITUATION IN EAST ASIA: A MATRIX

Theme	Cambodia	Indonesia	Mongolia	Philippines
Legal Framework: Policies, programmes and institutions	- Enactment of Law on the Election of Commune Council and Law on the Administration and Management of Communes/ Sangkats in January 2001 was the beginning of decentralization -Election in 2002 -Commune is responsible for preparing Commune Development Plan, Commune Investment Programme and Annual Budget. - law remains vague as to actual responsibilities of Commune Council for implementation of plan Planning: - CC responsible for preparing plan, consolidation through District Integration Workshop -Commune Planning and Budgeting Committee (2 rep from each village) - Provincial departments have limited autonomy with regard to central planning and funding of sector activities. Monitoring: -CC role in implementation is not clear but they have role in monitoring and evaluation -Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (one CC and one citizen)	- Law No. 22 (1999) decentralizes authority to the district and municipal level more than to the provincial level. - Freedom to Information Law 2008 has made all documents related to planning and budgeting accessible to public. - Law No. 25 (1999) on central-local government financial relations stipulates that 25 percent of the national revenue should be allocated for block grants to local government. -Regulation No. 8 (2008) on the regional planning process flowing from the Act 32 (2004) has detailed out the content and process of planning. It provides normative goals for development planning and seeks to make it an inclusive process. It also strengthens the integration of development planning to spatial planning and of planning with budgeting through medium-term expenditure framework	-Democratic centralism gave way to democracy and market economy in early 1990s -Central- Province (aimag) and Capital City- Region (Soum) and capital city in districts- rural (Bag)and urban sub-districts (horoo) -Self governance and state management. Governor proposed by assembly but appointed by higher levels of government. -Two types of planning: Land use planning and Urban Planning. Lack of coordination. -Local self governing bodies organize the participation of the people in solving problems of national scale and that of larger territorial divisions. -Authorities at higher level do not take decision on matters coming under jurisdiction of local self-governing bodies.	-Local Government Code 1991 provides for a number of mechanisms for people's participation. These include system of recall of elected and appointed local officials; local initiative and referendum; local sectoral (women, labour, poor, indigenous communities and disabled) representation; public hearings; local special bodies etc. -LDCs at the Barangay (village), municipal, city and provincial levels are responsible to initiate and propose a comprehensive multi-sectoral five-year development plan to be approved by the sanggunian; formulate public investment programmes - Joint Memorandum Circular No. 1 in 2007 to provide guidelines on the harmonization and synchronization of local planning, investment programming, revenue administration, budgeting and expenditure management. - Social Reform Agenda (SRA), launched in 1995, also paved way for people's participation in governance. -SRA is composed of social reform packages providing programmes and services for marginalized sectors of society in the country's 20 poorest provinces.

Theme	Cambodia	Indonesia	Mongolia	Philippines
				-KALAHI-CIDSS) is the Philippine government's flagship poverty-alleviation programme adopts participatory and community driven development approach
Initiators and stakeholders	- Donor - Government - NGOs e.g., DND	- IPGI a network of officials, academicians and civil society activists advocated for participatory planning in Solo city. - Mayor's Decision No. 410/45-A/1/2002, on Promoting Participatory Planning and Budgeting Policy stipulated steps to be taken.	- ADB in collaboration with Government of Mongolia (MCUD), JFPR. UDRC is local consulting NGO helping in CB and mobilization.	Municipal government on Pinabacdao, Department of Interior and Local Government, Department of Social Welfare and Development and Institute of Democratic Participation in Governance
Tools and techniques	-Triangulation by survey -Accountability boxes -Sharing of minutes of CC meetings -DIW	- Multi Stakeholders Dialogue - Musrenbang - Budget Information Dissemination through posters	- Sports day for exchange of information - Desk and filed appraisal - Community organization through saving groups	- Community Based Monitoring System -Participatory Situational Analysis
Steps and processes	-planning meeting in each village to prioritize village needs -Additionally people can put up their demands in monthly meeting. Not regular everywhere. -CCs prepare commune development plan (CDP) -CDP sent to District Integration Workshop (DIW). Line agencies provide inputs. -PBC prepares commune investment plan. -PBC also helps prepare draft budget	- First step is a meeting at each neighbourhood association, followed by meeting of neighbourhood representatives and village government officials (as organizing committee) to draft rule of the game for general meeting and identifying some crucial issues. Finally in the General Meetings (Museranbang) involving all households in village will discuss Organising Committee's drafts and propose development plans to sub-municipal (Kecamatan) level and formulate village government budget allocation.	Erdenet (Orkhon): -Saving groups and CBOs identify and prioritize needs and develop a comprehensive plan for mitigating identified problems -Community groups or sub project committee develops sub project proposal and budget. -Desk and field appraisal -Community participation in developing proposal, inclusion of women, community contribution, capacity of the community, O&M and	-The policies, programmes, and projects proposed by LDCs are submitted to the sanggunian concerned for appropriate action. - The local development plans approved by their respective sanggunian is integrated with the development plans of the next higher level of LDC. - The Department of Budget and Management furnishes the various LDCs information on financial resources and budgetary allocations applicable to their respective jurisdictions to guide them in their

Theme	Cambodia	Indonesia	Mongolia	Philippines
	-CC adopts draft budget in public plenary meeting in October. -Approval by DIW. -Fund: equal, population and poverty index - Commune can complain to provincial level authorities if implementing agencies are not following quality and standard -Technical team at provincial level assist commune to monitor implantation of project and administer the contracts. ***Tbong Khmum (Kampong Cham***) - Most of those participated were women. In July men busy with paddy plantation. Women did not find any difficulty in articulating their demands. -Participation was high in Sorlop Commune due to CB programme by Democracy resource centre for National Development (DND) -In most villages village chief prepares plans on his own. -CC triangulated demands by carrying out need assessment of villages. - community's contribution nearly 10 percent	- Same process is followed at Sub-municipality or Kecamatan level. -Planning at the municipal level will start with Regional Development Planning Agency (BAPPEDA) at the Municipal level organizing a meeting with the heads of sub-municipal governments, chambers of commerce and CSOs to establish an organizing committee, draft rules of the game for general meeting, draft spatial and sectoral development plans based on the proposals received from sub-municipalities. The General meeting will discuss Organising Committee's draft and propose development plan to the municipal parliament. -Current Mayor Joko Widodo introduced new mechanisms (e.g., Focused Group Discussion in sectoral committees) to accommodate marginalized sections in the process and hence improving the quality of participation in the planning. -There are two lines of participation: first sectoral and second territorial. - Draft city plan (RKPD) is presented and discussed during city level Musrenbang In this city-level Musrenbang. With this Draft Consolidated Plan fixing the specificities, budgeting process begins. This process results into draft	M&E plan imp criteria -PIU prepares contract -Consulting NGO provides training -Participatory planning workshops	planning functions.

Theme	Cambodia	Indonesia	Mongolia	Philippines
		of final city budget. A public hearing is organized before it is sent to legislative council for legal sanction. Once such sanction is obtained this document is called Annual Plan Budget Document.		
Impact	-People felt empowered to discuss -There are instances where roads have been re-laid on complaints of CC Monitoring Committee	Organization building: -NGOs are educating and mobilizing people and motivating them to come prepared in the meetings for planning -SOMPIS has become an influential network of marginalized groups participating in the Musrenbang Process. - Civil society and government collaboration for participatory planning and budgeting was institutionalized in IPGI and though MSD based consultative process. Access to Information: -From 2006 onwards, Department of Finance (DPPKA) of the municipal government produces printed poster of the city budget for the information of the public Citizens Voice in Decision Making: -Now about 30% of the participants in general meetings for planning are women and in many cases women are leading these discussions. These women are also involved in monitoring of implementation of	Community Organising: -CB of formal and informal local institutions -Establishment of saving groups-CBOs of 200-300 households. CB of local governments on CDD approaches. Social accountability: -Access to information: subproject accounts are open and available for inspection by community. Community sports days- information boards. -Participatory techniques to determine community satisfaction Citizens' Voice in decision making: -Communities in driver's seat-planning, implementation and monitoring Impact on power relations: -Earlier one way communication channel from government of funding agency to community. Now residents	Citizens' Voice in Decision Making: -The BDC is now able to negotiate and demand resources from the government and non-government organizations. - increased community participation especially in Barangay Assemblies; enhanced knowledge of the community regarding formulation of participatory local development plan. - change of attitude and behaviour of the people from a passive observer to an active participant. - Needs of women, elderly, youth, religious groups, peasants, fisher folk and other sectors were included in the BDP and representatives of these sectors were involved in the decision making. Responsiveness of Local Government: -policies and ordinances implemented by the Municipal LGU of Pniabacdao for protection and preservation of the environment. -MLGU have a Comprehensive Municipal Development Plan for the

Theme	Cambodia	Indonesia	Mongolia	Philippines
		budget at Kelurahan level. -Pedicab drivers, street vendors, street singers (beggars) and sex workers are now participating due to interventions of network of CBOs. Citizen's monitoring of budget implementation: -People's engagement with the implementation and monitoring of the city budget has increased. Citizen and CSOs monitor implementation of approved city budget through protests and representations to line departments. Impact on Power Relations: -Marginalized have become more equal. -poor and women have become a part of the policy decision-making process and even the budget has become sensitive to their needs.	take control of neighborhood development. -Collaborative relationship. Staff & representatives members of CBOs. -Community contribution- about 20 percent (3 percent cash). Land, licences, technical support, material and financial contribution by public authorities.	Barangays -MLGU has become more responsive especially in extending services to the Barangays -Official's performance is assessed on the basis whether the needs of the community have been responded to or not. Community Monitoring: -People in the Barangay asked on the progress, process and timelines of the project to be implemented. -Organizations of senior citizens were actively participating in implementation and monitoring of the projects. -People are coming forward to register their complaints and grievances.
I S S U E S				
Capacity gaps	- Very low capacity among elected representatives and officials in facilitating participatory planning	-Officials and ERs lack capacity to ensure participation of marginalized in Musrenbang	-Very low capacity among elected representatives and officials in facilitating participatory planning	- Limited capacity among officials and elected representatives.
Low participation	-In most villages village chief prepares plans on his own. Lack of substantive participation. Poor awareness and pessimism is constraining participation in planning and monitoring.	- Most marginalized are still hesitant to speak up in Museranbang deliberations.	- Decision making is centralized and peoples participation is very low.	

Theme	Cambodia	Indonesia	Mongolia	Philippines
	-non-acceptance of people's demands demotivates them			
Long wish list	-many demands are also not fulfilled	-A major part of budget goes for maintaining administrative infrastructure and hence many demands are not met		- some identified projects have not received fund and not been implemented yet
Weak downward accountability	-people not using accountability boxes, not aware of CC meeting minutes being shared, not aware of functioning of M&E Committee	- Although people have started asking questions, registering complaints officials still do not feel they are accountable to people.	Only sharing of project progress takes place. Local authorities do not feel accountable to people	- downward accountability is stronger in comparison to other countries in this study and officials feel that they are accountable and their performance will be judged in context of their responsiveness.
Strategies	Role for NGOs and traditional associations like faith based organizations - Study the feasibility of Commune as unit for service delivery.	-More activists committed to people's participation should join politics and occupy important positions like Mayor. - If civil society collaborates with academicians, together they can make greater impact.	- Policy initiatives for participatory planning - Set up mechanism for social accountability - Civil Society building programme - Capacity building of officials and elected representatives on participatory planning and social accountability.	- Sustained collaboration among municipal officials, elected representatives and volunteers -All programmes/projects for the development of Barangay must be directly endorsed to the Barangays. -Refresher trainings on participatory planning at Municipal and Barangay level -A new package of CBMS plus needs to be developed. Easy to understand and follow manuals on CBMS, planning, organizing and monitoring should be developed.

FOUR CASES OF PARTICIPATORY PLANNING IN EAST ASIA

THE FOLLOWING section presents a detailed study of four cases of participatory planning in East Asia, one each from Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines. Each case outlines the policy and institutional environments of participatory planning, reviewing the laws, rules, and guidelines of each country. The cases describe in some detail how participatory planning is conducted at the local level from design to outcomes, including the interplay of key actors in the planning process. Based on an analysis of each case, the challenges and opportunities present some directions on how social accountability can be enhanced through participatory planning.

Case 1: Cambodia

TBONG KHMUM DISTRICT, KAMPONG CHAM PROVINCE

CAMBODIA'S PAST is as colorful as it is tragic. Hemmed in by aggressive neighbors, the country went through a painful history of colonialism, ideological conflict, and genocide[10]. As a result, governance in the country was erratic. Public decision-making was always a top-down affair, with those in power dictating to the masses, treating them as mere subjects.

After the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991, Cambodia underwent a social and political transformation. A multi-party liberal democracy was established under a constitutional monarchy in 1993. After a short period of political turbulence in the mid-1990s, Cambodia became more open in institutionalizing governance reforms.

Cambodia went the way of decentralization, shifting central power to sub-national government units in the countryside. Being where most the people are, the communes have become the arena where people can engage their government and participate in public decision-making.

Cambodia is a poor country (see Box 1). Two-thirds of the population lives in rural areas, relying on traditional subsistent agricultural practices. Reforms in the political system—thought to be one of the keys to address poverty—are slow-moving despite the push for decentralization. Complicating the problem is the lack motivation and competence of many government workers to do their jobs effectively, probably because they are poorly paid. In addition, many citizens are not aware of, much less care about, local development initiatives.

But poverty has not stopped Cambodians from rising above the infamous "killing fields" of the past. Persistently, Cambodia has struggled to promote national reconciliation and to take substantial strides toward democratic governance and national development.

[10] Between 1975 and 1979, Cambodia was under the rule of the communist Khmer Rouge. This period saw the death of approximately two million Cambodians through political executions, starvation, and forced labor. Due to the large numbers, the deaths during the rule of the Khmer Rouge are often considered a genocide, and commonly known as the Cambodian Holocaust or Cambodian Genocide.

Box 1. Cambodia's socio-economic indicators.

- Thirty-six percent of the population lives below the poverty line of US$ 0.46-0.63.
- Maternal and infant mortality remains high, with maternal mortality at 437 per 100,000 live births ad infant mortality at 95 per 1,000 live births. Almost 24 percent of births are considered unwanted.
- In 2000, 58 percent of women between 15-49 years of age, 66 percent of the pregnant women and 87 percent of children were anemic. Forty-four percent children were stunted; 15 per cent malnourished; and 45.2 percent were underweight.
- Illiteracy rate among men is 25 percent and 45 percent among women. Health services like immunization are largely inaccessible to the poor.

Cambodia: Policy and Institutional Context

THE FOLLOWING reviews the policy and institutional context of the decentralization reforms and the place of participatory planning as a process. It discusses the national development framework, the decentralization thrust of the country, and the roles and responsibilities of the commune councils.

National Development Framework: The "Rectangular Strategy"

Since 1998, the Royal Government of Cambodia has given priority to governance reforms and poverty reduction through the so-called Rectangular Strategy (2003-2008) (Figure 5).

The Rectangular Strategy, first launched in 2004 and updated in 2008, sets out Cambodia's long-term development vision. With good governance as its core strategy, the scheme establishes the government's intention to build Cambodian society by strengthening peace, stability and social order, promoting sustainable and equitable development, and entrenching democracy and respect for human rights and dignity. (Royal Government of Cambodia, n.d.)

The four growth components of the Rectangular Strategy are agricultural development, infrastructure rehabilitation and development, private sector development and employment creation, and capacity building and human resource development. (See Box 2)

Box 2. Components of Cambodia's Rectangular Strategy.

THE FIRST PART of the core of the rectangle focuses on good governance. It has four components: anti-corruption reforms, legal and judicial reform, public administration reform including decentralization and deconcentration, and reform of the armed forces especially demobilization.

The second part is building an appropriate environment for the implementation of the strategy. Its four components include: a) peace, political stability and social order; b) partnerships with stakeholders, private sector, donors, and civil society; c) favorable macro-economic and financial environment; and d) integration of Cambodia into the region and the world.

The third part has four strategic "growth rectangles": agriculture, private sector and employment, improved physical infrastructure, and capacity and human resource development.

Figure 5. Cambodia's Rectangular Strategy.



The National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)—together with the Cambodian MDGs (CMDGs), the National Poverty Reduction Strategy, and the National Population Policy—lays out the vision, goals, strategies, and priority actions for the five-year period 2006-2010. It provides the framework for growth, employment, equity, and efficiency to each CMDG and keeps focus on equitable, pro-poor, and pro-rural development. Its goals and strategies include reducing poverty and strengthening measures for rural development through decentralization and deconcentration (see Figure 5). The NSDP is the "blueprint for further progress on building edifice of [a] New Cambodia based on institutions of governance, processes, and procedures" (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2006).

Decentralization in Cambodia

While relatively new to the decentralization reform process, Cambodia was already experimenting with decentralization reforms even prior to the Rectangular Strategy. The Seila Programme[11] experiment in 1996, supported by the UNDP, was designed to formulate and test systems for decentralized and deconcentrated planning, financing, management, and

[11] SEILA—a Khmer word that means foundation stone—a Cambodian government initiative to establish a national program to promote local economic development activities through decentralized planning and decision making. UNDP believes that the methods of SEILA are the foundation on which to build an effective and self-sustaining rural anti-poverty effort. SEILA also has the potential to bring about social cohesion, behavioral changes and organization in villages and communes in regions where the social fabric and farm-production organization has been largely disrupted or dismantled by the country's prolonged war. It also serves as a model to reintegrate former Khmer Rouge-held territories into the mainstream of Cambodian society. (UNDP, n.d.)

implementation of local development at the commune and provincial levels. From a programmatic perspective, however, decentralization efforts jumped to the institutional level when the communes (or *sangkat*[12]) were recognized as the smallest units of governance.

Box 3. Some facts on decentralization in Cambodia.

- Commune/*sangkat* councils (commune in rural areas and *sangkat* in urban areas) are decentralized local bodies;
- Communes are entitled to have their own revenue sources and they can access development and administrative grant assistance from the government and external assistance on an annual basis. This grant assistance is also known as the Commune/*Sangkat* Fund.
- A commune follows a bottom-up participatory planning process in order to address the needs and aspirations of the citizens. It prepares the Commune Development Plan with the participation of citizens.
- The National Committee to Support Communes provides policy coordination while the Ministry of Interior provides the links.
- The national government and international NGOs provide substantial support for commune capacity development.

Cambodia's decentralization reform initiatives were aimed at promoting participatory local democracy, enhancing social and economic development, and reducing poverty.

Two major policies, enacted in January 2001, signaled the beginning of decentralization in the country. The Law on the Election of Commune Councils provided for the election of commune councilors, while the Law on Administration and Management of Communes/*Sangkats* increased the commune's power in public decision-making. Supporting these two laws are regulatory structures and mechanisms. Box 3 highlights important points in the decentralization efforts of Cambodia (Sokha, 2005).

The commune election on February 3, 2002 was one of the most significant dates in Cambodia's recent history. Cambodians elected 954 women and 10,307 men in 1,621 communes as members of the *sangkat* councils.[13] The elections, then as now, were contested by the major political parties: the Cambodia People's Party (CPP), the FUNCINPEC, and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). Councilors were elected on the basis of proportional representation of political parties.

Roles and responsibilities of commune councils and other councils

The Commune Law of 2001 empowers the communes with legislative and executive authority and establishes the commune councils as representing the citizens. It provides the basic legal framework for the operations of the commune councils.

[12] A *sangkat* is the equivalent of a commune in a municipality. Communes are predominantly rural while *sangkats* are normally urban. But there are also "urbanized" communes and "rural" *sangkats*. In this study, the term "commune" will be used to refer to both the commune and the *sangkat*.

[13] Depending on the population, each *sangkat* has between five and 11 council members.

Box 4. The administrative role of the commune/*sangkat*.

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNE covers general administration and local development services. The commune council has the following functions (Romeo and Spyckerelle 2004, 3-10):

- To establish its own financial resources, budget, and assets.
- To collect direct revenues from taxes, fee, and other service charges (own-source revenue). They are entitled to a share of national revenue instruments (tax sharing). They are also entitled to receive transfers from a share of national revenue. They are barred from borrowing money.
- To be compensated by the central government when the commune performs any function on behalf of the national administration (agency functions).
- To establish the Commune/*Sangkat* Fund (CSF) as the primary mechanism to channel central government funds, donor loans or grants, and other sources to finance commune expenditures (fiscal transfers).
- To prepare the Commune Development Plan and an annual balanced budget.
- To establish by-laws and commune orders (*deccas*) approved by the commune.

A commune council governs and administers the commune. The commune chief, who presides over the council, has two deputies who are appointed from the ranks of the elected councilors. The commune councils have their own financial resources and staff support. Each council has a clerk appointed and employed by the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The chief also appoints advisory committees composed of councilors but may also include citizens such as NGO representatives. Two of these committees are the Planning and Budgeting Committee and the Procurement Committee. (Mansfeld & MacLeod, 2004) (See Box 4)

The commune council's primary responsibility is to facilitate local economic and social development, including the delivery of administrative services, mediation of local conflicts, and the maintenance of law and order. As such, the commune council has the authority to make legislative and executive decisions as well as formulate and approve a five-year development plan to be updated annually through a three-year rolling investment program. (Ninh & Henke, 2005)

Romeo & Spyckerelle (2004) note that the law is vague with regards to the actual responsibilities of the councils for service delivery.

> Decentralization in Cambodia is not concerned with the devolution of specific service delivery responsibilities but they tried to address the issue of local-level governance and public expenditure management systems including the promotion of participatory planning, budgeting and implementation procedures. (p. 6)

The Organic Law of 2008—also known as the Law on Administrative Management of the Capital, Provinces, Municipalities, Districts and Khans—provides policies on enhancing citizen participation in local development efforts and in improving the quality of public services (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2008). To facilitate citizen participation, the Law requires the establishment of sub-national councils and establishes the linkages between and among the various tiers of administrative units, specifically focusing on citizen participation and consultation. (See Box 5)

Box 5. Other pertinent provisions in the Organic Law of 2008.

- *Article 96*: Enumerates the roles and functions of the district councils:
  - To assist the commune and *sangkat* councils to establish, promote, and sustain democratic development;
  - To work, together with the commune and *sangkat* councils, in promoting public participation in the governance process within the district, commune, and *sangkat*; and
  - To identify and address the needs within the district, and to respond to the requests of commune and *sangkat* councils.
- *Article 98:* The district council is accountable to the commune and *sangkat* councils and to all citizens within its district for its choices, decisions, and performance, including their impacts.
- *Article 99:* The district council conducts consultations with commune and *sangkat* councils and other stakeholders for the purpose of assessing the capacity of the latter. It provides capacity building activities and raises public awareness of citizens on the new setup.
- *Article 100:* The district council integrates strategies, programs, and activities addressing needs and requests of the commune and *sangkat* councils into the three-year rolling investment programs and five-year development plans of the district, communes, and *sangkats*, including the annual budget plan and the medium term expenditure plan of the district and communes.
- *Article 101:* The district council, upon consultation with the commune and *sangkat* councils, facilitates and enhances the administrative capacity of and resources for commune and *sangkat* councils.

- Source: Royal Government of Cambodia, 2008

The National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development (NCDD) was created as the implementing arm of the Organic Law. The NCDD oversees and coordinates the implementation of the national decentralization and deconcentration reforms. One of its tasks is to oversee the implementation of the National Plan for Sub-National Democratic Development (NP-SNDD), which is a 10-year reform agenda designed to undertake comprehensive and in-depth reforms of sub-national administrations. The set of reform initiatives includes facilitating the cooperation between and among central ministries, sub-national administrations, development partners, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders for implementing the decentralization and deconcentration reforms. The NP-SNDD also serves as the mechanism for technical and financial assistance for the implementation of the decentralization and deconcentration laws and policies. (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2010)

The NP-SNDD likewise provides the implementation framework and program areas for achieving sub-national democratic development. The five program areas are:

- Sub-national institutional development. The councils (directly and indirectly elected) at the sub-national administrative level are responsible for program implementation.
- The development of human resource management systems. Elected councils are to have qualified, competent, and experienced staff—a cadre of civil servants—to undertake functions on behalf of the councils and are be accountable to them.
- The transfer of functions and resources. Councils at the sub-national level are to be assigned functions/responsibilities with adequate resources so that they can provide public services to

local communities. The transfer of functions and resources are to be carried out in a transparent, coordinated, and consultative manner.

- Sub-national budget, financial and property systems. For the councils to have adequate financial and property resources, the Organic Law provides them with the power to develop plans, budgets, and financial arrangements. They also have the power to own properties.
- Support institutions for the decentralization and deconcentration process. The NCDD are to work closely with the Council for Administrative Reforms (CAR), the PFM Reform Committee, and other sectoral reform mechanisms to ensure adequate staffing, capacity, financing and other resources for each implementation phase.

With these measures in place, the government expects the following decentralization outcomes at the sub-national level, specifically in the communes: a culture of citizen participation in the communes and transparency/accountability of local governments and agencies, improved delivery of services and infrastructure, and overall social and economic development. These, in turn, are expected to contribute to poverty reduction.

Planning in the Commune

THE COMMUNE LAW and the subsequent supplemental policies mandate the communes to develop and adopt a five-year CDP.

> The Plan is to be prepared and approved by the councils during the first of the five years of their mandate, and must be reviewed and updated yearly. The CDP is meant to provide the framework for a multi-year Commune Investment Program (CIP) and for the preparation of the annual budget. (Romeo & Spyckerelle, 2004, p. 9)

Initiating the planning process

The CDP adopts a bottom-up development process, starting at the village level (see Figure 6). The village chief convenes the planning meeting in July. The planning meeting is open to the public. While commune council members and government officials are encouraged to attend, their presence is not mandatory.

The purpose of the meeting is to identify and prioritize the development needs of the village. The results of the meeting are sent to the commune council, which prioritizes the service delivery and infrastructure projects for the entire commune. The output is the CDP. The commune council submits the CDP to the DIW.

In addition to the CDP, villagers can submit their requests during the monthly commune meetings. These meetings, attended by the commune councilors, are also open to the public. (Councilors, however, can convene closed-door meetings if necessary.) (Mansfeld & MacLeod, 2004, pp. 22-23)

Figure 6. The commune planning process.



The village chief has the responsibility of disseminating the minutes of the commune meetings in the village. Some communes put up information boards where these minutes and other notices are posted.[14]

The commune PBC, which is mandated by commune planning regulations, has an advisory role vis-à-vis the commune council. It is represented by two village members, usually a man and a woman. It has a critical function in local public expenditure management because it can influence commune-level resource allocations for the projects. Additionally, the PBC helps in the political education of the communes and facilitates in the development of the CDP. In other words, the PBC is an important venue for citizen participation at the commune level.

Allocating the Commune/*Sangkat* Fund Budget

The PBC helps draft the CSF budget, which the commune council submits for adoption. Once the CSF budget is approved in the DIW, the funds are disbursed from the national treasury. (See Box 6 for some facts on the CSF.)

The law says that the draft budget should be prepared with wide public participation. To ensure this, the commune/*sangkat* chief discloses the budget at least two weeks before the

[14] Villagers, however, say that minutes of commune meetings are not announced by village chiefs. But announcements posted on information boards often arouse their curiosity though many villagers do not know how to read.

commune council meeting. Citizens can participate in the commune council and the PBC deliberations on the draft budget. The provincial governor, in behalf of the MOI, verifies that the commune councils indeed followed the participatory planning and budgeting process, completed all financial reports on budget and plan execution, and mobilized local resources. Then the provincial governor recommends the finalization of the CSF to the MOI. (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2002)

Box 6. Some facts about the Commune/Sangkat Fund.

THE COMMUNE/SANGKAT Fund enables the communities to administer and promote local development activities and to serve as an incentive for building the capacity for good governance in the commune/sangkat councils.

The CSF has two categories: one for administration expenditures and another for local development expenditures. The former is for administration purposes, while the latter is for local infrastructure development and delivery of local economic and social services.

The CSF constitutes the bulk of locally programmable resources for development spending at the commune level. But it also stimulates local resource mobilization because the communes are required to put in a counterpart. Counterpart resources depend on the type of projects; it may come in the form of local taxes, or from specific contributions paid by direct project beneficiaries. (Romeo and Spyckerelle 2004, 6-9)

The CSF has become an important source of funding for the commune councils because the money is used to fund projects that do not need the government's approval. The discretionary power of the commune council over this fund has helped meet the more urgent needs of the communities usually related to infrastructure such as water, roads, and health centers.

Deliberations in the District Integration Workshop

The commune-approved CDP documents are submitted to the DIW for deliberations. It is during this critical step that the government and development partners commit to provide the resources to support the implementation of the CDP activities. (See Box 7 for the composition and functions of the District Integration Workshops.)

The DIW involves a process of formal interactions between the commune councilors and agencies such as the provincial departments of national ministries and the donor agencies. The two sides discuss and negotiate which commune proposals (as documented in the CDP) should be provided with funding support. The workshop concludes with the commitment of actors to support specific local projects and activities.

What happens to the CDP priority projects and activities that have no budget allocations? The commune councilors, through negotiations and consensus, assign resources that are to be generated by them and the commune, such as "own-source revenue". The CSF's allocation for local development expenditures are also budgeted for this purpose.

Box 7. Composition and functions of the District Integration Workshop (DIW).

- DIWs are convened every year for the finalization of CDPs in the district.
- Commune councilors, officials of line departments, and members of aid agencies/NGOs attend the DIWs.
- Line departments and aid agencies/NGO make financial commitments for the projects to be implemented in the communes. Funds are allocated for the Commune Funds.
- DIWs assess and evaluate the implementation of development activities during the previous year.

The entire process provides the communes with an institutional mechanism to articulate their demand for infrastructure and services, while identifying the potential where the government and other actors can provide the supply side (Romeo & Spyckerelle, 2004).

As mandated by law, the DIW outputs consist of the integrated development plans of the communes, line departments, and aid agencies for the current financial year. While the DIW system needs more time to adapt to the local context, it has started to influence the key actors in the planning process.

> DIWs are meant to be a specific step common to the planning processes of both communes and provincial sector departments. While this is still a new concept for many sectors, and the ability of provincial departments to interact with commune councils remains constrained by their own limited autonomy with respect to central planning and funding of sector activities, there are signs that the DIWs are starting to influence sector programming of government resources. (Romeo & Spyckerelle 2004, p. 11)

Project Implementation in the Communes

HAVING A GOOD grasp of the role of the commune council in the implementation of projects would help the reader in understanding the system of accountability at the commune level. While the law is quite unclear about the delegation of service delivery management and local administrative functions, the commune council's monitoring and evaluation functions—using both formal and informal mechanisms—are clearly spelled out.

First, the commune councils are directly involved with local development project implementation. These projects are contracted to service providers who are selected through competitive bidding at the provincial level. However, the contract is signed by the service provider (contractor) and the commune councils. A provincial technical team assists the communes in monitoring the implementation of the projects (Romeo & Spyckerelle, 2004).

Second, each commune council nominates two persons—a commune councilor and a citizen—to monitor and evaluate commune projects and activities under the CDP. These two nominated persons have a number of critical functions:

- to mobilize commune members to participate in the monitoring activities;
- to collaborate with government departments, agencies and CSOs in training the commune councilors and the PBC members on project monitoring and evaluation;
- to participate in meetings with technical experts on project implementation process; and

- to report to the commune council and the PBC on project progress, including risks and problems encountered. (Mansfeld & MacLeod, 2004, pp. 8-9)

In contrast, the development partners (usually NGOs) use informal mechanisms to promote accountability at the commune level. They organize village-level forums where commune councilors are invited to discuss issues with the commune members, and commune members giving feedback to the councilors. Emphasizing public interaction, these forums are a solid first step in promoting accountability among the councilors. At the same time, they open the space for the community to obtain information and/or ask for justifications for actions taken or not taken by the councilors. (Mansfeld & MacLeod, 2004)

The processes and mechanisms just described show how community involvement even during the early stages of planning can create a system of accountability. Participatory planning at the commune level is used as the framework to deepen the commune members' understanding and appreciation of accountability as well as a greater sense of ownership. The government expects that applying such a framework would lead to better implementation of the projects.

But what are the realities on the ground? How are these principles, policies, and frameworks applied at the commune level? What are the actual practices? What are the challenges? To answer these and similar questions, this study focuses on the participatory planning processes of a particular community, the Tbong Khmum District in Kampong Cham Province.

Participatory Planning in Tbong Khmum District[15]

KAMPONG CHAM Province, located more than a hundred kilometers northeast of Phnom Penh, is the second largest in Cambodia. It has 16 districts and 173 communes with 1.7 million residents (See Figure 7). Majority of the people are farmers, but there are rubber plantations owned by Korean, American, and Cambodian companies. Its main development issues are the need for infrastructure (roads), water for irrigation, health facilities, education facilities, sanitation, and livelihood. These issues are often on top of the priority lists during village- and commune-level planning sessions.

Actors in the planning process

Next to the villagers, the key actors in the planning process of the Sorlop Commune (population: est. 17,000) are the village chief, an NGO called Democracy Resource Center for National Development[16] (DND), the commune councilors, and the provincial-level government departments.

[15] PRIA, assisted by SILAKA, DND and BSDA, undertook a field-based study of participatory planning in Tbong Khmum District. The participants included the community members of the Trapaina Sangke village and the commune councilor in the Sorlop Commune. The Deputy Governor of the district was also interviewed. In addition, three FGDs on accountability were conducted with the community in the Krola Commune in Kampong Siem District.

[16] Democracy Resource Center for National Development, or DND, focuses on empowering and providing opportunities to local people to participate in decision making to improve community development, service delivery and good governance (Khmer Views, 2010)

Prior to the actual planning activity, the DND conducted a series of community sessions to prepare the commune members. The sessions focused on the importance of planning and how their participation can make a difference to the development of their commune.

Figure 7. Location map of Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia



The official planning process was initiated by the village chief by announcing the date and venue of the planning activity. After the planning activity, the commune councilors consolidated the needs and priorities as articulated by the community participants. The commune councilors also carried out informal assessment surveys to validate the community's list. The final output was captured in the commune's draft CDP.

The draft CDP was then submitted to the DIW where commune councilors, department officials, and the participating NGOs deliberated on the CDPs from the various communes. The final outputs were the approved CDPs.

Planning process

The planning process had three phases: prioritization of commune needs at the village level, consolidation of the commune needs by the commune councilors, and deliberation and approval of the CDPs in the DIWs, including funding allocation.

Village planning

The series of planning sessions in the Sorlop Commune were organized in July 2009. Majority of the participants were women; most of the men were either out of town looking for work or in the rice paddies, July being the planting season.

The respondents in the Sorlop Commune said they did not encounter any major problems during the planning meetings. The villagers were free to speak out their minds, and they were able to articulate what they perceived as the villages' needs. Many of them felt empowered by

the process because it was so unlike their past experience when district officials decided what was best for them and all they could do was to accept. They saw the planning activities as a milestone on the road to development.

Though attendance was not a requirement, a number of commune councilors and district level officials participated in some of the meetings. They said they wanted to see if the planning process was on track.

Majority of the respondents attributed many of the improvements in their villages to their active participation in the planning activities. As a result of the planning, for example, one respondent said that 65 toilets have been constructed in her village, thus arresting the problem of sanitation. Roads and irrigation canals have also been built in the past year, something that the villagers could only dream of in the past.

The work of the NGOs was crucial in increasing the awareness and involvement of the commune members. An example is the work of the faith-based Pagoda Coordination Committee (PaCoCo) based in Kompong Tham province (Stoung District). PaCoCo conducted training workshops and organized public forums so that people would understand and appreciate citizen participation in the context of decentralization. PaCoCo also provided the space for dialogue between the villagers and the commune council and committee leaders. In general, NGOs such as DND and PaCoCo facilitated the representation of communes' problems, concerns, and issues (Malena & Chhim, p. 32).

But even with all these policies, mechanisms, and processes in place, participatory planning in general continues to be saddled with issues and problems. Some of these are the following:

- Majority of the adult males cannot attend the planning meetings because July is the planting season, and most of them are working in the rice paddies.
- There is poor participation in majority of the villages because many villagers are illiterate and do not realize the importance of planning, much less their participation. As a consequence, some village chiefs would rather prepare the CDPs themselves *sans* inputs from the villagers.
- The information and the invitations to attend the planning meetings do not reach a significant number of villagers who reside in remote areas. In other cases, the information comes too late.
- Some villagers do not agree with the priorities in the CDP. Most of those who complain, however, were unable to participate in the planning meetings because of the reasons cited above.
- Many villagers show a lack of understanding of the link between the planning meetings and the development projects.
- People would rather have the central government or the Prime Minister plan for them and provide them with what they need.
- People are disappointed and frustrated when their priorities are not included in the CDP or among the implemented projects.

Commune planning

The commune councilors did most of the work at the commune-level planning. They consolidated the village priorities and gave final shape to the CDP. They followed a system of ranking the village priorities and projects, weeding out those they thought would have less

impact on the development of the community. For example, inaccessibility to quality rice seeds was the most common issue among the villages, so this became priority number one. This ranking system facilitated the decision-making on the selection of projects to be prioritized in the CDP.[17]

It was also the role of the commune councilors to assess and validate the priority needs of the villages. They visited the villages[18] to conduct meetings and to gather information on five indicators (service delivery, economic, security, social, and natural resource management). The validated information was inputted into a database of community needs and matched with the village priorities. The consolidated output was the final version of the CDP.

During project implementation, the councilors take on another role: that of convincing those affected by the projects to have the government expropriate their land for road construction or for the building of irrigation canals. The councilors usually convene a consultative meeting to make people understand about these projects.

In the Sorlop Commune CDP for 2009, projects that needed huge investments were funded by the national government and constructed by government departments; these included the construction of roads, irrigation canals, and water wells. Projects needing smaller funding were constructed using the CSF. The Danish Development Assistance[19] (DANIDA) for Cambodia funded the natural resource management project.

The respondents in this study identified two major of issues in the commune-level planning:

- The Sorlop Commune councilors see the need to increase people's awareness and to mobilize them to address the problem of lack of participation. But they do not want to be seen as usurping the function of the village chief.
- The non-inclusion of some village priority items in the CDP frustrates the councilors. Some of them felt discouraged, and said they would rather not participate in future planning meetings if their issues are not addressed.[20]

District planning

The final commune-level CDP was submitted in the DIW where commune councilors, government department officials, and NGO representatives deliberated, decided, and committed the resources to fund the various development programs and projects.

In the Tbong Khmum district, one of the major projects approved by the DIW was the construction of irrigation canals. According to the deputy governor, one of the main factors for the decision was that people participated in the decision-making process, including the sharing of resources.

[17] Respondents said that during the fiscal year 2009-10, access to quality rice seeds was the number one priority in most of the village plans in the commune. The other priorities included roads, irrigational canals, wells, toilets, natural resource management, and income generating activities. All these issues were included in the CDP of Sorlop Commune.

[18] District level officials were also encouraged to join the commune councilors in these assessment visits. But only few district officials actually joined these activities.

[19] DANIDA is managed by the Representative Office of Denmark in Cambodia. The office is mandated to prepare, plan, coordinate and supervise the implementation of the Country Programme funded by DANIDA.

[20] The respondents complained that their request for schools and health centers were not included in the CDP. They were told that there was an overwhelming demand for other infrastructure projects.

The community contributed nearly 10 percent of the total cost—including labor—for the construction of the roads and irrigation canals. The funds came from the CSF. Projects not included for external funding but which the commune considered important were also funded through the CSF, like the road construction that amounted to nearly 50 million riel (US$11,600). For their part, the NGOs provided financial support for projects at the commune level and for the whole district, such DANIDA's support for the environmental management project.

Accountability Mechanisms in the Commune Development Plan

THERE ARE THREE levels of accountability mechanisms based on the CDP framework: the Commune Council-created committees, the NGO-organized village forums and public hearings, and the "accountability boxes".

It should be noted, however, that the communes do not have a role in the fiscal and administrative management of the projects as these are under the control of government departments. In addition, raising revenues from taxes are not within the purview of the communes. This means that the role of the communes is limited only to inputs for the CDP, but implementation is in the hands of government agencies.

Commune council advisory committees

The first level of accountability rests with the commune councils who appoint advisory committees to monitor and evaluate the projects. But their functions are practically nominal. The law says that the monitoring and evaluation committees are supposed to prepare the annual reports as well as engage the line departments in case of poor project implementation. If the quality of work is below the standards set by the contract, then the committees can raise their complaints to provincial level authorities.

The Sorlop respondents in this study, however, said they do not know of any monitoring and evaluation activities by the commune committees. On the other hand, the commune councilors insisted that such activities are being carried out regularly as evidenced by the reconstruction of several road projects because of the complaints filed by the monitoring and evaluation committee. The councilors also pointed out the improved quality of service delivery, again attributed to the reports filed by the committee. In other words, the conflicting reports point to the fact that accountability tools are, indeed, being used by the committees, but people in the communes do not know about it.

NGO-sponsored public forums

The second level of accountability is the NGO-sponsored public forums, where commune councilors are invited to listen to the reports and feedback of the commune members. These open dialogues have resulted in addressing loopholes in the projects at the commune level.

Accountability boxes

The third level is the use of the "accountability boxes". Accountability boxes are set up in each commune and people deposit their complaints (often anonymous) about alleged misuse of

the CSF, or the poor quality of project implementation, or the inefficient manner by which services are delivered.

The provincial government of Kampong Cham has distributed 263 accountability boxes in all communes. Provincial authorities are supposed to open these boxes monthly. The problem was that the accountability boxes were hardly used because citizens were simply not aware about these boxes.[21] Respondents in the Krola Commune in Kampong Siem District, Kampong Cham Province admitted during the interviews that while they knew about the boxes, these were located some distance away from their residences. They said they would rather complain directly to the commune councilors about poor project implementation or inefficient service delivery.

All this shows that accountability through monitoring and evaluation mechanisms is still in the early stages of development in the communes of Cambodia.

One of the decentralization and planning issues that need to be addressed is the commune size. Many communes are just too small to operate effectively as units of local government, to maintain an administrative structure, and to be capable of adequately providing services at a minimum level. This is a matter that should be reviewed and resolved by the National Committee for Support to the Communes/*Sangkat* (NCSC), the body tasked to oversee the implementation of the decentralization reforms at the commune level. Suggestions include the creation of cooperative arrangements among commune councils, or the establishment of multi- or single-purpose service districts. Such arrangements would overcome the constraints of the small fiscal base of communes but at the same time broaden the economies of scale in terms of delivery of services.

Strengthening Social Accountability through Participatory Planning

GIVEN ITS RECENT historical past, it comes as a surprise that Cambodia has made giant strides when it comes to citizen participation in governance matters. While the case of the Sorlop cannot be generalized, the planning process that the commune went through is quite unique in the sense that a good beginning has been made in making the participation of citizens substantial. Despite the atmosphere of pessimism (traumatized as they were with their recent history) and the low level of understanding about their role in governance, commune citizens—for the first time in their history—came forward to decide on their own path toward development.

A palpable transformation has taken place in the communes. People feel their voices are now being heard and their needs addressed. The power to decide how to use their CSF has given them confidence to help the government to implement their projects. While they are still a long way off from being fully empowered, they have been able to take the first steps.

While the mechanisms for social accountability and citizen participation are in place, these need further fine-tuning. One area that needs to be addressed is building and sustaining an enabling environment in which citizens and citizen groups, on the one hand, and government, on the other hand, can engage each other in a positive and constructive manner.

[21]This finding is supported by other research. See, for example, Malena & Chhim, 2009, p. 60.

This involves, among other things, openness by the government, organizing and building the capacity of citizens and citizen groups, allowing access to information, and respecting culture and context where the engagement happens.

On the government side, it is important to find local and national officials who understand, appreciate, and have the capacity to champion efforts at citizen participation. Championing citizen participation can be in the form of proposing policy reforms, providing access to information, and having an attitude of openness and availability to dialogue and negotiate with citizen groups.

Citizens, on the other hand, have to organize themselves, clarify their agenda, and enhance their capacity to engage government in a constructive way. Organizing means doing away with vested interests for the sake of a common goal and vision. Clarifying their agenda means sifting through diverse group interests, then articulating a common position that is aligned with their developmental needs. Enhancing their capacity means acquiring the necessary knowledge and skills, accompanied by an appropriate attitude, to deal with governance matters that are often complicated, technical, and requiring social and cultural sensitivity.

Access to information is crucial if the manner of engagement should lead to positive action. This means information is used to promote the engagement and not to find fault, threaten, or harass government officials. Access to information requires strong policy support as well as mechanisms to facilitate a two-way information flow between citizens and government. In addition, systems have to be in place for information to be available, accessible, understandable, and usable to both parties.

Finally, context and culture must be taken into account in the engagement between citizens and government. The mindsets and behaviors of all actors in the arena of social accountability are shaped by their respective personalities interfacing with their own past, culture, and context. Social accountability actions, processes, tools, and mechanisms, then, should be brought to the context and level of experience of the users.

The challenge of governance in Cambodia is not only to maintain the active participation of the community in the planning process, but to promote and enhance the enabling conditions for social accountability. The country has taken its “baby steps” as shown in the Tbong Khmum District, but there is a need for continued guidance and handholding especially at the commune level.

SURAKARTA (SOLO CITY)

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION in planning and budgeting is relatively new in Indonesia. Previously, under Suharto's highly centralized "New Order" regime[22], agencies that were supposed to deliver basic services were remote and unresponsive to the needs and priorities of local communities (Dixon & Hakim, 2009, p. 120). Centralized authority and the concentration of power in the bureaucracy created a culture of command and control that had little concern for the ordinary citizen's needs (Shah, 2004). The hold on political power at the center weakened those at the periphery. Even local governments were highly centralized and bureaucratized (Pratikno, 2005, 59).

Suharto's resignation in 1998 signaled the start of democratization and decentralization. These processes significantly weakened the hold of the state over society. Indonesians started to exercise their civil rights and individual freedoms.

The democratization and decentralization process has shaped current practices in public finance management, which is the core of governance. The reforms have led to unifying the budget, simplifying treasury functions, increasing planning and financial management transparency, linking planning to budgeting (and making these performance-based), and preparing budgets within a medium term expenditure framework.

Indonesia: Policy and Institutional Context

THE INDONESIAN government enacted a number of policies to support participatory planning and budgeting. Some of these are:

- Act No. 17/2003 – refers to State finances, especially Articles 17-20;

[22] Former President Suharto coined the term "New Order" to characterize his regime when he came to power in 1966. Suharto used this term to contrast his rule with that of his predecessor, Sukarno (dubbed the "Old Order," or *Orde Lama*). The term "New Order" in more recent times has become synonymous with the Suharto years (1965–1998).

- Act No. 25/2004 – refers to the national planning system, especially Articles 21-27;
- Act No. 32/2004 – refers to local governance, especially Articles 150-154 and 179-199;
- Act No. 33/2004 – refers to the financial sharing between central and local governments, especially Articles 66-86; and
- Act No. 1/2004 – refers to the Public Financial Management and the State Treasury. (Suhirman, 2005, p. 22)

Majority of the local governments are dependent on the General Allocation Funds, while a few get a share from revenues from natural resources. Law No. 32/2004 has significantly improved the conditions for accountability of regional governments, one of which is the direct election of regional heads. Prior to this law, the regional parliaments could impeach local chief executives based merely on their accountability reports.

While the Acts mentioned earlier provide the general guidelines, it is the Regulations that detail the processes, also called implementing rules and regulations (IRRs).

Box 8. Pertinent laws on decentralization in Indonesia.

SINCE 1999, a number of laws were enacted that started the decentralization process while allowing the national government to retain central authority over international relations, defense, monetary policy, religion, and the judiciary. Two of these laws are:

- Law No. 22 /1999, decentralizing authority to the district and municipal levels. It strengthened the parliament at the district and municipal levels. It gave local governments the right to enact local regulations and to elect the head of the region without interference from the central government.
- Law No. 25 /1999, allocating 25 percent of the national revenue to local governments as their General Allocation Fund. The law stipulates that provincial governments get 10 percent, while the *kabupaten* (rural/district)/city get 90 percent. It also introduced sharing of revenues from natural resources (e.g., oil, mining, forestry, fisheries) between the central and local governments.

Government Regulation No. 8/2008—which is an IRR of Act No. 32/2004 on the regional planning process—puts into detail the content and steps of development planning. The regulation sets normative goals and makes planning an inclusive process. It links development planning to spatial planning[23] and budgeting through the medium-term expenditure framework.

Government Regulation No. 59/2007 clarifies the relationship between regional governments and civil society. Regional governments cannot provide continuous funding or other support to selected non-government organizations. It mandates regional governments to open the review of the General Budget Policy with the participation of civil society. This policy helps civil society ensure that project proposals developed using the bottom-up process are able to survive. (Suhirman, 2009, p. 2)

(See Box 8 for other pertinent laws on decentralization in Indonesia.)

[23] Spatial planning includes all levels of land use planning including urban planning, regional planning, environmental planning, etc.

Surakarta: A Cultural and Trading Center

SOLO, ALSO known as Surakarta, is the cultural and trading center of the island of Java (Figure 8). It was established in 1745 when the capital of the Mataram Kartasura kingdom was moved to a village known as Solo. Solo became the capital of the new kingdom called Surakarta Hadiningrat. The kingdom was abolished in 1945 when Indonesia gained independence.

Figure 8. Location map of Surakarta (Solo) in Java.

Modern Surakarta is a middle-sized city with an estimated population of around one million (Pratikno, 2005, 62). The Javanese make up the majority, while a sprinkling of Chinese, Arab, and Indian groups belong to the minority.

Economic inequality and feudalism continue to persist in Solonese society. The Chinese minority control the textile and batik painting industry, which is one of the economic drivers in Solo City. As in many parts of the island, majority of the native Javanese are poor. Relations between the Javanese majority and the local Chinese have not been good, and the problem of poverty has often been attributed to the Chinese and government bureaucrats. Solo City has experienced social and political unrest because of this problem.

The *kecamatan* (sub-district or sub-municipal) and the *kelurahan* (village) are the two political units under the municipal or city government. Surakarta has five *kecamatans*: Banjarsari, Jebres, Laweyan, Pasar Kliwon, and Serengan. The Surakarta municipality controls 11 public services, including education, health, social services, and land administration.

From Top-Down to Bottom-Up Planning

THE DECENTRALIZATION process in Indonesia brought about changes in the way development planning and budgeting were conducted.

Prior to 1999: Top-down planning and budgeting

Prior to the political reforms in 1999, a representative body called Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (LKMD) used to draft the development plans of the village. The village chief, who headed the LKMD, appointed its members. The villagers were excluded from the planning process, which was monopolized by the LKMD.

The proposals at the village-level were consolidated and prioritized at the sub-municipal or *kecamatan* level. Because village representatives were not included, the *kecamatan* bureaucrats decided which programs to prioritize, often disregarding the proposals from the villages.

The consolidated proposals at the *kecamatan* level were then submitted to the municipal government. These were deliberated upon by the municipal planning body consisting of sectoral agencies and heads of the sub-municipal governments. The municipal planning body often ignored by the proposals from the *kecamatan* level because decision-making was centralized.

The municipal budgeting committee composed of bureaucrats and council members drafted the budget based on the submitted plans. The draft budget was then presented to and approved by the municipal council, which was dominated by the political party of the government.

While the planning process was proclaimed to be "bottom-up", decision-making was, in reality, a "top-down" process.

Transition to bottom-up participatory planning

At least 11 major public disturbances were reported in Surakarta between 1911 and 1998, all attributed to economic disparity and political problems. The most serious one in 1998—which contributed to Suharto's downfall—resulted in a loss of nearly US$59 million. Tens of thousands lost their jobs (Kartono, 2004).

According to civil society organizations, the over-centralized policy-making process, which excluded ordinary citizens from public decision-making, contributed to the series of civil disturbances in 1998 and 1999. CSOs and the academe argued for community participation in public decision-making, believing that this was a key to resolve socio-economic inequalities and mutual distrust among the stakeholders.

The political reforms in 1999 led to the change of name of LKMD to Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (LPMK), signaling the involvement of village-level institutions in the development planning process. The LPMK acted as facilitators, while funds for the Kelurahan Development Meeting were sourced from the Municipal Annual Budget (APBD) (Sugiartoto, 2003).

In 2000, the Ford Foundation sponsored Mr. Pak Qomaruddin, the city's Planning Officer, to participate in a study tour to the Philippines to learn about decentralization and participatory governance. Inspired by what he observed in the Philippines, Qomaruddin appealed to the local government to introduce participatory planning in Solo City. Despite stiff resistance from local officials—who feared losing their hold on power— Qomaruddin found his allies among CSOs. Eventually, the Indonesian Partnership for Local Governance Initiatives (IPGI) was established. The IPGI was a tripartite partnership among the local governments, the

academe, and NGOs. Qomaruddin was selected as the local government partner for the IPGI Presidium in Surakarta (Widianingsih, 2005).

The initiators and key players

The IPGI Presidium in Surakarta (also called IPGI-Solo) initiated discussions at the local level to agree on the appropriate planning process. Involved were the Planning Agency (BAPPEDA), the State University of Surakarta, and Gita Pertiwi, the latter a local NGO working on environmental and governance issues (Sugiartoto, 2003). A study in ten selected *kelurahans* found that the LKMD dominated the development planning process at the *kelurahan* level, and there was community resistance to the LKMD (IPGI, 2004). IPGI used the study's findings to pilot-test participatory processes in the ten villages.

In 2001, the city government initiated changes—due mainly to the efforts of Qomaruddin and IPGI—by introducing direct community involvement through the Participatory Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan Partisipatif or PPP). The mechanism allowed for participation of various stakeholders at the *kelurahan*, sub-municipality, and municipality levels. The Regional Planning Board (BAPPEDA) consolidated the decisions submitted from the lower levels. The regional government provided budgetary support for projects to be undertaken at the community level. Local government officials at all levels played important roles in identifying the issues, preparing the draft plan, ensuring the plan is approved in the *musrenbang*, and supervising the implementation of the plans.

An assessment in 2001 showed that the process did not guarantee meaningful participation, mainly because most communities failed to appreciate the participatory planning approach. The findings showed that the Kelurahan Development Meetings had no clear objectives and no concrete program proposals. Local elites continued to dominate the process. In addition, the focus was still on physical infrastructure such as constructing a *kelurahan* office or a *gapura* (symbolic village gateway) (Sugiartoto, 2003, 174-177).

To address these issues, the Mayor of Solo in 2002 issued detailed implementing rules and regulations on participatory planning and budgeting (Mayoral Decision No. 410/45/A/1/2002). It outlined the steps, activities, and outputs, starting with meetings at the neighborhood level up to regional BAPPEDA level.

Starting in 2002, the Kelurahan Development Meetings had a clearer direction, gaining support from higher levels of local governments. Community interest in the *kelurahan* meetings increased. The Regional Planning Board and IPGI-Solo trained 255 facilitators from 51 villages (IPGI, 2004, 12-13). The starting point was the neighborhood meetings where priorities were identified and discussed at the sub-district meetings. But a number of *kelurahans* failed to submit their priorities due to a limited capacity to develop their plans. In such cases, the sub-district committee did the prioritization based on information from the *kelurahan* meetings (IPGI, 2004, 3).

In 2005, Joko "Jokowi" Widodo was elected mayor of Solo. He introduced mechanisms for consultation and participation, such as focus group discussions in sectoral committees, thereby providing "voice" to the marginalized sectors. City government officials adopted this approach that has since then involved all stakeholders in policy decision-making.

Figure 9. Participatory planning in Indonesia.



Figure 9 shows how BAPPEDA consolidates and synchronizes the inputs in preparing a draft plan. Starting with the mayor's vision, the BAPPEDA prepares a 20-year long-term strategic plan and a 5-year medium-term plan. (The line departments likewise prepare their strategic plans.) Action plans are drafted based on the medium-term plan. The action plans are the basis for the annual planning and budgeting process.

Institutionalizing Citizen Participation in Solo

FIGURES 10 AND 11 illustrate the process by which ordinary citizens participate in the Rukun Tetanga (RT) and Rukun Warga (RW) at the *kelurahan* level upwards to the community/city level. This process is institutionalized in Regulation No. 25/2005.

In Solo City, there are two tracks for citizen participation, the sectoral track and the territorial track.

The sectoral track involves discussions among different sector groups, such as artisans, educators, etc., starting with small meetings then up to bigger assemblies at the city level.

The territorial track starts with meetings at the neighborhood levels (RT and RW), where all households are involved. Representatives of the neighborhood RTs and RWs join in the village *musrenbang* where the neighborhood proposals are consolidated. The consolidated proposals are then brought to the *musrenbang* at the the *kecamatan* (sub-municipal) level, where representatives of the *kelurahan* also participate. While only a limited number are formally invited at the *kecamatan* level, it is open to anybody (but sans the right to vote).

Figure 10. Participatory process in planning and budgeting in Indonesia.



Source: A. Indro [BAPPEDA], personal communication, March 19, 2010.

The draft documents resulting from the two planning tracks are submitted to the city departments. The proposals are synchronized with the line department's activities through the SKPD, which is a forum within each department. Each department then prepares a draft plan with the corresponding budget. All department plans are consolidated into a draft city plan (RKPD), which is presented and discussed at the city-level *musrenbang*.

The city-level *musrenbang* is the venue where budget proposals are made as to which items will be funded the city government, the provincial government, and from other sources (community, NGOs, private sector). The output is the draft Consolidated Plan (RKPD) containing the budget specifics. Then the budgeting process then begins.

The budgeting process is a technical process, starting with matching the contents of the RKPD with two policy documents, the a) general policy on budget, and b) prediction budget[24] of the departments made by the BAPPEDA and the Department of Finance. The result is the draft city budget (RAPBD) containing itemized activities with the corresponding budget.

The draft RAPBD undergoes a public hearing where inputs by citizen groups are considered. The revised RAPB is then submitted to the legislative council for legal approval. The final document is called the Annual Plan Budget Document (APBD).

Some observers have criticized the disconnect between planning and budgeting. There are also allegations regarding the collusion between legislative council members and department officials. BAPPEDA officials, however, has defended the integrity of the process. These officials likewise claim that the legislature can give its opinion by suggesting an increase or reduction of budget items.

[24] The Department of Finance (DPPKA) prepares the prediction budget of ten sectors every year and delivers them to line departments. It is based on the prediction of local revenue and strategic plan.

Figure 11. The musrenbang process.



Multi-stakeholders dialogue

In 2005, Solo City adopted the Multi-Stakeholders Dialogue (MSD) approach, which is a modified *musrenbang* process. While the MSD sees the planning activity as part of the annual regular agenda of the city, it also includes planning for emergency situations. At the time this study was conducted, for instance, the city was faced with serious flooding problems due to excessive rainfall. The city government, using the MSD approach, has plans on how to deal with the situation. Activities include the reclamation of eroded areas by the riverbanks, upgrading of slum areas, relocation of vendors, and creation of a park and playground. For the relocation of park vendors alone, around 50 meetings were held for a consensus to be reached.

Bridging the gap between citizens and government

During the Suharto era, there were only a few NGOs and CSOs in Solo City. Their work was focused mainly on community organizing. By the mid-1990s, the number of NGOs and CSOs increased significantly. Today, the city has quite a number of active and diverse NGOs and CSOs. But critics say that NGOs heavily dominate the civil society landscape, with grassroots or people's movements remaining in the background.

The start of the post-Suharto era provided space for NGOs and CSOs to explore and discuss such ideas as decentralization, modes of local governance, and citizen participation. But

the most prominent topic during this time was how to break the Golkar domination over civil society.[25]

In 2000, a common concern among CSOs and NGOs was to find ways to bridge the gap between the government and citizens. A number of NGOs, mostly from the academe, lobbied local politicians to adopt participatory planning. The initial reaction of resistance slowly dissipated as political reforms continued to snowball, and the bureaucracy started to entertain the idea of participatory planning. Thus was created platforms for interaction and dialogue between CSOs and NGOs, on the one hand, and the government bureaucracy, on the other hand. The former took on the task of motivating and mobilizing the communities to participate in local development planning.

Two examples illustrate this movement toward participatory planning. PATTIRO[26], for example, organized and facilitated the inclusion of marginalized women and other poor sectors into the Forum of Coordination of Posyandu Activists (FKKP). PATTIRO also organized the Association of Pedicab Drivers.

Another example is the initiative of Semmy Samuel Rory, a social activist, who organized disadvantaged groups into a network called Solidarity of Marginalized Groups of Surakarta (SOMPIS). The network includes pedicab[27] drivers, street singers, persons with disabilities, and street vendors. The members of the network are encouraged to participate in the *musrenbang* to influence local policy to be more pro-poor.

Partnership between citizen groups and government

The partnership between civil society and government in participatory planning and budgeting was institutionalized in the IPGI. IPGI-Solo, established in 2000, was committed to promote democracy by strengthening the capacity of social groups and the local government. An important program was to develop popular participation in public decision-making. IPGI-Solo's leadership consisted of academics, NGO activists, and government bureaucrats (Pratikno, 2005, 64-65).

Mr. Semy and Mr. Zachariah, both officials of the Regional Network for Poverty Alleviation, said in an interview (personal communication, March 2010) that participatory planning and budgeting stand on three pillars. These are the local government, community members (both sectoral and territorial), and civil society organizations (e.g., sectoral groups, NGOs, and INGO project staff). Efforts to recruit the private sector are also currently ongoing.

[25] Golkar was formed on October 20, 1964 under the name Sekber Golkar. It was a federation of 97 NGOs that grew over time to 220 organizations. While claiming to be apolitical, Sekber Golkar had the support of senior military officers to counter the increasing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). On Suharto's instructions Golkar was turned from a federation of NGOs into a political party. Later Suharto tightened his control over the Golkar by having himself elected Chairman of its Executive Board.

[26] Pusat Telaah dan Informasi Regional (PATTIRO) is a NGO based in Jakarta. It was established on April 17, 1999 to promote good governance and public participation in Indonesia, particularly at the local level. PATTIRO has a branch office in Solo.

[27] A pedicab is similar to a cycle rickshaw.

Citizen Participation

DECENTRALIZATION, which brought about participatory approaches in development planning and budgeting, created an impact on the way citizens engaged government.

Access to information

Government and CSOs/NGOs are working together to make information on the annual budget available to the public. In 2005, PATTIRO posted the city budget—printed in reader-friendly form—in strategic places. The aim was to inform the people and to motivate them to monitor the implementation of projects. The posters included contact information of government officials.

The Department of Finance followed suit in 2006 by making public the city budget, using a similar format as PATTIRO's. The summary of the budget was posted in the website; printed forms were also distributed in the villages.

While the Freedom of Information Law (2008) requires that documents related to planning and budgeting are disclosed to the public, the city government is not proactive about it. The demand for access to information still rests with citizens, led by NGOs.

Citizen's voice in decision-making

Participatory planning processes gave voice to the poor and marginalized sectors of Surakarta society, bringing their demands to the negotiating table. Through dialogue, the poor were able to participate in decisions that affected their lives. Two examples are given here: the women sector and the pedicab drivers group.

Participation of women

In 2002, a number of villages initiated the move to include women in planning. The wives—together with the husbands—were invited to the neighborhood meetings. But without systematic organizing and mobilization, only a number attended.

PATTIRO organized the women in Solo in 2003. Mothers whose children were below five years old were asked to attend the monthly meetings. PATTIRO trained women to speak up during the planning and budgeting sessions. The women advocated for gender-sensitive budgeting and for an increase in the social health system budget. As a consequence, the city government issued a policy in 2004 requiring 30 percent representation of women in the planning process. Women's perspectives were also institutionalized in the local development plan (Ida, 2005, 9).

In 2006, the FKKP was established. The FKKP or Posyandu is an organization of women involved in the delivery of health programs. PATTIRO and FKKP sent facilitators to 51 villages to encourage women to participate in the *musrenbang*. By 2009, the city government accredited the FKKP in 2009. The accreditation opened the doors for the women to participate in the different committees. Currently, women make up around 30 percent of community assemblies; in many cases, the women lead the discussions. The women are also involved in the monitoring of budget implementation at the *kelurahan* level.

The status of women in the city has changed significantly. Budget allocations for women concerns have increased. Majority feel empowered. Women now attend planning and budgeting sessions. Groups of women have taken on the task of taking care of child centers and to attend to the needs of the elderly. Many of them have become entrepreneurs.

Participation of pedicab drivers

One of the poorest groups in Surakarta are the pedicab drivers. Most of them are migrants from the rural areas. Being marginalized, they had no "voice" whatsoever in any governance undertaking.

The drivers' situation led PATTIRO and a number of CSOs to organize the pedicab drivers into an association called Forum Kerukunan Keluarga Becak (FKKB). The CSOs encouraged the drivers to join in the local planning process. Today, representatives of the FKKB join in the consultation activities and have found their "voice" as citizens. As a consequence, the city government has issued licenses to the drivers, provided them with parking spaces, gave them uniforms, and painted their pedicabs in bright colors to make the contraptions appealing to tourists. More importantly, many of these drivers have been trained to speak English so that foreigners, especially tourists, can interact with them (A. Basuki [PATTIRO] and S. S. Rory [Regional Network for Poverty Alleviation], personal communication, March 2010).

The World Bank-supported poverty-alleviation program called Programme Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri (PNPM) supports vulnerable groups such as pedicab drivers, street vendors, street singers, and sex workers. It encourages representatives from these groups to join local development planning activities. Those whose lives are affected by government decisions are asked to take part in the decision-making process. A case in point was the plan of the city government to augment revenues by increasing parking fees. Understandably, the scheme created conflict between motorists and parking attendants who were most affected. A series of dialogues were conducted among the stakeholders—motorists, parking attendants, contractors, city government. The negotiations resulted in standardized parking fees, efficient services for road users, better working conditions for parking attendants, and reduction of conflicts.

Expectedly, there are contrasting views regarding this matter. Most CSOs believe that ensuring the participation of the marginalized results in better service delivery, not to mention the empowerment of the poor. On the other hand, the hardliners among the bureaucrats continue to be convinced that services can be more efficiently delivered even if poor people do not participate in the decision-making processes. This is the reason why some CSOs think bureaucrats tend to short-cut the process. The deputy head of the district legislature, however, strongly believes that a government agency's plans should be aligned with the people's aspirations (Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of DPRD, personal communication, March 2010).

Citizens monitor budget implementation

A number of bodies monitor the implementation of the budget. This includes the DPBD/BAPPEDA, which has oversight authority; the legislative council (DPRD); the city level

inspectorate; and task forces at the *kelurahan* and the *kecamatan* levels. Representatives of accredited CSOs and citizen groups also monitor budget implementation.

The local chief executive is supposed to submit a quarterly report on the budget implementation as part of the monitoring process, but in reality the reports are often delayed from four to 12 months. To address the problem, members of the DPRD (legislature) initiate consultations with citizen groups and summon the department heads, after which they issue an independent report.

Citizen participation in monitoring the budget implementation has increased over the years. Some indicators include a rise in the payment of taxes and user charges; people are also more willing to report anomalies and lodge complaints.

Changes in power relations

Citizen participation in local development planning and budgeting has brought about changes in terms of power relations

First, the institutionalization of participatory processes has, to a certain extent, leveled the playing field between the power-holders (city government) and the marginalized. The government has opened the space for the poor to make decisions on matters that affect their daily lives. Women, for example, are now part of the policy decision-making, resulting in budget that is sensitive to their needs and concerns.

Second, ordinary citizens have learned how to exercise their basic rights. Between 1999 and 2004, a number of legislative council members were charged (and many of them jailed) for corruption. These cases were reported and filed by citizens with the backing of CSOs.

Third, the horizontal power relationships have changed likewise. People belonging to different economic, ethnic, and ideological camps have learned to listen to each other. Anti-government feelings have subsided for the most part (Ardhyanti, E. [PATTIRO], personal communication, March 2010).

Recognizing the Challenges

WHILE PARTICIPATORY planning in Indonesia is one of the most advanced in the region, the government and citizen groups continue to face many challenges.

Government openness

Surakarta is not wanting in committed and reformist leaders like Mayor Joko Widodo. The sustainability of reforms initiated by the mayor would be ensured if leaders like him join politics and government service.

Development outcomes would be realized if coordination improves between the executive and legislative branches of the city government. There appears to be a need for the legislative branch to scrutinize the budget more closely, using developmental lens.

Organized and capable citizen groups

While CSOs and citizen groups have successfully engaged government, there is a need to sustain the engagement. Building their capacity to dialogue and negotiate with government is crucial. Enhanced networking capacity with other CSOs and citizen groups, including the academe, faith-based organizations, and the private sector, is a must in order to increase their "voice".

CSOs and citizen groups need to mobilize resources for their advocacy work and other tasks related to reforms. An option is to ask the national government to allocate a portion of the budget for civil society so that the latter will not remain dependent on donors (which tend to insist on their pre-defined outcomes). A caveat, however, is the danger of cooptation by government.

CSOs and citizen groups should see to it that the competencies needed for engagement should be with the villagers and the base sectors. Capacity building should go beyond information dissemination and awareness; it should also focus on building the knowledge and skills as well on changing the attitudes of people toward participation in the local development planning and budgeting processes.

To achieve social accountability outcomes, it is likewise crucial to build the capacity of government and CSO facilitators. The recommended way is to adopt learning-in-action, or experience-based learning, which is promoted by ANSA-EAP.

Seventy to 80 percent of the budget goes to the maintenance of the government bureaucratic structure (capital outlay, personnel, etc.). Obviously, the remaining amount would never be enough to address the development needs of people and communities. This is where support from funding agencies, NGOs, and private sector should come in. The mayor of Solo, to a certain extent, has been able to gain the support of non-state actors. A policy on phased reduction on administrative expenses is also recommended.

Access to information

While citizens can now access information on the budget, the information should be understandable and useful, that is, user-friendly.

Context and cultural appropriateness

The National Poverty Alleviation Program or PNPM is directed at the *kelurahan* level, but consultants who implement the program tend to ignore the existing participatory planning process. This weakens parallel community institutions. It is recommended that the PNPM be integrated into the regular *musrenbang*-based planning process.

Strengthening Social Accountability in Development Planning

IN ORDER TO strengthen social accountability through participatory planning, government and citizen groups should focus on the following challenges.

Capacity building of key actors

Ongoing and systematic capacity building of key actors through learning activities such as exposure visits help create a pool of champions for participatory planning. Government officials, on the one hand, and CSOs and citizen groups, on the other hand, are able to enhance technical know-how but also learn innovative strategies and approaches as they plan, implement, and monitor development projects.

Diversity enhances dialogue

Bringing in and fostering dialogue among diverse groups of people and sectors facilitate an atmosphere of mutual understanding. This approach enhances the feeling of ownership and empowerment, two important elements in social accountability.

Keeping the delicate balance of power

Increasing the participation of marginalized groups appears to be positively correlated to a more balanced power relation between the government and citizens. The ability of marginalized sectors to share their ideas and monitor development activities gives them a feeling that they are the creators of their own development and not just targets of development.

An accountable leadership

Electing a leadership committed to development and reform is crucial to the promotion of participatory initiatives. Such a leadership provides the impetus for making the government more responsive to the community's demand for accountable governance.

Case 3: Mongolia

ERDENET CITY (ORKHON)

MONGOLIA IS a land-locked country between China and Russia. From 1924 to the early 1990s, the Mongolian political system followed that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's (USSR) model of rigid democratic centralism.[28] But the USSR's "*glasnost*" (openness) and "*perestroika*" (restructuring) in the late 1980s up to 1990 (see Box 10) inspired Mongolia's rapid economic and political transition from an authoritarian socialist regime with a centrally planned economy to a democracy with a market-based economy. (Beck, Mendel, & Thindwa, 2007)

Box 9. Glasnost and perestroika: the end of USSR socialism.

Glasnost refers to the Soviet policy of open discussion of political and social issues. It was instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s and began the democratization of the Soviet Union. *Glasnost* also permitted criticism of government officials and allowed the media freer dissemination of news and information. Mikhail Gorbachev brought a fresh, more expansive style to the Kremlin. With express support for the economic reorganization initiated by Andropov, he introduced the concept of *perestroika* in April 1985. He intended it to be a program of moderate and controlled reform that would revitalize the economy, while keeping central planning and the leading role of the Communist party.

- Source: Glasnost and Perestroika, n.d.

Mongolia today is a unitary state with four levels of government—one central and three sub-national. The highest level of sub-national government is the province (*aimag*) and the capital city. Provinces are divided into regions (*soum*), and the capital city into districts. The lowest tier consists of two types: rural sub-districts (*bag*) and urban sub-districts (*horoo*).

[28] In democratic centralism, decision-making power and authority was centralized at senior party levels. In this single-party system, decisions of higher-level bodies are binding on subordinate-level party organizations.

Mongolia has 21 provinces, 329 *soums* and 1,520 *bags*. The capital city of Ulaanbaatar has nine districts and 117 sub-districts.

Until the 1960s, the economy of Mongolia was traditionally based on herding and agriculture. Between 1960 and 1980, Mongolia became heavily industrialized, supported by the economic bloc of communist states called the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON.[29] In 1990, industries represented almost 40 percent of Mongolia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while agriculture made up 20 percent. Nearly one-third of the GDP came from Soviet assistance, but this disappeared between 1990 and 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed.

Since then, growth has been sustained largely because of high copper prices and new gold production—10.6 percent in 2004, 7.7 percent in 2005, 8.4 percent in 2006, and an estimated 9 percent in 2007. However, Mongolia has also been experiencing a high inflation rate in over a decade as consumer prices in 2007 rose 14 percent due largely to increased fuel and food costs.

More than 60 percent of Mongolia's population is urban, and more than half of the population lives in Ulaanbaatar. The population of Ulaanbaatar has been rapidly increasing due to in-migration from the rural areas from the provinces. Most of the migrants settle in the *ger* areas. A large part of the rural population lives in sparsely populated semi-nomadic communities in the countryside, but agricultural community settlements are increasingly common (Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, n.d.). Table 2 presents the population of Mongolia from 2003 to 2006.

Table 2. Population of Mongolia from 2003 to 2006.

Population	Year			
	2003	***2004***	***2005***	***2006***
Total	2,504.0	2,533.1	2,562.4	2,594.8
Urban	1,464.2	1,498.2	1,543.3	1,579.5
In Ulaanbaatar	*893.4*	*928.5*	*965.3*	*994.3*
Rural	1,039.8	1,034.9	1,019.1	1,015.3

Source: e-Mongol.com, n.d.

Mongolia: Policy and Institutional Context

UNDP's PROJECT document entitled "Local Governance Support Programme" (June 2007 to June 2010) contextualizes the decentralization reform initiatives in Mongolia:

> Since the 1990s, decentralization has been part of Mongolia's reform agenda. However, the process of decentralization in Mongolia has been centrally driven, implemented slowly, and is so far incomplete. Politically, citizens elect local parliaments, but governors are nominated by these parliaments and appointed by the next higher level of government. Administratively, local governments (*aimags* and *soums*) have some control over local personnel, but decisions over sectoral policy-making remain centralized. Fiscally, local governments have some

[29] COMECON, byname of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), also called (from 1991) Organization for International Economic Cooperation, organization established in January 1949 to facilitate and coordinate the economic development of the eastern European countries belonging to the Soviet bloc. COMECON. (n.d.).

> revenue raising powers but there is no coherent inter-governmental transfer system in place. While legal reforms are frequently made, Mongolia lacks an integrated decentralization strategy and, most fundamentally, national consensus on how to operationalize decentralization with concrete arrangements for the inter-governmental sharing of responsibilities for service delivery and financing. (UNDP Mongolia, 2007, p. 2)

The new constitution, adopted in 1992, organizes the administrative units of Mongolia on the basis of self-governance and state management, with each unit having its own governor and assembly (*hural*). The governor is the local representative to the central or higher levels of sub-national government, while the members of the assembly are elected by the lower-level assemblies. The assemblies nominate the governors, who are then appointed by the immediate higher level government. For example, the *soum* governor is nominated by the *soum* assembly and is formally appointed by the *aimag*; the *aimag* governor is proposed by the *aimag* assembly and is appointed by the Prime Minister of the central government. All families have the right of representation in the *bag* assembly. *Bag* assemblies elect the *soum* assemblies, who in turn elect the *aimag* assembly (Constitution of Mongolia, 1992).

The governor's office prepares, implements, monitors and evaluates local policies. It also provides administrative services such as civil registration, civil services, licenses, and permits. The mechanism of nomination allows governors to link citizens to higher levels of government. The assemblies, as the people's representatives, pass regulations, monitor local administrative agencies, approve local budgets, and control their implementation (Government Structure in Mongolia, n.d.).

Mongolia's sub-national governments are quite fragmented and uneven. *Aimags* and *soums* vary in size—the average community has a population of around 5,000, but some have less than 1,500 members. Administrative capacity is weak in communities where people lead a semi-nomadic life, with virtually no economies of scale in service delivery.

The Public Sector Finance and Management Law delineate local and central government responsibilities. Local responsibilities are financed locally. These include sanitation, garbage collection, environmental concerns, pest eradication, local road maintenance, sewage, flood and fire protection, and local public infrastructure. Central mandates, which are financed centrally, consist of tasks that are implemented locally but supported by central government policies. These include key social services: education, health, labor, welfare, and social security. The central government decides on capital investments, but local governments cover maintenance and operational costs. Government personnel responsible for central government mandates (basic service delivery) are dually subordinated to the central government (under output-based contracts) and to the local governments.

Local government revenues consist of taxes decided by the assemblies, shared taxes, and non-tax revenues. Local governments, however, have little revenue autonomy, with local taxes (e.g., livestock tax, inheritance and gift tax, property tax, city tax, transport tax, stamp duties) representing six percent of consolidated government expenditures. Corporate income tax and excises, shared before 2003, are now retained by the central government. The Value Added Tax (VAT) is shared, but the proportion is decided annually by the center. All taxes are collected by the General Department for National Taxation, a central government body with local offices, which transfers local taxes to sub-national governments. Inter-governmental tax transfers

represent 60 percent of local government revenues until 2003, when the shared dropped to 30 percent. These transfers are mostly equalization grants and conditional transfers for central government mandates. Sub-national governments can incur deficits, and only *aimag* governors are allowed to borrow for capital expenditures with prior approval by the Ministry of Finance.

People's participation in local governance

Article 62 of the 1992 Constitution provides space for people's participation in local governance. According to the Constitution, local self-governing bodies organize citizen participation in solving problems of national scale, besides making independent decisions at the level of the province, the capital city, region, district, community, and neighborhood. Higher level authorities are not supposed to meddle with the decision-making of local self-governing bodies. The National Parliament, however, may delegate matters to the provincial and capital city parliaments as well to the governors if these are within the latter's competence.

In reality, however, citizen participation is limited in the decision-making process at the local level. Engblom, Svensson, and Westermark (2008) comment that the "decision making process on law and policy-making is not fully open and consultations with the citizens and the public are according to our sources not conducted effectively. Citizen's participation is still limited and would need further development." (p. 18)

Planning in Mongolia

Local development in Mongolia is hinged on two types of plans: the Land Use Plan and the Urban Plan. Land use planning is relatively new to Mongolia's market economy as this was directed mainly for the development of the agriculture sector of the country prior to the 1990s. Urban planning, on the other hand, is responsible for urban development. On paper and in terms of policy direction, the planning system is supposed to be well-coordinated with the land use plans as the basis for urban plans. In reality, however, the lack of coordination between the two systems is one of the major issues in local development planning.

Erdenet, A Mining City

ERDENET IS Mongolia's second-largest city. It is the capital of Orkhon *aimag*. Forming an enclave within the Bulgan *aimag*, the Orkhon *aimag* is located in the northern part of the country in a valley between the Selenge and Orkhon rivers. Erdenet is 371 kilometers by road from Ulaanbaatar, but 240 kilometers as the bird flies (see Figure 13). The population was 86,866 in 2008, up from 68,310 in 2000.

Between 1967 and 1970, geologists from Mongolia, Russia, and Czechoslovakia discovered a rich deposit of copper and molybdenum in the territory of the Orkhon *aimag*. In 1974, the Soviet-Mongolian copper ore dressing enterprise called "Erdenet" was founded, and has since then become one of the ten biggest plants in the world. Erdenet mines 22.23 million tons of ore per year, producing 126,700 tons of copper and 1,954 tons of molybdenum. The mines account for 13.5 percent of Mongolia's GDP and seven percent of tax revenue.

Figure 12. Location map of the mining city of Erdenet.

The copper mines—regarded as the lifeblood of Erdenet City—employ about 8,000 people. While some described Erdenet as "soulless", it is modern and is comparatively wealthy, and the facilities are the best outside of Ulaanbaatar. There is a significantly large Russian community, many of them working as technical advisers in the mines. (The Orkhon *Aimag*, n.d.)

Problems in the *ger* areas of Erdenet

Residential development in urban areas in Mongolia presents two different and distinct patterns. The first involves USSR-style planning that features multi-family housing surrounded by vaguely defined open space. The second pertains to temporary *ger*[30] areas (urban informal settlements) characterized by large plots with wide dirt roads. Eighty percent of those who live below the poverty line (which is 36 percent of the total population) live in these *ger* areas in Ulaanbaatar and in the *aimag* centers.

Following the Soviet exodus from Mongolia in the early 1990s, the *ger* areas in many cities including Erdenet continued to grow. The result has been a growing disparity in the provision of services between the *ger* areas and the formal housing sites. Among the beneficiaries of the case selected for this study, for example, 88 percent rely on water brought by trucks, either at designated water kiosks or delivered to their houses—water that is low in quality and less regular than the centrally-piped water supply. For heating and cooking, *ger* area residents

[30] A *ger* is round, cone-shaped tent. A *ger* has only one door and no windows. But it has a small opening at the top called a *toono* that allows smoke to go out of the stove's chimney. It is made out of boards with wool covering so that it is easy to put up and to take down.

primarily use highly polluting stoves, which are actually more expensive to use.[31] The *ger* areas also lack basic infrastructure facilities for sanitation[32], paved roads, street lighting, and drainage. Social services such as schools and health clinics are scarce. As a consequence, *ger* areas have a high concentration of health issues associated with unsafe drinking water, poor sanitation, little or no solid waste management, and air pollution created by heating stoves.

While *ger* housing areas are a major feature of Mongolia's urban landscape, many government officials tend to regard these as temporary in nature, believing that these will be replaced—"in some near future"—by permanent housing apartments. This is the reason why efforts to upgrade the *ger* areas were often undertaken in a piecemeal and lackadaisical manner, with little interest in generating more broad-based and longer-term improvements. Until now, there has been little meaningful development or visible change in most *ger* areas.

Initiators and facilitators of participatory planning

The Asian Development Bank (ADB), in collaboration with the Government of Mongolia, the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR), and the German Development Service, with support from the local consulting organization Urban Development Resource Center (UDRC)[33], initiated a project named "Community-Driven Development for Urban Poor in *Ger* Areas". The project was aimed at empowering local communities through increased citizen participation in local governance. The project was designed to involve the communities in the design, implementation, and management of community demand-driven infrastructure and income-generating projects in selected *ger* areas (ADB, 2007). (See Box 10)

The Ministry of Construction and Urban Development (MCUD) was tasked to implement the project. The Project Implementation Unit (PIU), headed by a project manager, is supported by a national financial management consultant and one short-term international monitoring and evaluation (M&E) consultant. A specialist on community participation is assigned in each project town including Erdenet. The Project Steering Committee (PSC) supervises project activities at the national and project levels.[34] The Technical Working Committee (TWC) is responsible for reviewing the technical, financial, and social aspects of the sub-project proposals.

CBOs and savings groups are responsible for implementing the second component of the project. Supported and guided by community mobilizers, they are actively involved in sub-project planning, proposal preparation, decision-making, implementation, operation and maintenance (O&M), and M&E. The CBOs and savings groups receive funds directly from the

[31] In Erdenet, the average household monthly expenditure for heating varies from about 6 to 12 per cent of the total expenditure in contrast to non-poor families, which are predominantly apartment dwellers, spend 3 to 4 per cent on heating (National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 2003).

[32] Virtually all households use unimproved and, in many cases, dilapidated pit latrines.

[33] The Urban Development Resource Center (UDRC), an NGO, works in the *ger* districts of Mongolian cities with the aim of improving living conditions. It organizes neighborhoods into small savings groups that work together to tackle problems like air pollution and lack of sanitation. It also offers small, short-term loans and offers advice on energy-efficient building practices. The UDRC also encourages partnerships between communities and local government to identify and meet community needs.

[34] The PSC is composed of representatives from the Ministry of Finance, MCUD, local governments, public urban service organizations, and NGOs working on *ger* area improvement and community development.

PIU for their sub-projects. They are responsible for managing the finances and procuring equipment and services for the implementation of the sub-project.

Box 10. The components of the Community-Driven Development for Urban Poor in *Ger* Areas in Erdenet.

The project Community-Driven Development for Urban Poor in *Ger* Areas has two components:

Component 1. Capacity building to strengthen formal and informal local institutions. Objectives include the following:

- Mobilizing local communities to participate in the project through the provision of technical assistance by facilitators and NGOs;
- Strengthening the capacity of local communities and local governments to initiate, plan and implement, and manage and supervise community subprojects through the provision of technical assistance, training, and workshops; and
- Establishing a system for participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and strengthening community capacity to undertake M&E.

Component 2. Grants for community-driven development initiatives include activities such as:

- Preparation by community groups of sub-project proposals for small-scale community infrastructure and income-generating projects;
- Provision of small grants to community groups (savings groups and CBOs) on a demand-driven basis for subprojects that include small-scale infrastructure, social services, and productive or income-generating subprojects; and
- Implementation of subprojects by the communities; and management and operation by CBOs of community facilities created.

Small grants are made available to the *ger* communities for small-scale infrastructure, social services, and income-generating sub-projects.

The UDRC has been contracted to implement the first component, which focuses on public awareness campaigns, community mobilization, training and capacity building, and participatory M&E.

Participatory Planning in Erdenet

THE PARTICIPATORY planning process adopted by the project takes into account a number of factors, including facilitation of the participatory planning workshops, community organizing, and capacity building of local stakeholders.

Facilitation of a planning workshops

The UDRC facilitates participatory planning workshops for the CBOs and savings groups under the project. The process, designed to be inclusive, includes identifying and prioritizing community needs and developing a comprehensive plan. A key objective of the facilitation process is to ensure that all community members, including women and marginalized groups, are consulted. The participatory process also ensures that dissenting voices are heard and that consensus is built on the plan.

The second step is the nomination of a sub-project committee, which develops a budget proposal for the priority sub-project. The UDRC facilitators and community mobilizers guide

the sub-project committee. The proposal should include an O&M and a M&E plan, the preparation of which requires intensive training. In preparation for this step, user-friendly manuals are distributed to community members.

Once the proposal is approved, the sub-project group (SPG) implements the sub-project. This entails fund management, procurement of materials and transportation, and hiring of contractors, laborers, and consultants (the latter if needed). The community also prepares a maintenance plan and establishes a maintenance fund.

The task of the TWC is to conduct a desk review of each sub-project proposal followed by a field appraisal. The desk review is based on a predefined set of criteria, which include the following: a) community participation is maximized during the proposal development; b) gender issues are addressed; c) the community is able to contribute either in cash or in kind; d) the local government has a counterpart (e.g., land and O&M support); e) an O&M plan is in place; and f) community lots are used, i.e. land that is unoccupied or used for residential or productive purposes.

Those sub-projects that pass the criteria undergo field appraisal, which consists of a social and technical evaluation. The social evaluation determines a) whether women and other vulnerable groups are sufficiently involved in the decision-making process; b) whether the members agree to an acceptable plan for mobilizing community counterpart and for settling disputes; and c) the types of training required to implement the sub-project. Finally, the TWC evaluates the technical feasibility of the sub-project, the accuracy of the cost estimates, and the viability of the O&M plan. To assist the community in meeting the technical requirements, the PIU provides the SPGs with a template for typical sub-projects.

The PIU prepares an approval letter detailing the steps the SPGs must take prior to implementing the sub-project. The steps include a) identifying the types of training required, b) opening a checking account, and c) mobilizing the community counterparts. The PIU and the SPGs sign a contract, signaling the implementation of the sub-project.

The UDRC develops and delivers a training package covering all aspects of the sub-project implementation—procurement, accounting, financial management, O&M, and M&E. The package includes modules on technical maintenance as well as training on the financial (e.g., fund raising through contributions, user fees) and social aspects of the project, such as hygiene education.

To make the initiative sustainable, the SPGs establish a maintenance fund based on the O&M plan for the next three to five years. They can set aside the community counterpart as seed money for the maintenance fund. Part of the process is to determine how to raise additional maintenance funds; some seek a commitment from the local government—in cash or in kind—to match the group's counterpart.

Community organizing

The Community-Driven Development for Urban Poor in *Ger* Areas project in Erdenet has been successful so far in generating participation from local community institutions using a bottom-up process. The ADB in partnership with World Vision has also made similar attempts in Ulaanbaatar, with some degree of success.

Community mobilization has been going on to strengthen formal and informal local institutions. As of March 2010, approximately 54 percent of the 3,173 households in the Erdenet *ger* areas have been informed about project. (See Table 3) The UDRC and local consultants have conducted a series of capacity building activities in the communities and among the CBOs. Examples of such training include building compost toilets and bins, proper composting, piping of potable water into the houses, building of bathrooms and kitchens, retrofitting stoves, and disposing of used water.

Table 3. Number of participants in "mobilization meetings" in Erdenet City.

***Bag* Name**	**Number of Participants**				
	Meeting 1	***FGD meeting***	***Meeting 2***	***Meeting 3***	***Total***
Bulag	74	51	46	48	219
Bayanbulag	33	50	39	40	162
Bayantsagaan	77	76	68	69	290
Shand/CBO	60		17	34	111
Ihzaluu/CBO	20		9	21	50
Denj/CBO	24		13	18	55
Naran/CBO	30		22	38	90
Rashaant/CBO	28		16	20	64
Tsagaanchuluut/CBO	38		13	18	69
Bulag/CBO	39		10	22	71
Bayanbulag/CBO	19		13	13	45
Govil/CBO	23		6		29
Erdenet/CBO	31				31
Total	**496**	**177**	**272**	**341**	**1,286**

At the core of the community mobilization strategy is the establishment of savings groups[35]. Through the UDRC, the project organizes, trains, and supports these savings groups. They are taught how to determine the terms of their savings and to establish lending policies, such as how much to save, how often members contribute, who collects the money, and what are the terms of the loans. Savings groups are encouraged to band together into larger, registered CBOs of 200 to 300 households. Usually, the formation of these savings groups and CBOs is on a voluntary and geographical basis.

Capacity building of local stakeholders

One of the more important sustainability features of the project is to build the capacity of the local government using community-driven development approaches. The local government staffs are linked with the sub-project groups for cooperation and coordination purposes,

[35] Savings groups are proving to be an effective model for social mobilization and community organization in Mongolia. Savings groups are entirely voluntary organizations composed of 20 to 40 households in the same neighborhood.

training them on the CDD approach, and providing them with information on procedural matters. Participatory planning workshops are organized where community beneficiaries and local government staffs share insights and experiences.

Social Accountability in Development Planning

THE SPACES for social accountability in the Erdenet project are in the areas of access to information, citizen monitoring, and in the continued engagement between citizen groups and government as a result of a transformed power relations.

Access to information

The project stakeholders are encouraged to promote free and open exchange of information. At the planning stage, there is a constant exchange and sharing of information using such tools as transect maps, Venn diagrams, and flow diagrams. Tools are also used to determine the community's level of satisfaction with project implementation. Sub-project accounts are open and available for inspection by the community; these are also subject to internal and external audits. Reports are generated and submitted regularly to the PIU.

Two *bags* in Erdenet have organized a monthly community Sports Day. In addition to the traditional community activities, the Sports Day has been used to enhance transparency about the project. The local communities publicize the project's activities through information boards, and there are sessions on how to organize and how to publish information updates. Community activities such as these have facilitated the exchange of information among members.

Citizen's voice in decision-making

With plenty of handholding, the project has had some success in bringing out citizen's voice in public decision-making. The *ger* communities have been enabled to participate in making decisions about their own development, in administering the funds, in managing the implementation of their priority investments, and in monitoring and evaluating the extent to which their activities have improved their lots.

A total of 154 SPGs have been established so far in three cities, including Erdenet. To gauge their success, SPGs were evaluated internally according to sustainability, the capacity to cooperate, accuracy of procurement and the use of project funds, efficiency of the internal organization, timely reporting, and so on. SPGs that showed promise during the first phase have initiated new sub-projects more efficiently. Informed residents are now more actively involved. Measures have been taken to strengthen those SPGs found to be operationally deficient and conflict-ridden.

A number of sub-projects in Erdenet have already been completed as of March 2010. The Saijrakh-SPG, for example, has improved the *ger*'s household access to electricity. The Ahmadiin Toloo-SPG, on the other hand, has just finished constructing a center for the elderly that doubles as a meeting place complete with gymnastics facilities and computers.

Citizen monitoring

A comprehensive M&E system has been established in the sub-project areas. Three types of M&E are conducted: participatory monitoring by project beneficiaries, internal M&E by the PIU, and external M&E by NGOs and the media. The UDRC trains SPGs to develop their own monitoring indicators and tools.

The project's stakeholders give importance to community monitoring. Community monitoring reports are given weight alongside with those of local M&E specialists, engineers, and architects who assess the technical aspects of the sub-projects. Community M&E training has been successfully conducted using, for example, role playing in the procurement of goods and services.

Impact on power relations

The implementation of the project may be regarded as a major factor that contributed to the improvement in power relations among the various stakeholders. Previously, development projects were top-down affairs, in which residents were looked upon as mere beneficiaries who were informed of the proposed interventions and updated on project progress. Decision-making and management were sole responsibilities of higher level officials.

Under the project's CDD approach, the *ger* residents are now able to take control of the development of their communities. While resources are not that much for each SPG, these enable them to build needed infrastructure and undertake income-generating activities. Most importantly, the project has given the residents the skills to access funds, influence future development, and hold local officials and other stakeholders accountable for the level and quality of services delivered to them.

The partnership between *bag* administrations and the community residents has resulted in a more balanced power relationship. *Bag* administrators and representatives of local citizen councils have become volunteer members of CBOs, giving them the opportunity to understand better the communities' development priorities. Even as residents cooperate with local administrators in planning and implementing the sub-projects, the local administration allocate financial contribution from the local budget, or grant permission for land use (Table 4). Communities also decide on a counterpart, which is approximately 20 percent of the total sub-project cost.

Table 4. Examples of cooperation between sub-project groups, local administration, and public institutions in Erdenet.

SPGs	Project Activities	Cooperation Scheme
Tsagaan Shonkhor	Street-lighting in Tsagaanchuluut *bag* (more than two km)	The local administration prepared a location map free of charge.
Ireedui	Street-lighting in Bayantsagaan *bag* (more than two km)	The "Town Improvement Authority" provided a crane during the installation. (It will also be responsible for future maintenance and operational costs.) The "Erdenet, Bulgan Aimags' Electricity and Line Office" provided the heavy equipment to dig post holes.
Yesun Bulag	Street lighting along central road in Bulag *bag*	The "Town Improvement Authority" provided 19 street lighting posts and will be responsible for future

SPGs	Project Activities	Cooperation Scheme
		maintenance and operational costs.
Idevtkhen	Installation of an electrical transformer and electricity lines for 265 families in Erdene *bag*	The aimag administration agreed to contribute 2,059,195 MNT (around US$1,600) in cash and prepared a location map free of charge. The "Erdenet, Bulgan Aimags' Electricity and Grid Office" also agreed to contribute 2,059,195 MNT (around US$1,600) equivalent of labor cost and prepared the technical needs assessment free of charge.
Usukh Ireedui	Construction of a playground in Rashaant *bag*	Local administration allocated land free of charge.
Sanaachilga	Construction of a flood prevention dam	The *bag* administration promised to provide workers to support the construction.
Gerelt Naran	Street lighting along a small footpath in Naran *bag*	The "Town Improvement Authority" agreed to provide street lighting posts and will be responsible for future maintenance and operational costs. The local administration prepared a location map free of charge.
Akhmadin tuluu	Improvement and equipping a center for the elderly in Shand *bag*	The local administration allocated two rooms for the elderly free of charge.

The *ger* communities where the sub-projects have been successfully implemented have earned the respect of government officials. As a consequence, the communities are now more successful in obtaining land titles, licenses, professional advice, and even material, labor, or financial contributions. Agreements have been made between local officials and the communities to maintain large technical infrastructure sub-projects to be operated through the "Town Improvement" Public Utility Services Organization and other similar agencies. This is an example of local communities influencing decision-making at the local level.

Lessons for Mainstreaming Social Accountability

SEVERAL LESSONS and insights for mainstreaming social accountability can be learned from the project.

- Incorporating M&E and O&M plans as important components of the participatory planning process enhances community involvement in the implementation and assessment of development projects.
- Well-informed and trained stakeholders (specifically community representatives and local government officials) result in increased participation during the planning, implementation, and monitoring of development projects.
- Creating and strengthening CBOs help facilitate community mobilization for planning, implementation, and monitoring of projects; strong CBOs also ensure project sustainability.
- Emphasis on making the planning process inclusive even at the project design stage helps in increasing awareness and participation, leading to a broader prioritization of needs even among those from the marginalized sectors in the *ger* communities.

- Collaboration between the local government administration and the community during the planning stage, on the one hand, and the contribution of resources for the project, on the other hand, lead to better project implementation and improved delivery of services.
- The role of local NGOs and community volunteers as facilitators and mobilizers was crucial in increasing people's awareness about and participation in project activities.

Case 4: Philippines

PINABACDAO, SAMAR

THE PHILIPPINES' legal framework for citizen participation is an offshoot of the People Power Revolution in 1986. President Corazon Aquino opened the space for citizen participation through the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. Similar policies institutionalized "people power": Republic Act 6735, for example, provided for a system of Initiative and Referendum,[36] while the Party List system allowed for representation of marginalized and under-represented sectors.[37]

Philippines: Policy and Institutional Context

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION recognizes the importance of citizen participation as a vehicle for development. It says that the "State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote welfare of the nation." (Philippine Constitution, 1987, Art. 2, Sec. 23)

> The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall,

[36] The System of Initiative and Referendum recognizes and guarantees power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act. (Republic Act 6735, 1989)

[37] The Party List System is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from marginalized or underrepresented national, regional and sectoral parties, or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty *per centum* of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list (Halalan 2010: Party List, 2009).

by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms. (Philippine Constitution, 1987, Art. 13, Sec. 16)

The Local Government Code of 1991, on the other hand, requires all national government agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with local government units, non-government and people's organizations, and other community sectors prior to the implementation of any program or project. It provides for a number of mechanisms for people's participation, such as the recall of elected and appointed officials, local initiative and referendum; local sectoral representation of women, labor, indigenous people, persons with disabilities, and the elderly; public hearings; local special bodies; and so on. (Republic Act No. 7160, 1991)

All local government units (LGUs) are required to conduct mandatory public hearings to ensure people are consulted in vital undertakings. Usually it is the *sanggunian* (local legislative body) who are mandated to do this.

The LGC provides for local special bodies as mechanisms for citizen participation. These bodies represent accredited NGOs, CBOs, and sectoral groups. They are tasked to formulate policy recommendations, draft developmental and sectoral plans, and propose measures to guide the *sanggunian* in their legislative work. These bodies include the local development council, local health board, local school board, local peace and order council, local pre-qualification bids and awards committee, and so on (see Box 11).

Special mention should be made about the LDCs. The LDCs at the *barangay* (village), municipal, city, and provincial levels are mandated to initiate and propose comprehensive 5-year multi-sectoral development plans that are submitted to and approved by the *sanggunian*.

Box 11. Pertinent provisions in the Local Government Code of 1991 on the functions of the Local Development Councils.

SECTION 109 of the LGC specifies the functions of the LDCs as follows:

- Formulate long-term, medium-term, and annual socioeconomic development plans and policies;
- Formulate the medium-term and annual public investment programs;
- Appraise and prioritize socioeconomic development programs and projects;
- Formulate local investment incentives to promote the inflow and direction of private investment capital;
- Coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the implementation of development programs and projects; and
- Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or competent authority.

The BDC in particular is tasked to:

- Mobilize people's participation in local development efforts;
- Prepare *barangay* development plans (BDPs) based on local requirements;
- Monitor and evaluate the implementation of national or local programs and projects;
- Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or competent authority.

Source: Republic Act No. 7160, 1991

The Barangay Development Council (BDC) and the Municipal Development Council (MDC) are headed by the local chief executives (*barangay* captain or municipal mayor). The council's members are the *sanggunian*, representatives of accredited NGOs or CSOs working in the locality, and a representative of the congressman. The MDC, in addition to those mentioned, also includes all *barangay* heads. Representation from NGOs or CSOs shall not be more than a fourth of the total LDC membership. The LDC meets at least once every six months or as often as necessary. An executive committee acts on its behalf when the LGC is not in session.[38]

The LDCs may call upon any local official or an official of national agencies holding office in the LGU to assist in the formulation of their development plans and public investment programs.

Planning Process in the Philippines

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT planning in the Philippines is a combination of "top-down" and "bottom-up" processes. For example, the municipal (or city) Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) should be based on an analysis of the *barangay* situation. In the same manner, the BDCs should also be guided by the overall thrust of the municipality or city as defined in the CLUP and in the Municipal (or City) Development Plans.

The policies, programs, and projects proposed by LDCs are submitted to the *sanggunian* for appropriate action. The local development plans approved by the *sanggunian* are integrated with the development plans of the next higher level of LDC. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) furnishes the LDCs with information on financial resources and budgetary allocations applicable to their respective jurisdictions to guide them in their planning functions.

Because of practical considerations, including the unreasonable number and variety of plans required at the local level and the disconnect between the plans and the budget, the national government saw it fit to harmonize and synchronize the planning and budgeting process. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), DBM, and Department of Finance (DoF) issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 1 in 2007 to provide guidelines for the harmonization and synchronization of local planning, investment programming, revenue administration, budgeting and expenditure management. (DILG-NEDA-DBM-DOF, 2007)

The DILG and NEDA also provide guidelines for the preparation of the Provincial Development and Physical Framework Plan (PDPFP) and, for cities and municipalities, the Comprehensive Development Plan[39] (CDP). These plans are prepared following a process of situation analysis, goal- and objective-setting, and strategy formulation, culminating in the crafting of the PPAs. The PPAs of the LGUs are supposed to align and harmonize with national development goals.

[38] Section 106, Local Government Code of 1991.

[39] The CDP is the multi-sectoral plan at the city/municipal level. It embodies the vision, sectoral goals, objectives, development strategies and policies within the term of LGU officials. It contains the corresponding PPAs that serve as primary inputs to investment programming and subsequent budgeting and implementation of projects.

The LDCs are tasked to formulate the six-year Local Development Investment Plan (LDIP) by prioritizing and matching the PPAs with available financing resources.[40] A one-year slice of the LDIP comprises the Annual Investment Plan (AIP) which, with the *sanggunian*'s approval, serves as the basis for preparing the executive budget. The LDCs endorse the AIP to the Local Budget Officer for budget preparation and for the annual budgetary allocations for the PPAs.

Kalahi-CIDSS: Flagship Poverty Alleviation Program

THE PHILIPPINE government's flagship poverty alleviation program is the World Bank-supported Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (Kalahi-CIDSS).[41] The Municipality of Pinabacdao is one of the Kalahi-CIDSS project areas.[42]

Kalahi-CIDSS seeks to empower communities in targeted poor municipalities to achieve improved access to sustainable basic public services and to participate in more inclusive Local Government Unit (LGU) planning and budgeting. Its three main components consist of community grants, capacity-building and implementation support and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Participating *barangays* and municipalities undergo a 16-step Community Empowerment and Activity Cycle (CEAC) process divided into four phases: Social Preparation, Project Development, Project Selection, and Project Implementation. An Area Coordination Team (ACT)—composed of an Area Coordinator, Engineer, Financial Analyst and community facilitators—is deployed in each target municipality to lead Project implementation and assist the participating *barangays*.

According to the Kalahi-CIDSS website (Kalahi-CIDSS, n.d.), a Kalahi-CIDSS municipality focuses on six key development processes:

- Participatory situation analysis (PSA). By using different tools and with the Project's facilitation, communities are able to extensively appraise their current socio-economic and political situation. The people develop an action plan that they themselves will implement and monitor.
- *Participatory development planning and resource allocation.* Communities are taught how to access resources for their planned development interventions. LGUs are taught to practice a more democratic and participatory means of governance, where development agendas are planned and executed together with their local constituents.
- *Organizational development and local structure enhancement.* Kalahi-CIDSS enhances people's capacities in decision-making, project development and implementation through trainings and technical support in different aspects of the local development process.
- *Community mobilization and volunteer development.* Kalahi-CIDSS encourages the participation of the community's formal and traditional leaders in the Project's activities. Social values and

[40] LDIP is a basic document linking the local plan to the budget. It contains a prioritized list of PPAs that are derived from the CDP in the case of cities and municipalities matched with financing resources, and to be implemented annually within a three to six year period. The first three years of the LDIP shall be firmed up along the priorities of the incumbent local chief executives (LCEs).

[41] The phrase "*kapit-bisig laban sa kahirapan*" literally means "arms linked together against poverty".

[42] Through six years of implementation, Kalahi-CIDSS has covered 12 regions, 42 provinces, 214 municipalities and 4,841 barangays. Kalahi-CIDSS municipalities have an average poverty incidence of 5 percent based on the 2003 small area poverty estimates of the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). (Kalahi-CIDSS, n.d.)

principles are imparted to the community to prepare them for the task of project planning and implementation.

- *Social inclusion.* Elite capture is prevented by broadening the base of participation, especially of the vulnerable groups like women and the indigenous people. In this process, the people are given a voice in their communities and become the local government's partners in the efforts to achieve their developmental goals.
- *Community-based M&E.* Kalahi-CIDSS taps and utilizes indigenous knowledge and skills in monitoring their action plans. It allows the people to reflect on the causes of their problems and make informed decisions on what they can do about them.

Bantay Sangkay of Pinabacdao

PINABACDAO IS a 3rd class municipality[43] in the Province of Samar in the Eastern Visayas region of the Philippines. Based on the 2007 census, Pinabacdao has a population of 14,492 in 2,888 households. Nearly half of the population is female while three out of five are under 40 years old. Seven out of ten residents are considered literate (National Statistics Office, 2010). Figure 13 shows the location map of the Municipality of Pinabacdao.

The municipality has 24 barangays (or villages), nine of which are in the uplands, four along the coast of Maqueda Bay, and 11 along the Maharlika Highway. The financial area is located in Brgy. Dolores, while "downtown" is in Brgy. Mambog.

Aside from being known as a rice-producing town, Pinabacdao is also famous for its annual Mayao-Mayao Festival (Pinabacdao, Samar [n.d.]).

Pinabacdao has a poverty incidence of 74.3 percent, ranking 11th out of 26 municipalities in the province (Albacea, 2008). Majority of the residents rely on fishing and small-scale farming, while a few engage in trading. Access to education, health services, sanitary facilities, potable water, and electricity is limited. Like most towns in the island of Samar, Pinabacdao continues to feel the effects of insurgency. Nearly half of its *barangays* were caught in an armed conflict between government forces and the New People's Army for a number of decades.[44] The fighting disrupted people's lives, put the local economy in disarray, and stunted development.

[43] Municipalities in the Philippines are divided according to average annual income during the last three calendar years. This classification is done every four years. (National Statistical Coordination Board, n.d.)

[44] The New People's Army is a Maoist group formed in March 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. (Pike, 2004)

Figure 13. Location map of Pinabacdao, Samar, Philippines.

The combination of extreme poverty and ideological conflict was one of the reasons why citizen participation was very limited in the past, if at all. Either by force of circumstance or sheer ignorance, people were excluded from public decision-making. This was the situation of Pinabacdao when Kalahi-CIDSS, dressed up as the Bantay Sangkay project, came to town.

Key actors in Pinabacdao's Kalahi-CIDDS and Bantay Sangkay Project

Mayor Mario Quijano worked as a medical doctor in the United States when he decided to return to Pinabacdao to serve his hometown. He was elected mayor in 2004 and again in 2007. He is known to be open to new ideas and welcomes technical and financial support for his programs. (M. Quijano, personal communication, March 2010)

The convergence of Mayor Quijano's vision and the interventions of Kalahi-CIDSS proved providential to Pinabacdao. Prior to Kalahi-CIDSS, municipal officials saw local development as just one of those bureaucratic exercises required by national agencies. The mayor, however, wanted a "bottom-up", community-based formulation of the Municipal Development Plan. Kalahi-CIDSS helped establish the process through the CBMS. The mayor saw that the primary data gathered through the CBMS, coupled with secondary information, was a powerful tool in crafting the local development plan. (See *Box 2* on the link between CBMS data and local development planning.)

In the course of implementing Kalahi-CIDSS, Mayor Quijano saw the need to raise resources in order to consolidate the gains of the program and to strengthen community

participation further. The World Bank-sponsored "Panibagong Paraan 2008" or Philippine Development Innovation Marketplace competition, with the theme "Building Partnership for Effective Local Governance", offered just the right opportunity. With at least a million pesos (around US$45,000) at stake, Mayor Quijano partnered with the Institute for Democratic Participation in Governance (IDPG), a NGO experienced in the participatory planning process (M. Quijano, personal communication, March 2010).

Box 12. CBMS data and local development planning.

The CBMS collects information at the local level in an organized and systematic way. The data is for use by local government units, national government agencies, NGOs, and civil society mainly for development planning, implementation of programs and projects, and monitoring purposes. The CBMS is supposed to fill the information gaps in determining and diagnosing issues and concerns at the community level, identifying qualified program beneficiaries, and assessing the impact of policies and programs. It adopts a set of core poverty indicators that focus on output and impact measures (Department of the Interior and Local Government, 2010).

The Municipality of Pinabacdao, supported by IDPG, DSWD, and the DILG, submitted a proposal titled "Bantay Sangkay" to the Panibagong Paraan 2008 competition. Among the 500 or so entries, Bantay Sangkay was selected along with 30 other proposals (Quirante, 2008). The Philippines-Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP)[45] provided a grant to support the project.

The LGU was the primary project implementer while the mayor, supported by the Municipal Inter-Agency Committee (MIAC), was tasked to mobilize support for the project. The DSWD would continue to provide strategic and technical inputs, while the DILG would support the local planning process using the Rational Planning System (RPS). PACAP would provide the grant fund, and IDPG would act as the secretariat (IDPG, 2009). Figure 15 shows the organizational structure of Bantay Sangkay (see Figure 14).

The Bantay Sangkay project had the following objectives:

- Continuity of the Kalahi-CIDSS participatory approaches and processes;
- Adoption of the CDD technology into the LGU's local planning, budgeting, and public expenditure management cycle;
- Systematically utilize social accountability mechanisms, tools, and activities; and
- Utilize a dynamic combination of top-down/bottom-up participatory development planning process.

[45] Established in 1986, PACAP is a grant facility of the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). Projects supported by PACAP have sought to introduce innovative development approaches that uplift the social and economic conditions of marginalized communities. (PACAP, n.d.)

Figure 14. Organizational structure of the Bantay Sangkay project.



The Bantay Sangkay project aimed at creating a critical mass of 25 champions in each *barangay* whose task was to "energize" the community members to adopt participatory approaches in an inclusive manner.

The project intended to integrate and harmonize the CDD approach of Kalahi-CIDSS with the local development planning and budgeting process. The approach was to maximize the interface between citizens and government in order to strengthen the "supply side" and the "demand side" of governance (Bertelsman Stiftung, 2010).

The planning process in Pinabacdao

The planning process in Pinabacdao did not deviate from the policies and guidelines of the government as mandated by the RPS of the DILG. It utilized CBMS data using participatory situational analysis tools developed by the IDPG (IDPG, 2009).

Bantay Sangkay was officially implemented in August 2008 and lasted for a year. Capacity building activities included harmonizing local development planning using the CDD approach, creating the Municipal Learning Network, organizing and activating the BDC, and establishing a critical mass of grassroots leaders.

The first training workshop was an orientation about the project for the newly elected officials of the *barangays*. This was followed in September 2008 with training for the facilitators of the Barangay Development Plan. (It should be noted that the pool of trainers were the *barangay* captains or village chiefs and the *barangay* secretaries.) The MIAC and the Municipal Coordinating Team (MCT) were formed as a result of this training.

The next capacity-building activity was a three-day harmonization workshop participated by representatives of the MLGU, DILG, DSWD, IDPG, and the 24 *barangays*. The aim was to develop a planning model and agree on a Barangay Development Plan-Participatory Situation Analysis (BDP-PSA) process (IDPG, 2009).

A Municipal Learning Network (MLN) was created that included the mayor, the members of the *Sangguniang* Bayan[46], MIAC, MCT, Community of Practice (CoP), the 24 village heads together with their secretaries, and community volunteers.

The BDCs were reconstituted and strengthened for the BDP-PSA. The BDC was composed of the *barangay* captain, the seven *barangay kagawads*[47], the chairperson of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)[48] representing the youth sector, and one representative each from the following sectoral group: farmers, fisherfolk, women, senior citizens (elderly), labor, religious groups, and the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA).

Figure 15. The Municipal Plan Development Framework.



The 24 *barangays* were grouped into five clusters. From October to November 2008, each cluster underwent the BDP-PSA training cum planning workshops participated by community and sectoral representatives. The outputs of these workshops were the BDPs, which were then presented to the *barangay* general assembly for approval. The community-approved plans were consolidated into the Municipal Development Plan.

The Municipal Development Plan applied a framework outlined in the RPS. Figure 15 illustrates the framework.

Table 5 is a summary of the issues identified in the BDP-PSA as consolidated in the MDP.

Table 5. Issues and needs identified in the Pinabacdao BDP-PSA workshops.

Social	*Physical*	*Economic*	*Institutional*
Sanitary toilets	Farm to market road	Farm implements	Livelihood skills and entrepreneurship
Sufficient sup**ply of drinking water**	*Barangay* multi- purpose hall	Credit access/subsidy	Knowledge on Community Resource Management, agriculture, and waste management
Relocation from	Repair of water system	Alternative sources of	

[46] The *Sangguniang Bayan* is the legislative branch of municipalities. It passes ordinances and resolutions for the effective administration of the municipality.

[47] A *Barangay Kagawad* is an elected government official who is a member of the *Sangguniang Barangay*.

[48] The *Sangguniang Kabataan* (SK) (Youth Council) is the governing body in every chapter of the *Katipunan ng Kabataan* (Youth Federation). Each *barangay* in the Philippines is mandated by law to have its own chapter of the *Katipunan ng Kabataan*.

Social	*Physical*	*Economic*	*Institutional*
landslide prone areas		income	
Sufficient medicine and medical facilities	Dumping site for solid waste	Illegal fishing/depletion of marine resources	
Additional teachers for elementary school and day care center	River/flood control	Irrigation facilities	
Child nutrition	Day care centers	Fair market price for farm products	
Animal vaccination	Construction of *barangay* stage	Availability of seeds/seedlings	
Forestation	Construction of *barangay* covered court	Livelihood assistance for women's groups and CBOs	
Security of land tenure	Construction of *barangay* pathways		
	Construction of *barangay* health center		

Source: Project Documentation, Bantay-Sangkay Project.

Crucial to the process was the identification of resources to address the priority issues in the MDP. Because of limited municipal revenues, items in the Annual Investment Plan for 2009 had to be prioritized, as shown in the Figure 16.

The Donors' Forum

The Donors' Forum held on May 27, 2009 in Pinabacdao was a turning point for the municipality's development efforts. The forum was suggested by IDPG and picked up by the mayor, who broached the idea to the Presidential Assistant for the Eastern Visayas Cynthia Nierras (IDPG, 2009). Thus, based on the outputs of the MDP, the Donors' Forum was held where national government agencies, NGOs, foreign grantors and other possible partners were invited to the "Market Place for Development". The forum generated lots of pledges, grants and financial assistance to projects based on actual needs analysis. The assistance was a big boost to the development efforts of Pinabacdao's Bantay Sangkay Project (Bertelsman Stiftung, 2010).

Figure 16. The Annual Investment Plan of Pinabacdao for 2009.



Source: Annual Investment Plan 2009, Municipality of Pinabacdao

Social Accountability in Participatory Planning

THE BARANGAY Development Plans formulated by the BDCs strengthened social accountability in the sense that it promoted the constructive and strategic constructive engagement between two key actors in development—the local government on the one hand, and citizen groups representing the community, on the other hand.

To a great extent, the BDPs reflected the aspirations and needs of the communities. The BDP was a document attesting to the participation and contribution of those who had a stake in the community's development. It itemized the priority programs, projects, and activities of the *barangay* and indicated the expected outputs and outcomes, the timeframe, and the sources of funds.

Citizen's voice in decision-making

The CDD framework introduced by the Kalahi-CIDSS, while giving direction in terms of participation, transparency, and accountability, also strengthened the people's voice in decision-making. The evidence of this process of empowerment was the BDP. Beyond the BDP, community members, through the BDC, were now able to demand and negotiate for resources for their development from the local government and other development institutions.

During the FGDs for this study, the respondents said that the Kalahi-CIDSS and Bantay Sangkay projects appeared to have produced positive outcomes in terms of building the capacity of the community toward empowerment. The following outcomes were identified:

- Increased community participation during the *barangay* assemblies;
- Enhanced knowledge on how to formulate the BDP using the participatory approach;
- Observable behavioral changes of community members, i.e. from a passive observer to active participant; and
- An aware and more responsive citizenry who are actively involved in decision-making.

Responsiveness of local government

The CDD approach of Kalahi-CIDSS and the Bantay Sangkay project brought a change in the paradigms of local government officials, making them more open and responsive to the needs of their constituents. *Barangay* officials proudly said that they now have the capacity to:

- Assess, together with community members, the situation of their *barangays* through dialogue and in-depth analysis;
- Lead in the development and formulation of their BDPs using the participatory approach; and
- Lobby and access resources from the local government, national government agencies, and funding organizations to support the priority development projects of their *barangays*;

The Municipal Coordination Team, on the other hand, cited the following outcomes as a result of Kalahi-CIDSS and the Bantay Sangkay project:

- The development and formulation of the Comprehensive Development Plan where inputs from the *barangays*, in the form of the BDPs, were integrated;

- Community participation in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of community programs, projects, and activities;
- More efficient and effective delivery of services as a result of government being more responsive to the development needs of the communities;
- Recognition of and respect for the rights of citizens to express their opinions and to demand for good governance;
- Heightened awareness among *barangay* officials of their responsibilities and duties; and
- Reactivation and reconstitution of the BDC making it more representative in nature.

LGU officials claim they are now more open than before. A sign of this is their willingness to undergo performance assessment, which is based on the extent to which they have addressed the needs of the communities.

Barangay officials have realized the power of the BDP as a tool to generate and mobilize resources. They lobby government line agencies with their BDPs by showing their priority projects and asking which ones the agency would support. The mayor untiringly "markets" the municipality's plans. The most recent "buyer" was the Zuellig Family Foundation which supports programs on health services (Japson, 2010).

Community monitoring

People are more aware of the developments in their municipality. They are now more willing to engage local officials, asking for information about projects and activities. *Barangay* officials report of constituents inquiring them on how the money for the projects is being spent. Sectoral groups like the elderly actively participate in the implementation of some projects. *Barangay* residents contribute a fourth of the project costs through free labor.

Because they are now aware of their rights and who to approach, people seem more confident to file their complaints and grievances. The local social welfare officer, for instance, noted a rise in reports of child and sexual abuses, as well as cases of domestic violence, which went unreported before. According to the respondents, those who are not satisfied with local officials bring their complaints to the notice of higher authorities.

Change in power relations

Through a process of dialogue and negotiation, the local government has become more responsive to the people's needs. For example, marginalized sectors such as women and senior citizens needed to augment their family income to meet basic necessities. Through a process of dialogue and negotiation, their needs were recognized and prioritized in the BDPs and the Municipal Development Plan. Today, these marginalized groups avail of a micro-credit facility for small-scale livelihood projects. This process has brought about two outcomes: the poor are now more capable of articulating their needs, and *barangay* officials are more conscious of responding to such needs.

Municipal officials report that the changes brought about by the Kalahi-CIDSS have made them more aware of their roles and responsibilities. Feedback from the *barangays*, previously taken for granted, is now seriously considered. Good feedback further motivates them to work harder, while not-so-good feedback forces them to go back to their drawing boards.

While the symmetry of power relations has improved, municipal officials are sometimes overwhelmed with the workload. Their offices are now frequented by people making requests or asking for information, and they have to visit the *barangays* more often.

Impact on poverty and conflict

While it is still premature to measure the impact of Bantay Sangkay, many officials, CSO members, and community members believe that mainstreaming citizen participation in local development planning will pull down the poverty incidence in Pinabacdao. There are two reasons for this: one, people's real needs are being addressed and, two, ordinary citizens are now helping local officials find solutions to their problems and concerns.

The presence of the military in Pinabacdao initially posed some problems. The residents were wary of the military, believing that the latter's participation in the project might scare away the people. The military's involvement in the latter stage of the project was deliberate; it was designed to familiarize the soldiers to the participatory approach and, in a more indirect way, to sensitize them to the effects of the armed conflict and militarization on local development.

The impact of Kalahi-CIDSS and the Bantay Sangkay project in Pinabacdao has encouraged the IDPG and the Presidential Assistant for Eastern Visayas to replicate the approach in the entire province of Samar. So far, seven municipalities have responded to the offer.

Recommendations

TO SUSTAIN the social accountability gains of Kalahi-CIDSS and Bantay Sangkay project in Pinabacdao, the respondents in this study recommend the following:

- With Kalahi-CIDSS Part II in the pipeline (World Bank, n.d.), local development stakeholders believe that Bantay Sangkay Part II should not be far behind. The second phase of the program should be designed to strengthen further efforts at mainstreaming social accountability specifically the participatory approach to planning.
- Resources should be generated for unfunded and unimplemented projects already identified in the BDPs.
- To sustain community participation especially at the *barangay* level, collaboration among municipal officials, *barangay* officials, and community volunteers should be continued.
- Development programs and projects intended for the *barangays* should be directly endorsed to the *barangays*.
- Municipal officials, *barangay* officials, volunteers, and leaders of community-based organizations should undertake regular and continuing refresher training courses on CDD specifically the participatory planning approach.
- *Barangay* residents should be invited to attend the regular *barangay* assemblies to enhance community participation.
- A municipal-level team should be organized to monitor the implementation of programs and projects.

- The CBMS needs updating. A new CBMS package should be user-friendly and should contain manuals and guidelines on planning, organizing, and monitoring.

On the other hand, the Mid-Term Review (MTR) conducted by the DSWD in August 2007 identified the following weaknesses:

- Failure to mainstream Kalahi-CIDSS processes into the regular LGU structures and systems, among them the Public Expenditure Management (PEM) cycle and framework;
- Limited participation of LGU and *barangay* officials in the Kalahi-CIDSS implementation; and
- Lack of coordination between the Kalahi-CIDSS project staff and LGU/*barangay* personnel, and insignificant convergence with national government agencies.

The MTR proposed the following measures:

- At the *barangay* level:
  - Conduct of a "reflection session" with barangay leaders and volunteers with the aim of selecting activities that will promote Kalahi-CIDSS processes. The activities will be adopted through barangay resolutions and the BDCs will be tasked to advocate for the modified Kalahi-CIDSS program;
- At the municipal level, Kalahi-CIDSS implementation will be the responsibility of the MIAC;
  - DSWD will train and facilitate the transfer of technology to focal persons in the municipality;
  - The selection of sub-projects will be based on the Municipal Development Plan;
  - Barangay Development Plans will be incorporated into the Municipal Development Plan;
  - The LCE will advocate for the adoption of a bottom-up participatory planning process;
  - Kalahi-CIDSS processes should be seen as a way of doing development work by the LGU;
  - Synchronize Kalahi-CIDSS processes for the development and preparation of the Local Poverty Reduction Action Plan and the CBMS; and
  - Advocate for the synchronization of all local planning and budgeting process in the LGU, as mandated in the JMC-1 2007.

Lessons for Mainstreaming Social Accountability

THE FOLLOWING are some of the lessons learned from the Pinabacdao experience.

- An enabling policy framework for participatory planning does not automatically result in the mainstreaming of social accountability. It needs the support of local government and non-government champions. It also requires advocacy and mobilization at the community level.
- The participatory approach to local development planning increases people's awareness of their rights. As a result, people are encouraged to register their complaints and grievances. A grievance redress system should be institutionalized to accommodate their complaints.
- The quality of local leadership is a major factor in promoting participatory approaches in local development. A responsive and open leader like Mayor Quijano encourages people to participate in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of programs and projects. In addition, such leadership has a modeling effect on other local officials.

- A common platform for collective learning, like the “Municipal Learning Network” in Pinabacdao, provides the space for government and citizen actors to engage in dialogue in an atmosphere of mutual respect. This enhances mutual understanding and sensitivity to the needs and concerns of each one and builds mutual accountability.

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING: CASELETTES

THE FOLLOWING caselettes are examples of participatory planning initiatives in various parts of the region. The caselettes present how citizen participation can advance good governance reforms and promote development outcomes. It also illustrates the opportunities and the challenges faced by local communities. Showcased here are examples from the Philippines, Mongolia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand.

Village-level planning in Solano, Nueva Ecija

POBLACION NORTH is the smallest *barangay* in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya (in the northern part of the Philippines). It has a population of 1,500 residents distributed in 250 households.[49] (See Figure 17) In 1994, the newly-elected *barangay* officials—inspired by the call of the provincial government to take up sustainable development programs—initiated a development planning process focusing on the community's basic needs: food, clothing, and shelter. The overall vision was to "uphold the dignity" of the residents (Tiongson, 2002).

The biggest challenge, however, was to bring the residents' "voice" to the entire process. This required a strong leadership and political will, coupled with promoting a good working relationship between the local officials and the residents. Under the leadership of *Barangay* Captain Eduardo DL Tiongson, local officials initiated a participatory planning process. It started with *barangay* officials holding group discussions to assess the *barangay* situation with the macro situation of the municipality, province, region, and nation as the backdrop. They reviewed the provisions of the Local Government Code that highlighted the parameters of their authority and obligations of accountability. They were assisted by the Katinnuloang Dagiti Umili ti Amianan (KADUAMI), a CSO based in Baguio City[50].

Following the provisions of the LGC, the *Barangay* Development Council was reconstituted. The BDC consisted of 35 representatives from accredited NGOs, people's organizations (POs), and other sectoral groups. The planning activities consisted of a series of workshops where the BDC members, together with the elected *barangay* officials, discussed and

[49] Solano is a 3rd class municipality in the province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines. According to the latest census (2000), it has a population of 56,244 people in 11,205 households. Solano is the central business district in Nueva Vizcaya. (Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, n.d.)

[50] Established in 1984, KADUAMI, Inc. is a service institution that aims to contribute to the development of communities in Northern Luzon. KADUAMI is being supported by Church Development Service of Germany as its funding partner since 1984. (Kaduami, n.d.)

shared the *barangay*'s concerns, issues, and problems. They agreed that the *barangay*'s most serious concerns were the poor drainage system, traffic congestion, and the need to augment family incomes of poor families.

In October 1995, the USAID-assisted Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD) initiated a project that introduced a methodology to improve the planning and budgeting processes in local government units (provincial, municipal, and *barangay*) (USAID, 2009 October). Nueva Vizcaya, where *Barangay* Poblacion North is located, was covered by the project. The project included workshops on planning-budgeting, budget execution, and monitoring and evaluation.

Figure 17. Location map of the Municipality of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.



The convergence of citizen participation in the *barangay* development planning and the support provided by the GOLD project enabled *Barangay* Poblacion North to bag the Gawad Magat's "Cleanest and Greenest *Barangay* Award" in 1994 and 1995. The Gawad Magat was the first local governance awards in the region aimed at recognizing and rewarding exemplary partnership programs. In 2000, the Regional Health Board awarded the four-lane street of General Santos, Poblacion North as the healthiest street in the region (Tiongson, 2002).

The case of *Barangay* Poblacion North shows how effective leadership and political will can bring about good governance outcomes through participatory processes.

Land use planning in Ulaanbaatar City

WITH THE TRANSITION from a centrally-planned system to a market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia experienced huge changes characterized by large-scale migration of traditionally nomadic population to the capital of Ulaanbaatar. Most of these migrants have settled in the city's outskirts creating vast, underserved communities, where access to basic social services has become a predominant challenge.

Addressing the problem of social service access created a debate among local authorities and development experts. A number argued that adopting participatory approaches to development was not suitable due allegedly to the population's social and cultural peculiarities. Many thought that their nomadic lifestyle, which put high value on individual freedom, would be a constraint to community organizing and collective decision-making. Indeed citizen organizations exist in Ulaanbaatar, but these are mostly composed of apartment dwellers organized to address apartment privatization in the city.

Figure 18. Map of Mongolia showing the capital city of Ulaanbaatar.

In addition, decades of socialist rule have engendered people's dependence on a centralized approach to development. Under the socialist regime, people were indoctrinated that everybody is equal and should share equally the wealth of the country, with the basic amenities guaranteed by the State. This is the reason why housing in Ulaanbaatar is characterized by similar looking apartment blocks, with *ger* settlements all over the place.

The other side, however, argued that it was the people's right to steer their own development course, and that they would eventually appreciate and adopt participatory approaches. The participatory approach eventually won in the land-use planning debate, and people showed enthusiasm for the process.

The political and social situations have changed, however, since the transition. Large tracts of land have been privatized, and political decisions have changed the land policy and land tenure situation. People realized the value of land and land ownership, and this became an explosive social issue not only in Ulaanbaatar but in other Mongolian cities as well.

The biggest stumbling blocks, however, are government's weak policy support for a rationalized land use planning system and a lack of emphasis on participatory approach to people's development.

By its name, land-use planning is determining the use of the land. Land-use planning is the basic plan on which other plans are developed, whether it is environmental planning, town and country planning, or urban and regional planning. Taylor (1999) explains that while the objective of town planning is managing the physical environment in the most efficient manner, the bigger aim is social in nature—for the maintenance and enhancement of human welfare. Consequently, land-use planning is not the sole domain of land-use technicians and experts. More importantly, land-use planning—because it is also social in nature—looks at who should be involved, how they are to be involved, and what roles do citizens play in the process. In other words, land-use planning involves a process of accommodating a wide and, in most cases, diverse, range of citizen and group interests. Given this concept, the land-use planner assumes a new role—that of an organizer (Burke, 1979).

It was obvious to city authorities that previous approaches to land-use planning would not be effective to address the influx of unorganized ger settlements around Ulaanbaatar. Complicating the situation was the privatization of large areas where these ger settlements were located. Negotiation with the residents appeared to be the only option, and this was where the bottom-up planning approach became necessary to solve land tenure problems related to privatization and urban land use planning.

Between 1952 and 1986, Russian and Mongolian experts came up with four general land use plans for Ulaanbaatar. These plans were found inadequate to address the upsurge of migrants in the 1990s. In 2000, the Urban Planning Research and Design Institute developed the City Master Plan 2020, in which detailed plans were drawn up.

The problem, however, is that the City Master Plan and the Land Use Plan have not taken sufficient consideration of the land tenure situation. The city's land use plan focuses more on the soil structure and ecological aspects and appears to be deficient as a basis for the City Master Plan, thus complicating the land use planning situation.

Laws exist to regulate urban land use in Ulaanbaatar, but there are no detailed rules and regulations for citizen participation in urban land use planning. There are also no clear guidelines on how land use planning experts should facilitate citizen participation in the planning process.

Over the last 20 years, however, the city has adopted a number of tools to make planning more people-responsive. For example, through web-based technology and GIS (geographic information system), citizens' opinions have been brought into the urban planning process, planners provide information updates, people exchange ideas, and residents vote in their preferences. People can also provide feedbacks instantly. Using computer technology, planners have found it easier to present land use models and designs with immediate citizen comments. Media outlets such as television, radio, and newspapers have also proven useful in disseminating information to the people and in getting their feedbacks (ADB, 2010).

The Quang Thai commune experience

THE TAM GIANG-Cau Hai (TGCH) Lagoon is located in the central province of Thua Thien Hue in Viet Nam (see Figure 19). It is the largest lagoon system in Southeast Asia with nearly 70 km length along the coast and about 22,000 has of water surface.

The TGCH lagoon is a rich habitat for freshwater and marine species, and has long been a source of livelihood to an estimated 300,000 to 350,000 people living along the lagoon's rim (IMOLA Project, n.d.). However, the lagoon "suffers from a great anthropogenic pressure and appears subject to a process of progressive environmental deterioration." (Frignani, Piazza, Bellucci,…Gambaro, 2007)

In 1995, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded a study on the condition of the aquatic resource base and its use by communities around the lagoon. The research team brought together for the first time agricultural scientists from Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry (HUAF), biologists and sociologists from Hue University of Sciences, and administrators from the provincial department of fisheries.

The multi-disciplinary team working in the lagoon figured out that the government had left out the aquatic resource tenure from the fold

Figure 19. Thua Thien Hue Province in Vietnam, where the Tam Giang-Cau Hai Lagoon is located (inset).



of its agricultural policy. It was local custom alone that determined the ownership of fishing areas in the lagoon. The owners had invested in permanent fishing structures such as fish corrals to make most of the sea currents in directing the fish into narrow nets. But this opportunity was not evenly distributed since the poorer members (without land) of each community had no access to such facility. In fact, they lived lives of mobile fishers, and families lived on their boats. To make delivering basic services such as education and health care easier, the government got them to settle at the peripheries of the existing communities; so now they live in the margins of the lagoon. One such community was Quang Thai commune at the northern end of the lagoon. The community's only source of livelihood is fishery with limited access to agricultural lands.

The researchers realized that the pressure on the lagoon was increasing and the only way to lighten it was by creating alternative income channels. ; So the project introduced a cash crop, peanuts, which thrived in the sandy soil. This helped in boosting the community confidence. Next on target was the more difficult challenge of the aquatic resource base. They helped poor fishers assess the resource habitat and identify areas for restricting fishing and protecting against illegal fishing methods. The researchers also introduced simple cage aquaculture based on feeding the fish local sea grass. Aquaculture was an appealing option, in part to boost the income of women who lacked access to the most productive fishing grounds and gear.

In the adjacent lagoon commune of Phu Tan, both the communities and local government were working toward small-scale shrimp ponds and net enclosures. At the beginning of the 1990s, such enclosures were virtually unknown in the lagoon waters, but by the end of the decade they covered 75 per cent of the commune's water territory. Shrimp ponds constructed from flooded rice fields on the low-lying shorelines occupied another 20 percent of the water surface, leaving limited water bodies to be used for other purposes.

Local governments were given hefty sums for formalizing new private ventures. Even the provincial and national governments were earning from the fiscal collection and national export revenues. All governmental levels had consensus in rapid expansion of the shrimp farming. But this created a natural hazard. Water quality and current flow declined dramatically, creating conditions for disease and reducing productivity. The increased privatization of the common pool resources of the lagoon hit the poorest fishers hard, forcing them to try fishing in other territories that were already heavily exploited.

The issue assumed a critical proportion with the loss of waterways through the maze of net enclosures. The researchers were brought in to seek a solution. In consultation with local government officials, net enclosure owners and mobile fishers, they reached a conclusion that the re-opening of waterways would allow them greater local fishing opportunities. Through participatory mapping, examination of water quality data and negotiation with the different interests, the research team facilitated the design of appropriate clearings for navigation and water exchange. However, disagreement between mobile fishers and net enclosure owners stalled agreement on fishing rights in waters adjacent to net enclosures. An impatient local government went ahead with the implementation of a waterway plan, and used the police to coerce the net-enclosure owners to relocate their operations. Neither did they adopt the conflict resolution measures nor the provisions for shared fishing access in the waterways that had

been proposed by the research team. Negotiations collapsed and conflicts between mobile gear fishers and net enclosure owners escalated into violence**.**

This experience taught the provincial fisheries officials the arguments of the research team that conventional top-down planning would not work. Eventually, they were eager to try other approaches in Quang Thai commune, where conflicts were now emerging as fish pens proliferated. The research team made it clear that solutions could come only from participatory planning and co-management, in which local fishers and governments agreed on a set of guiding principles for the use of the resources and made commitments that could be jointly enforced. They were aided by the introduction in 2003 of new national legislation providing for fisheries co-management through locally defined user groups, and specifically mandating provincial authorities to implement the legislation.

All the parties involved could now benefit from the experience gained in six years of participatory research:

- The provincial department of fisheries saw this as an opportunity to solve an obvious problem and test practical implementation strategies for its new mandate.
- Local fishers had learned a lot about the lagoon resource base, and had sufficient information to make reasoned arguments and plans.
- The research team had acquired skills in communications and facilitation and could lead the process without imposing solutions.

Fishers in Quang Thai enthusiastically proposed forming a user group. Its first task would be to formulate a plan for allocation of the lagoon's surface area. The lagoon planning process was launched at a stakeholder meeting and workshop. The research team provided technical resources and facilitated consensus on key problems and overall strategy for the planning process. All participants agreed that the plan should maintain access for all current users, respect customary rights, and share the dislocations needed to re-arrange gear in the lagoon waters.

What emerged as the key difference between the two situations is the use of participatory research and planning; the involvement of the community right from inception of the plan to its implementation made reaching a middle ground among the stakeholders possible. The tools were shared information from joint mapping, focus group surveys, and group analysis. The process reinforced local knowledge as well as the insights from scientific research, and provided a foundation for new approaches to co-management and local governance. Local government officials initiated and led local resource planning. Provincial and district staff provided technical resources and facilitated local conflict management and problem solving.

The success of the Quang Thai experience has set it as an example and it is being replicated in adjoining municipalities in the lagoon. Training materials and guidelines are being developed for provincial staff who are taking leadership in fostering the new co-management system. Says the fisheries department's Nguyen Luong Hien: "Now we are looking for ways to better integrate community management and provincial government planning."

Interestingly, researchers observed that women were able to negotiate better terms for fishing access than men, because they were perceived to use less aggressive fishing techniques.

Cat Que commune in Ha Tay takes up environmental management

WITH THE SUSTAINED mobilization of mass organizations, villagers have gradually come to participate in environmental protection. In 2003, Cat Que in Ha Tay Province (see Figure 20) organized three events to clean sanitation systems done by the Youth Unions and villagers. In many small hamlets, elders organized to clear drainage systems, communal roads and areas surrounding villagers' houses. Groups also collected garbage with funds donated by villagers.

Figure 20. Ha Tay Province (shaded) where the Cat Que commune is located.



In some hamlets, farmers contributed funds to build drainage systems for their farm activities, while in other hamlets villagers built and improved drainage systems in their residential areas. The activities of villagers in rural environmental management were found to be very practical. However, the scale of the activities is too small compared to the increasing levels of pollution. They need more support from higher levels of government.

The management started with the community developing an understanding about what environmental pollution is all about and made it a part of their local discussion and action. The elders first grew concerned about the rise in pollution and set the process of forming action groups to solve the problems. Soon, some hamlets organized the construction of drainage systems and roads; the funds to support this activity came from money collected from the village community. Each household contributed an average of 500,000 VND (US$25) to 700,000 VND (US$35). In 1998 in Hamlet 1, Xuan Thang village, each household contributed 400,000 VND (US$20) to 500,000VND (US$25) to build drainage systems and roads. In addition, each household contributed 2000VND per month to pay garbage collectors. It is commendable that villagers have taken the responsibility of collecting garbage and cleaning the drainage systems during the food processing season. Xuan Thang village from within the hamlet has exhibited maximum motivation and collective consciousness in environmental management in Cat Que commune.

This is not to suggest that the local authorities played no role in finances. In fact, the expenditure on sanitation and waste management has shown an upward curve. In 2002 and 2003, Cat Que commune invested 300 million VND (US$15,221) to build an important drainage canal in Tam Hop and Xuan Thang and 1 billion VND (US$50,739) to construct a road. In addition, the Commune People's Committee also came forward to pay for the construction. This action by the committee was very symbolic in that it showed its awareness and acceptance of responsibility in regard to environmental management.

The diagnostic tool SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) was used to analyze the capacity of villagers to implement environmental management in Cat Que, a craft village.

The assessment exposed a twofold problem. On one hand, policy documents relating to environmental management did not reach the common people. In 1999 the Convention of Building Cultural Village for Cat Que, Part C of Articles 17, 18, and 19 clearly regulated environmental protection. However this information never reached the villagers. In a regional meeting it was claimed by leading government officials that policies relating to environmental protection were distributed. However, the leader of Duong Lieu said that they did not have these documents. In addition, the ignorance of the villagers obstructed to finding a solution to environmental pollution in the villages, especially in the rural areas. Disposal of garbage in drainage systems was a common occurrence in hamlets. While the Cat Que People's Committee tried to regulate the disposal of garbage and waste, some people continued to litter the streets and drainage systems.

Garbage was all over the place and the amount of trash was so huge that despite Cat Que People's Committee providing a dust-cart and safe working clothes, hamlets could not manage to pick up the waste. The hamlets explained that the equipment were not sufficient. This resulted in the hamlet remaining polluted and the villagers` awareness remaining low.

There is observable change in the living conditions of villagers who has taken up craft production. This is the time to canvass villagers to contribute money and labor within the formula of "State and people cooperate to do (*Nha nuoc va nhan dan cung lam)*" to build infrastructure and to achieve environmental protection. In this situation any new buildings could be fitted with biogas, sewers, drainage system, and roads.

The local communities have formulated an action plan for participatory environmental management. The first step involved participants putting into details the required action, the associated level of importance, location to be implemented, timelines, those responsible, resources required, and the expected results. Based on the participatory assessment, almost all of these actions were initially carried out by the community with support from donor institutions for activities such as the installation of a biogas plant. The plan did not rely on assistance from district or provincial authorities. The actions outlined in the plan also showed that the community understood their responsibilities toward environmental protection. It also supported the argument that the community did not clearly understand the role that district and provincial authorities should be playing. Local authorities capitalized on villagers' awareness and established activities aimed at protecting the environment. Obviously, this will not solve the environmental pollution problem in rural areas; however it may help to minimize the effects.

Community works out solutions. The local people got together to establish an action plan to protect their environment. The people involved in the development of the plan were also the people who were behind the pollution and who were exposed to its effects.

Always clean the effluence in the drainage system. Maintaining a regular cleaning schedule of drainage system proved helpful. Local mass organizations and leaders of villages were responsible for the mobilization of villagers to participate in this form of environmental protection.

General planning to improve drainage system. Villagers believed that the planning had to be implemented without any delay and feel that the local authorities should take up this responsibility. While the villagers have confirmed that they would pay, a part of the solution would be funded by the government.

Organize waste collection groups. This solution should be implemented as soon as possible. Villagers believe that commune level authorities and village leaders should be responsible for the establishment and action, while villagers will contribute for collection.

Shift to crafts that cause less or no pollution. It is interesting to note that the proposed solution reflects that the villagers are placing greater value on the reduction of environmental pollution than on maintaining tradition skills, which is not only their livelihood but a part of their social and cultural identity.

Kebumen uses *musrenbang* to enhance people participation

KEBUMEN HAS been widely known as one of a few districts (*kabupaten*) that have attempted to implement principles of good governance such as participation and transparency since the introduction of decentralization reforms. The *kabupaten* has been headed by a reform-minded lady (*Bupati* Rustriningsih), who has gone on to take up some very bold innovations in the government, breaking the bureaucratic regiment. This step has attracted several donor-supported programs that attempted to assist governance reforms in Kebumen.

Figure 21. Location map of Kebumen District in Indonesia.



Since the launch of decentralization, public consultation became a compulsory step to complete the planning process. For this specific end, the Government of Indonesia introduced a formal forum named *musrenbang*, a multi-stakeholder consultation forum for development

planning. In support of this participatory *musrenbang* process, a number of regional governments have tried to increase participation by passing *perda*, or local laws, to institutionalize transparency in budgeting and deepen the consultative approach down to the community level. The purpose of this forum is to reach an agreement on program priorities of the local government departments.

It is not uncommon to see districts that have not seriously attempted efforts to improve the quality of their respective planning and budgeting processes, such that the entire institution of *musrenbang* has been institutionalized in the process. An exception has been *Kebumen* regency which has had a lot of people participation at the level of planning. This has also been made possible by the Initiatives for Local Governance Reform (ILGR), which provided technical support for the enactment of bylaws (*perda*). The *perda* is essential to realize the principles of grassroots participation, transparency and accountability. This certainly influenced and improved the integration of planning and budgeting in the participating districts, including Kebumen. It is generally expected that better participation, transparency and accountability in planning and budgeting processes would improve the effectiveness and efficiency in the (limited) resource utilization.

In order to have relatively more time for planning and budgeting processes, Kebumen has moved up the start of the process from January to November of the preceding year (14 months prior to the budget implementation year). On one hand, this could potentially give more time for better participatory planning processes, especially at the village and sub-village levels. On the other hand, the longer timeline also opens up more possibility that things have changed by the time activity proposals are executed.

Acting as a catalyst in the participatory planning processes in Kebumen and responsible for its continuous improvement was *Bupati* Rustriningsih, the first woman local governor of the district. According to the New York Times, “Ms. Rustriningsih has carved out a reputation for being rigorously honest, a rare attribute in a government official in a country that regularly scores in international surveys as among the world's most corrupt” (Perlez, 2003). Her enthusiasm to push for reforms attracted donors from all over the world, supporting projects like participatory planning and budgeting. In addition, she welcomed initiatives from civil society. A positive outcome of this openness is that information is now relatively easier to access.

Since local officials are mandated to facilitate and carry out the musrenbang process, it is essential that they (local officials) and community facilitators have the capacity to carry out the task. While the process is participatory, there is a variation in terms of the sections that get represented. For instance, the priority to give special attention to the “voices” of women in Kebumen has paid off, but in other villages, women did not even bother to attend the multi-stakeholder dialogues.

The philosophy behind the facilitation of the participatory planning process ensures that the activities are not mechanistic and technical. The Forum for Indonesian Cooperative Movement (FORMASI) members have been trained to facilitate participatory planning processes with this philosophy in mind. FORMASI provided assistance to participatory planning processes in a number of sub-villages (*dusun*) prior to the *musrenbang-desa*. During the preparatory stage, the philosophy of deepening democracy through direct involvement of the

people was articulated. Once this is done, the entire process moves in one direction trying to include as many voices as possible.

Access to information, however, was a major challenge. This was where civil society pitched in by facilitating a transparent process between the government and the people. The transparency and information exchange helped in linking the planning and the budgeting outputs.

It was during the initial phase of planning people's participation were maximized, particularly in the few villages where local NGOs provided assistance. But in the later stages where higher levels of *musrenbangs* were decided, direct involvement of the people and their access to the process diminishes gradually. Only a few "prominent" NGO activists who have access to these officially closed parts of the planning-budgeting processes. They have used this access to promote changes or activities said to be in the interest of the public or local communities.

A constraint was that participation seemed to have been dominated by a small number of NGOs. The channels which were otherwise blocked did not allow the general public to access information regarding higher-level of policy decision-making.

Planning alone cannot guarantee accountability from the government since it is a one-time intervention in the process. One of weaknesses observed in citizen participation at the district (which actually also happens in most districts in Indonesia) is the absence of an evaluation mechanism of the immediate past planning-budgeting implementation. Even if conducted, it is often weak and decisive. This dilutes the citizens' stake in the planning process.

What participation seeks to address are issues of poverty and inequality. With regard to the pro-poor nature of Kebumen planning and budgeting processes, activists at FORMASI have had limited success. This is caused by the way "pro-poor" planning is defined; if the poor are participating in the processes, even if partially, if education and health services is free and there is some betterment in physical infrastructure for the poor, like roads, sanitation then the planning is poor-inclusive. As observed by some local NGO activists in Kebumen, an integrated and structural approach to reduce poverty which will alter social structures of power is yet to be taken up in the local development plans. The work is limited to the superficial level.

Gender-sensitive planning and budgeting is still largely understood as women physically participating in planning and budgeting processes, even if it is sporadic, and that there are budget allocations for women groups and activities. Other dimensions of gender planning, like bringing them to a decision making position, or creating a regular channel of participation, are missing from the agenda.

There is also a variation among villages in terms of the manner by which officials implement the *musrenbang.* Local officials' attitudes often play a determining role in how effective the multi-stakeholder dialogues can be. In villages where local officials were not present during the musrenbang activities, the process achieved very little. Such a situation often resulted in the problem of unbalanced quality of plans and/or proposals among the villages in the same district. So what it demands is a rapid replication of successful village-level assistance (including the assistance to *Pre-Musrenbang* processes).

Coastal resource management with local participation in Surat Thani[51]

THAILAND HAS 2,614 km of coastline stretched across 22 provinces along the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea. Coastal resources consist mainly of mangrove forests, seagrass, and coral reefs that are mutually dependent on each other.

Thirty years of development apparently has had a negative effect on the mangrove forest areas. Mangroves decreased by more than half. Degeneration was mostly found at the coastal area of the Gulf of Thailand. The mangrove degeneration had an adverse effect on the seagrass and coral reefs. The main culprit was using the area for intensive economic activities such as aquaculture, salt farming, agriculture, industrialization, sea port development, and mining. The deterioration of coastal resources in Thailand in the past 30 years of development likewise affected the socio-economic as well as the political condition of the localities in particular and the country in general.

The existing system of coastal management in the region was considered ineffective because of the following:

- Lack of policy with focus on sustainability of resources and preservation of natural resources.
- Lack of recognition of and respect for local traditional culture and knowledge.
- Focus on short-term development projects that put value on economic profits (e.g., shrimp farming, large-scale commercial fishing along coastal areas).

People participation has been part of natural resource management in Thailand since the Environment Act of 1992.[52] But the policy has met a lot of challenges in terms of practice.

[51] The source of this case study is Kumpa, L. (1998).

[52] Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental and Quality Act, B.E. 2535 (A.D.1992). The Act has been considered as one of the most comprehensive environmental laws in Thailand. The Act consists of six main sections: Introduction, Approaches to National Environmental Act, Environmental Protection, Pollution Control, Promotion Measures and Civil and Penal Liability.

The area of Ta-Chana Bay village, Amphoe Ta-Chana, Surat Thani Province is situated along a 30-km coast line. Majority of the people depend on small-scale fishing for a living. However, illegal fishing within the 3,000 meters of natural coastal conservation area and the conversion of mangrove forests to shrimp farming had serious effects on the local fishermen. Many species of fish became extinct and the income of local fishermen declined.

Figure 22. Location map of Surat Thani Province, Thailand.

To solve this problem, the local people formed the "Ta-Chana Gulf Conservation Group" in 1992. The solution was found in constructing artificial reefs in the reservation area supplemented with communal economic activities, such as forming cooperatives, community production of fish sauce, and integrated community farming.

The Ta-Chana Gulf Conservation Group held regular meetings. Five years of sustained participation of local people in coastal resources management has brought significant socio-economic and cultural changes mainly due to a more efficient coastal resource management. Some of its activities were the construction of local artificial reefs, beach cleaning, planting of pine trees for coastal protection from wind stress, setting group fish cage culture, establishing a revolving fund to purchase fishing gear for the members, putting up a community resource database, etc.

People have observed changes along the coastlines. Seagrass and seaweeds are now part of the fisherman's catch, indicating the return of these valuable marine resources. Dolphins and king mackerel have been seen within three kilometers of the coastal area. These changes have also brought about a decrease in petty crimes in the community, such as stealing of nets. Villagers are now more cooperative. All these have brought about an increase in the villagers' income.

PARTICIPATORY PLANNING: MOVING AHEAD

GIVEN THE "lay of the land" of development planning, including the issues and challenges facing stakeholders, it is important to formulate focused interventions to help improve participatory planning practices in developing countries East Asia. While not inclusive, the following recommendations should be considered by key actors of social accountability: a) reviewing legal frameworks, b) providing space and resources to citizen groups, c) enhancing capacities of key social accountability actors, d) promoting multi-stakeholder collaboration, and e) facilitating fiscal devolution.

Reviewing legal frameworks

For participatory planning to be effective, it is important to empower local governance institutions and to provide space for citizen engagement. They provide the enabling environment for mainstreaming social accountability through participatory planning. While legal frameworks in many East Asian countries support local empowerment and promote space for citizen participation, a strategy should be in place to review, rationalize, and harmonize the laws and their implementing rules and regulations (Logolink, 2002). Organized advocacy toward this end is part of the strategy. In addition, mechanisms to hold local authorities accountable should have solid policy support.

Providing space and resources to citizen groups

Many East Asian countries continue to search for the most suitable way in the practice of participatory democracy. While democratic space has opened up a bit, some countries still find it difficult to find the best formula for citizen-government engagement. Historical, ideological, cultural, and ethnic differences often underlie these difficulties.

Cambodia, Vietnam, and Mongolia still carry the baggage of their recent conflict-ridden histories. Pockets of ideological and religious extremism in the Philippines and Indonesia make

it difficult for people to assemble and articulate their demands freely. A World Bank report observes that

> Civil society work in Cambodia is still in its formative stages because democracy is relatively new and the country has to make up for its lack of professionals, a legacy of the Khmer Rouge era. In the Philippines, the NGOs had little funding support to enable them to participate effectively in Local Development Councils, and the groups that participated in Local Development Councils did not have the skills and technical expertise needed to fulfill their mandates. Similarly, lack of funds has impaired citizens' report card projects in the Philippines. (World Bank 2005a, pp. 28-29)

The areas covered by the study show promise in the use of the participatory approach, but the activities are for the most part sporadic interventions and highly dependent on donor agency support. An issue is the perception that some donor agencies are more concerned about efficiency rather than sustainability of participatory processes and accountability mechanisms.

For the participatory approach to be widely adopted and practiced there is a need to review and, where needed, formulate appropriate national and local policies to widen the space for citizen participation, including the provision of budgetary support. An example is the inclusion of NGO and CSO representatives in the Local Development Councils of the Philippines. In India, technical support for comprehensive district planning is provided by NGOs. Networks of NGOs and CSOs at the regional and local levels may likewise advocate for and support participation and social accountability. As Edgardo and Hellman observe, "Local civil society groups may be more effective in promoting accountability if they can rely on the capacity and power deriving from their national network." (p. 251)

NGOs, CSOs, and other citizen groups—specifically those representing local communities—however, need to build their capacity in participatory planning including its facilitation and technical aspects. This is likewise true for government actors.

Enhancing capacities of social accountability key actors

Policies often become ineffective due to local misinterpretation, manipulation, and non-compliance. Policies can be effective if and when power-holders—such as administrative officials, elected representatives, and community leaders—understand the principles behind participatory planning, are committed to it, and have the capacity to facilitate the process. It is in this sense that capacity-building becomes crucial. Capacity-building is aimed at

> understanding the contexts within which participatory planning happens, planning capacities (technical, integrated, facilitating participation of various sectors), and knowing how to work in teams, lobbying and negotiating so that plans are integrated…and covers the range from re-orienting people to actual skill building. (Logolink 2002, p. 40)

The mayors of Solo City (Indonesia) and Pinabacdao (Philippines) are a rare breed of government champions who advocate for and facilitate participatory planning, and promote community monitoring in the implementation of local plans. Such a reformist stance was shaped by constant interaction with various stakeholders with whom they dialogued during exposure visits and participation in training programs.

Ensuring active participation in planning—especially from those belonging to marginalized groups—requires effective facilitation skills. Effective facilitators keep themselves grounded on the world-view and experience of participants. At the same time, they are able to organize their work and make sense of the various elements by using frameworks.

Creating a cadre of citizen leaders skilled in organizing, facilitating, educating, and mobilizing the community should be the focus of a capacity building program. For local governments, capacity building should be aimed at "developing and improving performance in four key areas; financial, capital, natural and human resource management." (Logolink 2002, p. 25)

Promoting multi-stakeholder collaboration

For participatory planning to be effective, it is important to bring together different stakeholders, specifically social accountability's two main actors: the government, on the one hand, and citizen groups, on the other hand. Ideally, these actors constructively engage each other in the process of providing the appropriate policy support for participatory planning as well as the policy environment needed for plan implementation. This kind of constructive engagement was observed in Pinabacdao through its "Municipal Learning Network".[53]

The multi-stakeholder approach has been found useful in other parts of the world. In South Africa, for example,

> "The Foundation for Contemporary Research (FCR) was requested by one municipality to carry out Integrated Development Planning (IDP)… FCR organized the IDP Forum as a forum of all stakeholders. The FCR built the capacities of the IDP Forum to negotiate with the council, particularly around the community needs that the integrated development plans would have to address and respond to." (Logolink 2002, p. 17).

The Council of Participatory Budgeting (COP) in Porto Alegre (Brazil) was hailed as a sound practice utilizing the participatory approach. The COP is a deliberative body represented by citizens and experts in the field of budgeting. "The executive drives the COP process by coordinating meetings, setting the agenda, having its departments present information before along interventions from the Councilors to seek clarifications" (Wagle & Shah, 2003, p. 2).

The collaborative and multi-stakeholder approach, while sharpening the various perspectives and interests, creates a convergence in the process and facilitates a deeper understanding of local development needs and priorities.

Facilitating fiscal devolution to local governments

People are frustrated and their confidence eroded when their real or perceived needs are not addressed. This is especially true when government gives its "seal of acceptance" by listing down the citizens' priorities in the planning document. The problem is always "lack of resources". As Wong and Guggenheim observe, "[The] pitfall of many decentralized planning processes worldwide has been the lack of resources to implement the resulting plans". In the

[53] The Municipal Learning Network of Kalahi-CIDSS in Pinabacdao was created from among the 24 *barangays* and the LGU to serve as the learning nucleus of the project. The insights and lessons arising from the experiences of the participants are generated, analyzed, and used to inform successive activities.

same breath, Wong continues: “Community Driven Development projects tackle this problem by providing finances directly from the national level to local level to implement community-identified priority projects.” (p. 259)

The development backlog in many countries in East Asia can be addressed by increasing the resources for local governments, among other things. This is easier said than done, but providing grants or untied funds directly to local government units makes it easier for them to share their local resources, with aid from NGOs, the private sector, and the local community.

This has been done in Solo City where big corporations, donor organizations, NGOs, and members of the community pitched in to support local projects. A “donors’ forum” organized by the Municipality of Pinabacdao brought in donor agencies and big business which gave or pledged additional resources for local projects. The leadership of the mayors of both localities proved instrumental in the negotiation process with resource providers. Well-prepared plan documents, developed through a participatory process, also served as come-ons to prospective donors in Cambodia. “In Cambodia, under the Rural Investment and Local Governance (RILG) Project, district integration workshops provide actors to fund projects identified through the local planning process” (Wong & Guggenheim, p. 259).

In addition to increasing the allocation of resources to local governments, it also helps if there is a reliable, predictable, and transparent expenditure management of funds. This is an area where citizen participation is most important to prevent (or at least minimize) corruption and leakages, especially in public procurement.

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PRIA Global Partnership (PGP)

A Global Initiative on Citizenship and Democracy

PRIA Global Partnership (PGP) is an initiative of PRIA to foster knowledge and relationships globally. PGP provides demand-based advisory and consulting services to advance its priority thematic areas and strategic activities. It emphasizes the value of communication to strategic actors by using web-based technology and other popular mediums accessible to the communities it works with.

PGP strengthens and nurtures partnerships across communities and countries to "make democracy work for all citizens" through:

- developing local capacities,
- harvesting and sharing innovations through research and action learning,
- organising learning processes,
- promoting multi-stakeholder engagement and convening.

The broad themes of PGP's work are:

- Democratic governance
- Participation, voice and social accountability
- Effective and empowered civil society
- Agency for gender equity
- Environmental governance

PGP's key strategic activities are:

- Policy and practice oriented research on contemporary issues.
- Trans-national action–learning initiatives in partnership with other civil society groups.
- In-country, regional, trans-regional and global policy dialogues and learning events based on empirical research and knowledge production initiatives.
- Trans-national partnership and coalition building to support policy engagement.

AFFILIATED NETWORK FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

...connecting citizens to improve governance

OUR VISION is to help improve governance by mainstreaming the Social Accountability (SAc) approach. A regional network established in 2008, ANSA-EAP cultivates the East Asia-Pacific way of doing SAc.

"Social accountability" refers to initiatives taken by citizen groups to hold government to account for its decisions and actions. It is citizen groups claiming their rightful place at the table to keep an eye on how government goes about its business. This is sometimes called "constructive engagement"—an agreement between government and citizen groups, although social accountability action does not always require it. A noticeable facet of constructive engagement is that it is always accompanied—and oftentimes even preceded—by intense political action and pressure by citizens.

ANSA-EAP promotes the monitoring by citizens of government performance and the protection of the rights and welfare of communities. It involves monitoring the quality of public service delivery and transparency of public transactions.

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